

SENATE.

WEDNESDAY, April 5, 1916.

(Legislative day of Thursday, March 30, 1916.)

The Senate reassembled at 12 o'clock meridian, on the expiration of the recess.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Secretary will call the roll.

The Secretary called the roll, and the following Senators answered to their names:

Ashurst	du Pont	Martin, Va.	Simmons
Bankhead	Gallinger	Martine, N. J.	Smith, Ga.
Beckham	Hardwick	Myers	Smoot
Borah	Hitchcock	Nelson	Sterling
Brady	Holles	Norris	Sutherland
Brandeggee	Husting	O'Gorman	Swanson
Broussard	James	Oliver	Taggart
Burleigh	Johnson, Me.	Overman	Thomas
Cañon	Johnson, S. Dak.	Page	Underwood
Chamberlain	Jones	Pittman	Vardaman
Chilton	Kenyon	Polindexter	Wadsworth
Clapp	Kern	Pomerene	Walsh
Clark, Wyo.	Lane	Ransdell	Warren
Clarke, Ark.	Lewis	Robinson	Weeks
Culberson	Lippitt	Saulsbury	Works
Cummins	Lodge	Shafroth	
Curtis	McCumber	Sheppard	
Dillingham	McLean	Sherman	

Mr. KERN. I desire to announce the unavoidable absence of the senior Senator from Florida [Mr. FLETCHER]. He is absent on official business. This announcement may stand for the day.

I wish also to announce the unavoidable absence, on account of illness, of the Senator from Arizona [Mr. SMITH]. This announcement may stand for the day.

Mr. LEWIS. I wish to announce the absence of the senior Senator from South Carolina [Mr. TILLMAN]. He has been suddenly called to his home.

Mr. CHILTON. I wish to announce for the day that my colleague [Mr. GOFF] is absent on account of illness.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Sixty-nine Senators have answered to the roll call. There is a quorum present.

SUSQUEHANNA RIVER BRIDGES.

The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate the amendments of the House of Representatives to the bill (S. 3978) to authorize the Catawissa Railroad Co., its lessees, successors, and assigns, to construct a railroad bridge across the west branch of the Susquehanna River from the borough of Milton, Northumberland County, Pa., to the borough of West Milton, Union County, Pa., which were, on page 1, line 5, to strike out "railroad" and to amend the title so as to read: "An act to authorize the Catawissa Railroad Co., its lessees, successors, and assigns, to construct a bridge across the west branch of the Susquehanna River from the borough of Milton, Northumberland County, Pa., to the borough of West Milton, Union County, Pa."

Mr. OLIVER. I move that the Senate concur in the amendments of the House.

The motion was agreed to.

The VICE PRESIDENT laid before the Senate the amendments of the House of Representatives to the bill (S. 3977) to authorize the Shamokin, Sunbury & Lewisburg Railroad Co., its lessees, successors, and assigns, to construct a railroad bridge across the Susquehanna River from the borough of Sunbury, Northumberland County, Pa., to Monroe Township, Snyder County, Pa., which were, on page 1, lines 5 and 6, to strike out "railroad" and to amend the title so as to read: "An act to authorize the Shamokin, Sunbury & Lewisburg Railroad Co., its lessees, successors, and assigns, to construct a bridge across the Susquehanna River from the borough of Sunbury, Northumberland County, Pa., to Monroe Township, Snyder County, Pa."

Mr. OLIVER. I move that the Senate concur in the amendments of the House.

The motion was agreed to.

REPORTS FROM COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC LANDS.

Mr. MYERS. I ask leave out of order to submit three reports from the Committee on Public Lands.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. President, I shall object to the reception of any further morning business than this.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection to the reception of these reports?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I do not object to these reports being received, but hereafter I shall object to the transaction of any morning business.

Mr. MYERS, from the Committee on Public Lands, to which was referred the bill (H. R. 384) to amend the act of June 23, 1910, entitled "An act providing that entrymen for homesteads within the reclamation projects may assign their entries upon satisfactory proof of residence, improvement, and cultivation for five years, the same as though said entry had been made under the original homestead act, reported it without amendment and submitted a report (No. 328) thereon.

He also, from the same committee, to which was referred the bill (S. 4025) to grant patent to certain lands to Christian Fredrickson, reported it with an amendment and submitted a report (No. 327) thereon.

He also, from the same committee, to which was referred the bill (S. 3929) validating certain applications for and entries of public lands, reported it with amendments and submitted a report (No. 326) thereon.

NATIONAL DEFENSE.

The Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, resumed the consideration of the bill (H. R. 12766) to increase the efficiency of the Military Establishment of the United States.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. The pending question before the Senate is the motion to strike out section 56 of the bill.

The VICE PRESIDENT. That is the pending question, on the motion of the Senator from Maryland [Mr. LEE].

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I understand that there are one or two Senators who desire to address themselves to this subject, but before yielding the floor for that purpose I wish to state that I have received 40 or 50 telegrams addressed to me protesting against the striking of section 56 from the bill. I ask the Secretary to read the first two of them.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and the Secretary will read as requested.

The Secretary read as follows:

NEW YORK, April 4, 1916.

Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,

The Capitol, Washington, D. C.:

The executive committee of Military Training Camps Association has watched with concern the effort to kill Federal volunteer provision. We have no axes to grind, no pay or favors to ask. All we want is a chance to serve the country in effective manner. Our policy has always been to avoid legislative activity, but in view of effort to deprive our men of chance to get training we now propose to do what we can by open and straightforward methods to prevent killing of Federal volunteer section. We have sent telegraphic protests to all Senators and asked some of our members to wire you their views in order to assist you. Wish to be guided by your views; if you have suggestion as to what we can do to help your legislation, please notify immediately.

GRENVILLE CLARK,
Secretary, 31 Nassau Street.

NEW YORK, N. Y., April 4, 1916.

Hon. G. E. CHAMBERLAIN,

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.:

On behalf of Military Training Camps Association of the United States, of 4,200 men from all sections who have attended Federal training camps and representing also not less than 30,000 citizens who will attend this year's camps, at a cost of \$2,000,000 to themselves, we earnestly protest against attempt to defeat section 56, Senate military bill. This section, without impairing National Guard, will make available for service of Nation tens of thousands who under no circumstances can be made available under a National Guard system.

MILITARY TRAINING CAMPS ASSOCIATION EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I simply present the balance of the telegrams and ask that they be printed in the RECORD without having them read.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there objection? The Chair hears none.

The telegrams are as follows:

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.

Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,

Washington, D. C.:

As a member of last year's Plattsburg camp and as a member of this State's National Guard I urge you to use every effort to protect our country by extending the Plattsburg idea.

J. I. B. VAIL,
350 West Fifty-eighth Street.

MOUNT VERNON, N. Y., April 5, 1916.

Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,

Chairman Senate Committee on Military Affairs,

Washington, D. C.:

Please see that section 56 of Federal reserve bill is not defeated.

A. C. EMMEL.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.

Hon. GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,

Washington, D. C.:

Strongly urge passage of section 56, preparedness bill.

ERNEST E. WHEELER.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 In my opinion every possible effort should be made to prevent section 56 of the Senate bill being in any way amended. I earnestly hope that your efforts to pass this section will be successful.

JOHN T. PRATT.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 Permit me in the strongest manner to urge upon you the passage of the Federal reserve plan in section 56 of the Army bill.
 FREDERICK DREW BOND,
 15 Broad Street, New York City.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Hon. GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 Strenuously protest against attempt to defeat Federal reserve plan embodied in section 56 of the Senate, and emphatically urge the passage of this section.

G. E. GRAFMULLER.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 Have just learned that there is danger that the Federal reserve plan embodied in section 56 of the Senate bill may be defeated. The idea embodied in this section was put in practice in a small but very successful way at Plattsburg last year. It would be a great pity to discourage this first and only tangible effort to awaken the country to the need for preparedness. A great many other people will join me in thanking you for any effort you can make to prevent the defeat of this measure.

W. A. CHADBOURNE,
 14 Wall Street, New York City.
 PHILADELPHIA, Pa., April 5, 1916.

Hon. GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 Strongly protest against attempt to defeat Federal reserve plan embodied in section 56, Senate bill, and urge passage of this section.

L. F. PARSLEY.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 Emphatically protest against attempt to defeat section 56 of Senate military bill.

P. E. ADAMS.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Hon. GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 Protest most indignantly against defeat of Federal reserve plan, section 56. Will do more than almost anything else to democratize the United States and protect it from enemies within as well as without.

FREDERICK TREVOR HILL.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 I earnestly urge your support of the Federal reserve plan as set forth in section 56 of the Senate bill. I urge this as a citizen of military age anxious to train for and be enrolled in a Federal reserve.

DAVID DOWS,
 120 Broadway.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 Respectfully urge you to make every effort to defeat the attempt to kill section 56, Senate bill for national defense.

DE WITT MILHAUSER.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 I greatly oppose the attempt to defeat the Federal reserve plan embodied in section 56 of the Senate bill, and emphatically urge the passage of this bill.

LORIS R. POTTER,
 1 Liberty Street, New York City.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 Strongly urge passage of section 56, Senate bill.

H. E. MONTGOMERY, 2D.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 Respectfully urge you to make every effort to defeat the attempt to kill section 56, Senate bill for national defense.

GORDON MACDONALD,
 Morristown, N. J.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Hon. GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 We vigorously protest against any attempt to defeat Federal reserve plan embodied section 56, Senate bill, and emphatically urge passage of this section.

JAS. M. GIFFORD,
 ALFRED P. W. SEAMAN,
 CHARLES B. HOBBS,
 JOHN D. FEARHAKE.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Hon. GEORGE CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 Believe section 56 of proposed bill of vital importance to military policy of country.

TRUMAN SMITH.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 Emphatically urge passage of section 56 of your Senate bill.

W. W. METCALF.

NEW YORK, N. Y., April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 Please note that as a citizen of New York I protest against any attempt to defeat the Federal reserve plan embodied in section 56 of Senate bill, and I emphatically urge the passage of this section.

W. E. DOWD, Jr.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 Best interests of country demand passage section 56, Senate bill—Federal reserve plan.

SAMUEL O. KUHN.

NEW YORK, N. Y., April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 On behalf of many friends I wire you protesting against attempt to defeat Federal reserve plan—section 56. We can not urge its passage too strongly.

GEO. W. HUBBELL, Jr.

NEW YORK, N. Y., April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Committee on Military Affairs, Washington, D. C.:
 Urge protest against defeat section 56, Senate bill—Federal reserve plan—and emphatically urge passage of that section.

EDWIN DE T. BETCHELL.

LAKEWOOD, N. J., April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 As member Military Training Camps Association emphatically protest against attempt to defeat Federal reserve plan in section 56, Senate bill. Urge passage of bill.

Sergt. W. G. SCHAUFFLER, Jr.

NEW YORK, N. Y., April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 I am informed that section 56 of Senate bill authorizing Federal volunteers is seriously threatened. It is the one redeeming feature of the bill. The country will not forget its friends in the black days that are surely coming.

ABEL C. THOMAS.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 Undersigned militiaman protests against attempt to defeat Federal reserve plan, section 56, Senate bill. Most valuable provision of Army legislation.

JOHN FINE.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Senator CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 I protest emphatically against attempt to defeat section 56 of Federal reserve plan and urge passage of section.

LAMONT DOMINCK,
 49 Wall Street.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 I strongly protest against attempt to defeat the Federal reserve plan embodied in section 56 of Senate bill and emphatically urge passage of this section.

GEO. DE K. GILER,
 New York City.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 Use every influence to pass Senate bill, especially section 56, dealing with the Federal reserve plan.

B. M. VANCE.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 I protest against attempt to defeat Federal reserve plan, section 56, Senate bill. Urge passage.

SCHUYLER M. MEYER.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 I wish to protest against the attempt to defeat the Federal reserve plan embodied in section 56 of the Senate bill and strongly urge its passage.

EDW. SHIPPEN.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 I strongly protest against the attempt to defeat the Federal reserve plan embodied in section 56 of Senate bill and emphatically urge passage of this section.
 P. E. WOOD,
New York City.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 Emphatically urge passage of Federal reserve plan, section 56, Senate bill.
 DAVID FOX.

RIDGEWOOD, N. J., April 5, 1916.
 GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 Protest against attempt to defeat Federal reserve plan, section 56.
 R. N. WILCOX.

NEW YORK, N. Y., April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 Protest vigorously against attempt to defeat Federal reserve plan in section 56. Emphatically urge passage of this section especially.
 N. A. MIDDLETON.

NEW YORK, N. Y., April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 Strongly protest against attempt to defeat Federal reserve plan, section 56.
 R. CHOLMELEY JONES.

MONTCLAIR, N. J., April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 I protest against any attempt to defeat the Federal reserve plans embodied in section 56 of the Senate bill and also urge passage of this section.
 DAVID M. WESSON.

NEW YORK, N. Y., April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 Am heartily in favor with Federal reserve plan embodied in section 56 of Senate bill, and emphatically urge its passage.
 RICHARD DERBY,
116 East Seventy-ninth.

EAST ORANGE, N. J., April 5, 1916.
 Hon. GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 I emphatically protest against proposed defeat of Federal reserve plan embodied in section 56, Senate bill.
 C. S. FINCH.

PHILADELPHIA, PA., April 5, 1916.
 Hon. G. E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 Surely you have received sufficient protests against the attempt to defeat the Federal reserve plan as embodied in section 56 of the Senate bill to insure your urging the passage of this section with present urgent demand for preparedness. Surely you gentlemen will pass this vital piece of legislation.
 C. E. BERTIE.

PHILADELPHIA, PA., April 5, 1916.
 Hon. GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 A Federal reserve and training camps enabled under Senate bill, section 56, are measures of first consequence. As a student of this subject who attended the business men's camp at Plattsburg, I vigorously protest against their threatened elimination from the bill.
 WALTER L. SHEPARD.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Hon. GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 People of this section strongly approve Federal reserve plan (Senate bill, section 56), and condemn attempt to defeat it.
 WM. MONTAGUE GEE, Jr.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Senator G. E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 Please support section 56 of Chamberlain Army bill, giving President power to organize Federal volunteer camps in time of peace. Have attended Plattsburg camp personally, and believe it the greatest system ever devised for military instruction in a short period of time.
 PERCY H. STEWART.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Hon. GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 Urge passage of Federal reserve plan in section 56 of Senate military bill. A national system of training camps is essential.
 WM. D. STIGEN.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Senator G. E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 Earnestly urge passage of section 56 of Senate bill embodying Federal reserve plan.
 V. WORTHINGTON.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Senator G. E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 Would respectfully urge you to make every effort to defeat the attempt to kill section 56, Senate bill for national defense.
 EDWIN A. SEASONGOOD.
 GEO. C. HAAS.
 ALEX. AMEND.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Hon. GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 I protest against elimination or alteration of section 56 of Senate bill.
 C. H. WILMERDING, Jr.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Senator G. E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 I most strongly urge passage of section 56, Senate bill, embodying Federal reserve of volunteers and emphatically protest against attempt to defeat this plan.
 H. B. CLARK,
New Canaan, Conn.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Senator G. E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 Earnestly urge passage of section 56 of Senate bill, providing for Federal reserve plan.
 L. R. KING.

NEW YORK, N. Y., April 5, 1916.
 Hon. G. E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 Last year over 3,000 men at their own expense took a course of training at Plattsburg camps. At present rate of enrollment there will be 30,000 this year, assuring in advance successful results from passage of section 56 of Senate bill under consideration. It is of vital importance that section 56 be retained in bill and passed.
 SNOWDEN A. FAHNESTOCK,
14 East Seventy-sixth Street, New York.

PHILADELPHIA, PA., April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEO. E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 As a member of the first training regiment and strong believer in Federal reserve plan, section 56, Senate bill, I protest against effort being made to defeat this plan, and beg to urge most earnestly your efforts to forward passage of this section.
 Respectfully,
 C. F. HUSTON MILLER.

PHILADELPHIA, PA., April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEO. E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 I protest against attempt to defeat Federal reserve plan, section 56, Senate bill. Emphatically urge its passage.
 WARNER E. DORAN.

NEW YORK, N. Y., April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEO. E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 Urge passage of Federal reserve plan in section 56 of Senate military bill. A national system of training camps is essential.
 ALFRED ROELKER, Jr.

NEW HAVEN, CONN., April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEO. E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 As a citizen intensely in favor of military preparedness and as a member of the Plattsburg contingent, I hereby protest against any attempt to defeat the Federal reserve plan embodied in section 56 of Senate bill and emphatically urge its passage.
 D. C. SMYTH.

NEW YORK, N. Y., April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEO. E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 Section 56, regarding organization of Federal volunteers, most important. Expect you will vote for it.
 B. MEREDITH LANGSAFF.

NEW YORK, N. Y., April 5, 1916.
 Hon. GEO. E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 Urge passage of section 56 in Senate preparedness bill.
 ARTHUR WOODS.

NEW YORK, N. Y., April 5, 1916.
 Senator G. E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 I protest against the attempt to defeat the Federal reserve plan embodied in section 56 of the Senate bill. I urge the passage of this section.
 OLIVER ISBLIN.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 Section 56, Federal reserve plan, gives patriotism outlet. Enact it.
 CLARENCE A. PERRY.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 I most strongly urge passage section 56, Senate bill, embodying Federal reserve of volunteers, and emphatically protest against attempt to defeat this plan.

FRANCIS M. WELD,
Huntington, Long Island.

PHILADELPHIA, PA., April 5, 1916.
 Hon. GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 I emphatically urge passage of section 56 of Senate Army reserve bill.

HAZLETON MIRKIL, Jr.

PHILADELPHIA, PA., April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 Please protest emphatically against attempt to defeat Federal reserve plan embodied in section 56, Senate bill, and insist passage this session.

LAWRENCE J. MORRIS.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 Emphatically urge passage of section 56 of Senate military bill, calling for a Federal reserve.

JAMES JACKSON HIGGINSON.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Hon. GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 As a Spanish War veteran and ex-member of the National Guard and a Plattsburg Camp man, as well as a citizen with the welfare of the Commonwealth very much at heart, may I respectfully protest against the attempt to defeat the Federal reserve plan embodied in section 56 of the Senate bill, and emphatically urge the passage of this section?

HENRY W. BULL.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
*Chairman Senate Military Affairs Committee,
 The Capitol, Washington, D. C.:*
 Thousands of live Americans are expecting the chance of entering the Federal volunteers, who will be embittered if denied and who will not join a federalized militia, for obvious reasons. Won't you give these Americans a run for their white alley? If this administration won't, the next will.

ALBERT F. NATHAN,
55 Liberty Street, New York.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
The Capitol, Washington, D. C.:
 I wish through you to protest against the attempt to defeat section 56 of the Senate bill for national defense.

PHILIP J. ROOSEVELT,
Corporal, Company B, First Training Regiment.

NEW YORK, N. Y., April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
*Chairman Senate Military Affairs Committee,
 Washington, D. C.:*
 I protest against the attempt to defeat the Federal reserve plan embodied in section 56 of the Senate bill and urge the passage of this section.

KENNETH P. BUDD.

NEW YORK, N. Y., April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
*Chairman Senate Military Affairs Committee,
 Washington, D. C.:*
 Wish to protest against attempt to defeat Federal reserve plan embodied in section 56 of Senate bill. Strongly urge passage of this section.

PAYNE WILLIAMSON,
601 West Thirty-third Street.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEO. E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 We believe defeat of Federal reserve plan embodied in section 56 of Senate bill will be disastrous to the country, and strongly urge its passage.

J. M. TOWNSEND, Jr.
 J. C. THORNTON.

NEWARK, N. J., April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEO. E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Senate Military Committee, Washington, D. C.:
 Am anxious to have section 56 enacted. Hope you try hard for it.

DR. A. L. BOYER,
Fifty-second Avenue.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
*Chairman Senate Military Affairs Committee,
 Washington, D. C.:*
 I most strongly urge passage of section 56 of Senate bill embodying Federal reserve of volunteers, and emphatically protest against attempt to defeat this plan.

W. J. K. VANSTON,
14 Glenide Road, South Orange, N. J.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEO. E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:
 I respectfully urge upon you the necessity of approving section 56 in the Senate bill on military organization now under consideration. I feel very strongly about this.

J. A. RIPLEY.

NEW YORK, N. Y., April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEO. E. CHAMBERLAIN,
*Chairman Senate Military Affairs Committee,
 Washington, D. C.:*
 The defeat of section 56 of the Senate bill, dealing with the Federal reserve plan, will undoubtedly do much to destroy public confidence in the policies of your committee as well as in the administration. I urge you to use your influence to have this section approved.

J. W. TAUSSIG.

NEW YORK, N. Y., April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
*Chairman Senate Military Affairs Committee,
 Washington, D. C.:*
 I hereby protest against the attempt to defeat the Federal reserve plan embodied in section 56 of the Senate bill, and urge you to use every effort to have this section passed by the present Congress.

EDWARD H. LITTLE.

PHILADELPHIA, PA., April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Capitol, Washington, D. C.:
 Believe Federal reserve plan embodied in section 56 of Senate bill most important, and vigorously protest against any attempt to defeat it.

WILLIAM J. CLOTHIER.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEO. E. CHAMBERLAIN,
The Capitol, Washington, D. C.:
 I most strongly urge passage of section 56, Senate bill, embodying Federal reserve of volunteers, and emphatically protest against attempt to defeat this plan.

E. F. GRANT TAFF,
40 East Park Street, East Orange, N. J.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
*Chairman of Senate Military Affairs Committee,
 The Capitol, Washington, D. C.:*
 Urge enactment of legislation to continue training camps on Plattsburg plan.

GUSTAVE R. THOMPSON.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
The Capitol, Washington, D. C.:
 I most strongly urge passage of section 56, Senate bill, embodying Federal reserve of volunteers, and emphatically protest against attempt to defeat this plan.

ROBERT H. BRADLEY,
New Canaan, Conn.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEO. E. CHAMBERLAIN,
*Chairman of Senate Military Affairs Committee,
 The Capitol, Washington, D. C.:*
 I most strongly urge passage of section 56, Senate bill, embodying Federal reserve of volunteers, and emphatically protest against attempt to defeat this plan.

HAROLD T. WHITE,
President Bedford Rifle Club, Bedford, N. Y.

PHILADELPHIA, PA., April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
*Chairman of Senate Military Affairs Committee,
 Washington, D. C.:*

The defeat of Federal reserve plan, as embodied in section 56 of the Senate bill, will be a sad blow to true Americanism. We ask your assistance in the passage of the Federal reserve plan.

S. L. KENT.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Senator G. E. CHAMBERLAIN,
The Capitol, Washington, D. C.:
 I protest against attempt to defeat Federal reserve plan embodied in section 56 of Senate bill, and strongly urge the passage of this section. The dominant party will be held strictly accountable for failure to provide for adequate defense.

CHARLES D. ROBINSON,
Member American Society of Electrical Engineers.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.
 Hon. GEO. E. CHAMBERLAIN,
*Chairman Senate Military Affairs Committee,
 Capitol, Washington, D. C.:*
 Gravest alarm over attack on section 56 of Senate bill providing Federal reserve. Strongly urge enactment of this provision.

ELIHU ROOT, Jr.

PHILADELPHIA, PA., April 5, 1916.
 Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
The Capitol, Washington, D. C.:
 I emphatically urge the passage of the Federal reserve plan embodied in section 56 of the Senate bill and protest against the attempt to defeat it.

EDWIN N. BENSON, Jr.

PRINCETON, N. J., April 5, 1916.

GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Chairman of Senate Military Affairs Committee,
Capitol, Washington, D. C.:

Understand that an attempt is being made to defeat section 56 of the Army bill, and, believing firmly that this section is necessary for the proper protection of the country, I urge you to use all your power for its passage.

WM. C. VANDEWATER.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.

Hon. GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:

I strongly urge you to use your influence to secure approval of section 56, in regard to Plattsburg camps. Personal experience convinces me that they are a sound factor making for national defense.

FRANCIS W. AYMAR.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.

Senator G. E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:

Am greatly interested in seeing section 56 of Senate military affairs bill preserved unchanged. Hope you will save it.

E. S. BENEDICT.

PHILADELPHIA, PA., April 5, 1916.

Hon. G. E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:

Having taken one voluntary course of military training at Plattsburg and contemplating other courses, I respectfully protest against the defeat of the Federal reserve plan embodied in section 56 of the Senate bill, and urge its passage.

WM. H. HOLLAR, JR.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:

Personally and as representative numerous friends, emphatically protest against any attempt to defeat Federal reserve plan in your bill. Funds will be spent by myself and associates at the next election to defeat those voting against the Federal reserve plan.

CLARENCE FAHNESTOCK.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.

Senator G. E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:

Assured of your interest in the matter, I protest against the attempt to defeat the Federal reserve plan in section 56 of the Senate bill, and strongly urge its passage.

H. R. SHURTLEFF.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:

Can not too emphatically urge the passage of the Federal reserve plan in your bill. We can promise concerted action at the polls against its opponents, and promise you our determined assistance.

MCCOSKY BUTT,
Brigadier General, New York.

BRISTOL, PA., April 5, 1916.

Senator GEO. E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:

Section 56 of Senate bill vitally important. Please urge passage.

HUGH B. EASBURN.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.

Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:

Hope your committee succeeds in securing passage of section 56 of Senate bill. Consider that elimination of this section would be a national calamity.

ARTHUR P. MCKINSTRY.

PHILADELPHIA, PA., April 5, 1916.

Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:

I protest against the attempt to defeat the Federal reserve plan embodied in section 56 of Senate bill, and urge the passage of this section.

WELSH STRAWBRIDGE PENNA.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.

Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:

Urge the retention of section 56 for organizing volunteers in peace times.

HOWARD M. INGHAM.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.

Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:

I emphatically protest against attempt to defeat Federal reserve plan in section 56 of Senate bill, and urge passage of section 56.

ENOS THROOP GEERE.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.

Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:

We strongly protest attempt to defeat Federal reserve plan, section 56, Senate bill.

FRED R. SEARS.
JOSEPH W. BURDEN.
GERALDIN L. REDMOND.
HENRY K. HARDON.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.

Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:

We protest against legislation inimical to Plattsburg camps.
DONALD C. STRACHAN.
ION C. HOLM.

PHILADELPHIA, PA., April 5, 1916.

Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:

Protest against attempt to defeat Federal reserve plan, section 56, Senate bill, and emphatically urge passage thereof.

R. W. BARRATT.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.

Senator GEORGE E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:

I wish to enter my protest against the attempt to defeat the Federal reserve plan embodied in section 56 of the Senate bill, and emphatically urge the passage of this section.

W. L. RIGHTER,
52 William Street, New York City.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.

Senator GEO. E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:

I wish to enter my protest against the attempt to defeat the Federal reserve plan embodied in section 56 of the Senate bill, and emphatically urge the passage of this section.

D. THOMAS MOORE,
52 William Street, New York City.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.

Senator G. E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:

Urge passage of section 56 of Senate bill, Federal reserve plan.
DAVID WILSON,
New York City.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.

Senator GEO. E. CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:

I earnestly urge you to give fullest support to Federal reserve plan embodied in section 56 of the Senate bill, and to secure its passage.

W. R. MAY,
121 West Thirty-eighth Street, New York.

NEW YORK, April 5, 1916.

Senator CHAMBERLAIN,
Washington, D. C.:

Hope that you will use your best efforts to pass section 56 of the Senate Army bill.

CHARLES D. MILLER.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. President, I have received about 150 additional telegrams in favor of retaining section 56 in the bill besides those which I have already had inserted in the RECORD. I shall not ask that these additional telegrams be printed in the RECORD, but I desire to call the attention of the Senate to the fact.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Mr. President, before we vote on the pending motion to strike out this important section of the military bill I want to call the attention of the Senate to some thoughts which have occurred to me.

There is no part of the bill which was more carefully considered by the Committee on Military Affairs than this particular section. It was before the committee for a number of days and received the most careful consideration of the members, and then, without a dissenting vote, your committee recommended this section to the Senate.

I mention this fact, and I bring it before the Senate, because it seems to me we are in danger here of overriding if not ignoring the very carefully considered decisions which our committees reach. If this had been a divided decision, or if it had been a matter which had not been carefully considered, I would not feel like appealing to Members of the Senate now to view this provision with favor.

Mr. HARDWICK. Will the Senator yield to me for a moment?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. But it stands here to-day as a strong recommendation of the committee without a dissenting vote, after the most careful and painstaking investigation. I yield to the Senator from Georgia.

Mr. HARDWICK. I want to ask the Senator if he does not draw a distinction about matters of this sort along this line? If the committee's recommendation dealt with matters of detail, information on which could rest solely with members of the committee, or more with members of the committee because of their investigation of the subject, the matter might occupy the plane the Senator suggests; but when the proposition is merely the suggestion of a plan that one Senator can understand about as well as another, whether he is on the committee or not, what difference does it make whether the Senators who happen to be on the committee favor a plan involving that principle or not, except that they

are just so many Members of the Senate? In other words, does it involve any particular investigation of detail or any knowledge of detail or any information that one Senator can not obtain and does not possess as well as another Senator?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Mr. President, I am generally able to agree with my friend from Georgia, but it seems to me that in this particular case he makes a serious error.

This is not a trifle, it is true. It is a very important matter. It involves a great principle. It involves a great controversy. Now, upon that great principle, in the face of that great controversy, after careful consideration your committee has reported without a dissenting voice. I say this not because I think the Senate ought always to accept the recommendation of committees. Far from it. I occasionally myself have filed dissenting opinions; but I am speaking of the fact that this unanimous recommendation at least comes to the Senate with a presumption which entitles it to favorable consideration.

Mr. HARDWICK. The Senator did file a minority report on this very bill, did he not, generally opposed to the bill?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. I filed minority views as to one or two provisions of the bill. As a whole I commended it. On the provisions to which I excepted the committee was divided; but I am now talking about a matter in which there was no dissenting opinion in the committee, and of which there was careful consideration.

But, Mr. President, this much is only by way of introduction to what I desire to say. I mention it so as to give the presumption of excellence and favor to this recommendation before I speak of its merits.

Mr. CLAPP. If the Senator will pardon me, I should like to ask him one or two questions, not in any captious spirit but to ascertain, if I can, what section 56 means as construed by the Senator?

In the first place, I ask the Senator if he is satisfied that under the language of section 56 and existing laws in case there was a call to arms in excess of the Regular Army, that call would have to be first made upon the National Guard or whether it could be first made upon the men who would avail themselves of whatever there is in section 56?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Mr. President, I do not want to go into a discussion of the details of section 56 at this time, because we have first to decide whether it is to remain in the bill in any form; but I assume that the emergency to which the Senator refers would probably result under the existing law in first calling for the National Guard except in a condition such as we are now confronted with in the case of Mexico, where the National Guard would be impossible.

Mr. President, the point I wish to make is this—

Mr. CLAPP. If the Senator will pardon me, it does seem to me the first thing for us to determine, in voting for or against this section, is, What does it provide for?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Mr. President, I must decline to yield on that point, because I want to confine myself to the question whether or not this section should be stricken from the bill.

Mr. CLAPP. Regardless of what it is?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. If it is retained in the bill, then any amendment the Senator may propose will be considered at the proper time in the discussion of the details of the section; but now the great question before the Senate is, Shall Congress provide a Federal reserve back of the Regular Army, or shall it leave the country without any Federal reserve, dependent entirely upon a State militia, concerning the availability of which and concerning the possibility of the federalizing of which there is the gravest doubt?

Mr. SMITH of Georgia. Mr. President, will the Senator allow me to ask him a question?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Yes.

Mr. SMITH of Georgia. Does not the Senator's bill provide for a large Federal reserve from the men who have served two years in the Regular Army?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. It does, Mr. President; and I am glad of it; but it is yet an experiment whether there will be any Federal reserve from that source and of that character. We do not yet know whether we can enlist the number of men necessary to enlarge the Army. We have now been calling for 20,000 men to enter the service on account of the Mexican difficulty, and in 16 days throughout the country, in all the recruiting offices combined, we have only been able to recruit 3,200 men. We do not know, even if we pass this bill, whether we shall be able to enlist in the Army anything like the number of men for which the bill calls; and even if they do enlist, it will be a number of years before enough men will pass from active service to the reserve to make it a body of any particular size. After it is in successful operation and a considerable reserve is created it will even then not be large enough to satisfy this

country. This country, which I believe is opposed to a large standing army, is in favor of the largest possible reserve of men in civil life, drawn from all possible sources—from the militia, from the standing army, and from the source provided for in this section.

Mr. LEE of Maryland. Mr. President—

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Nebraska yield to the Senator from Maryland?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. I yield to the Senator from Maryland.

Mr. LEE of Maryland. I should like to ask the Senator whether there is not really an uncertainty not only as to the reserve, but as to the existence of a first line, and whether, there being uncertainty as to the existence of a first line, it is not a great deal better to apply the powers and the money of Congress to the organizing, arming, and disciplining the great military force that is in sight, consisting of 134,000 militia, than to speculate in these other directions?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Mr. President, I will say in answer to that, that the committee has done that thing. There is almost nothing that has been asked on behalf of the militia of the United States that has not been granted in this bill, which has been recommended by the committee. The committee has gone further toward recognizing the militia, toward paying the militia, toward equipping the militia, toward honoring the militia than has ever been done or even thought of in the past. Nevertheless, Mr. President, we know that there are in the militia certain inherent characteristics which raise difficulties and doubts. We know that the militia is in part a State body and only in part a national body; we know that it is subjected to a duality of control, and we know that some of the greatest lawyers in the country have questioned whether or not Congress has the constitutional power to Federalize the State militia. That declaration was made by the former Secretary of War, Mr. Garrison, who ranks as one of the leading lawyers of the United States, and he made that statement after most careful consideration. We have heard upon the floor here leading lawyers of the country point out the difficulties and the inherent weaknesses of Federalizing the State militia, and yet the committee has attempted it; it has presented a bill for the purpose, and I believe, although there are some elements of experimentation in the bill, that it ought to be passed; that we ought to Federalize or attempt to Federalize the State militia.

But, Mr. President, there are characteristics in the State militia that can not be lost sight of. There are many able-bodied men in the United States who will never enlist in the State militia. Go through all the industrial regions of the United States, where the labor unions are strong, and you will never get those men to enlist in the State militia. Because of the fear that the State militia can be used in strikes, because of the realization that it must be used in strikes, those men will never enlist in the State militia.

There are other reasons why men of certain classes will not enlist in the State militia. They will not do so because the regulations and the acts of Congress and the State regulations require weekly meetings of the State militia, and many men are not willing or able to give the time to drill each week. So I say that the State militia, while it affords an admirable reserve in some particulars behind the standing army, is defective in others, and we need this other Federal reserve, the volunteer army, made up of men who will not perhaps be tempted to go into the State militia, but who will be willing to enlist and drill for a month each year.

Mr. President, reference has been made to the fact that I filed minority views at the time the Military Committee made this report. I did so. I believe that the proposed increase in the standing army is excessive. I think there were some other members of the committee who agreed with me, and I believe there are Senators on the floor who agreed with me. When the time comes I shall make an effort to reduce the size of the standing army which is proposed in this bill. I think, also, the General Staff is too large and the increase in officers excessive. But, Mr. President, while I am opposed to a large standing army, while I believe we should have an army no larger than is proposed in the House bill, I am in favor of the largest possible reserve, composed of men who can remain in civil life, subject to the call of their country in case of need. You can not get that reserve too large to suit me. It is economical and it is effective, and its organization will place this country in a position of confidence which it can not feel when dependent alone for safety on the Regular Army.

Mr. HARDWICK. Mr. President—

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Nebraska yield to the Senator from Georgia?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. I yield to the Senator from Georgia.

Mr. HARDWICK. I want to ask the Senator from Nebraska this question: If those are the opinions the Senator holds in regard to this matter, why not support a proposition—which is not carried in this bill—to create the reserves in the schools from boys 18 years old and over?

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Well, Mr. President, this bill goes further in that direction than we have ever gone before. This bill provides over 300 officers for the purpose of affording young men in the schools, colleges, and universities of the country military training. Those same young men, as they are graduated from the schools and go to their homes, will naturally enter the volunteer army or the State militia. They will be the ones, in my opinion, who will enlist in the volunteer army and take the annual drill and discipline, or go into the militia and take its brief weekly drill. At least, many of them will do this; but in any event they will be available in case of need.

This bill has seized upon every possible means to provide a reserve. It proposes to develop it in the schools under the training of military officers; it proposes to develop it in the National Guard by developing the National Guard and making the appropriation for the National Guard seven times as large as it has ever been in the past. It also proposes to provide a reserve by establishing, or attempting to establish, this Federal reserve, which we call the Volunteer Army.

So, Mr. President, I desire to repeat that while I do not believe in militarism, while I am strongly opposed to a large standing army, I am in favor of making the civilian reserves behind the army as large as possible; and I sincerely hope the Senate will not repudiate the careful work of the committee by rejecting section 56.

Mr. McCUMBER. Mr. President, I understand that the pending motion before the Senate is to strike out section 56. That being the case, I wish, first, to ask a parliamentary question; and that is, whether at this time I can move a substitute for section 56?

The VICE PRESIDENT. There is not any doubt about that.

Mr. McCUMBER. Then, Mr. President, I offer the substitute for section 56 which I send to the desk, and which I ask the Secretary to read.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Secretary will read, as requested.

The SECRETARY. In lieu of section 56 as amended, it is proposed to insert the following:

SEC. 56. That the Secretary of War be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to prepare such abandoned or unoccupied military posts of the country and other places as may, in his judgment, be best fitted for use as military training camps during the months of July and August of each year, where the male high school, academy, and college students of the United States may be given military training and instruction in the same general manner as is now provided for the training of the cadets at the Military Academy at West Point during the summer months; that any male student of any high school, academy, or college in the United States shall be allowed to enter such camp by complying with such rules and regulations as the Secretary of War may promulgate, including regular company drills at stated intervals during the school year, such rules and regulations being framed to include physical, mental, and moral qualifications; and that the Secretary of War is authorized to provide transportation to and from such camps, uniforms, tents, and equipment, and all necessary facilities for the care and training in such camps of such high-school students in military tactics; and he shall detail for duty in such camps such officers of the Regular Army, including medical officers, as may be needed to provide suitable superintendence, instruction, and control of such camps; and that the Secretary of War may employ such physicians and surgeons, not connected with the military forces of the United States, as, in his judgment, may be necessary to preserve and protect the health of such students while in camp.

The said Secretary of War shall prepare all needful rules and regulations for enlistment of such high school, academy, and college students for training and for carrying out the provisions of this act: *Provided*, That all enlistments shall be voluntary and no boy under the age of 21 years shall be received without the consent of his parents or guardian.

Mr. McCUMBER. Mr. President, this provision is along the line just suggested by the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. HITCHCOCK]. Under our present system of high schools, colleges, academies, and universities we could have military training and organization in every one of them; and if there was the slightest incentive, the least encouragement given, the number of students who would join military organizations would be much greater than it is to-day. My idea has been that we could organize, beginning in our high schools and our academies and colleges, young men who would have weekly training under the instruction of competent officers, and during the vacation of their school year they would have an opportunity to have training at different convenient points in the State that would fit them for such military service as would be required for a private soldier.

Mr. NORRIS. Mr. President, I should like to ask the Senator three or four questions in regard to his amendment.

Mr. McCUMBER. I yield for a question, Mr. President.

Mr. NORRIS. From the reading of the amendment, I judge that it applies to high-school students and to university students.

Is there any provision in it that provides for the payment of the expenses of the university students to the places of encampment?

Mr. McCUMBER. Yes; there is a provision that the expenses of all the classes of students mentioned shall be paid.

Mr. NORRIS. As I caught the reading, I thought the payment of expenses applied only to high-school students.

Mr. McCUMBER. No; it is not so intended.

Mr. NORRIS. Now, I should like to ask the Senator another question. I ask, is there any power given to the Secretary of War to provide any rendezvous except at abandoned military reservations?

Mr. McCUMBER. Yes; the amendment includes "and other places," convenient places in the State.

Mr. President, I am in harmony with the views of the senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. SMITH] with reference to educational facilities being afforded to the soldiers in the Regular Army, and, as I can not discuss this amendment without discussing to a certain extent the whole question and some side issues which have been raised in connection with it, especially with reference to the attitude of the Central States, I will make my discussion rather broad, though not long.

Mr. OVERMAN. Mr. President, before the Senator begins, will he allow me to ask him one question? The amendment reads:

That the Secretary of War be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to prepare such abandoned or unoccupied military posts of the country—

Mr. McCUMBER. Yes; but before submitting the amendment I added the words "and other places."

Mr. OVERMAN. Oh.

Mr. McCUMBER. The words "other places" are included in the amendment which I offered and which has just been read. They were omitted in the original print.

Mr. OVERMAN. I was going to observe that in the South we have no abandoned or unoccupied military posts; so that the provision could hardly apply to that section of the country.

Mr. McCUMBER. I am aware of that, and the amendment has been changed to meet that exigency.

Mr. President, the science of war has progressed to such a degree that all matters of detail in army organization must be left to experts—to those whose life study and special training authorize them to speak with authority on such matters. Acknowledging my deficiency in such expert knowledge, I have refrained from expressing my views on that particular branch of the subject. But the general policy of adding materially to our standing and auxiliary army, and the sources from which the auxiliary force is to be drawn, is for Congress, and not for army experts. This calls for the exercise of legislative judgment and discretion.

Mr. President, it has been intimated, not only on this floor, but also in the eastern press of the country, that the central sections of these United States, being less liable to suffer from invasion in case of war, look with complacency on what is called our defenseless condition, and with a degree of displeasure on any increase in our Military Establishment. Mr. President, this is not true in any respect. We are one country, with one undivided interest. If there is any difference between us it is in the state of mind with which we view the subject—whether calmly or excitedly. The fear of an imminent danger naturally first affects those of the immediate vicinity of the real or supposed danger—in this case the coast sections. Their excitement surpasses that of the interior; they are more liable to exaggerate the danger, more vociferous in their demands for protection, and to that extent less liable to exercise a conservative judgment.

We all remember at the outset of the Spanish-American War the panic that seemed to seize the people of New York and other Atlantic coast cities. If the press were any indication of their mental condition, these cities were in the throes of a wild panic of fear lest Cervera's fleet should suddenly appear and destroy them. Reason was thrown to the winds, and the Government was fiercely assailed because it did not congregate all its warships at New York Harbor. And all this time Cervera's fleet was seeking every available means to get away from our well-known vastly superior naval armament. It may be that our people would have become equally excited and unreasonable if placed in the same situation. As it was, the scare tremor did affect some of them, but not many.

Now, that is our present situation. The only charge you can make against us is that we are not sufficiently scared, not sufficiently panicky, and our judgment will be deliberative.

I shall try to express what I believe to be the sentiment of the people of the interior, who give the subject serious consideration. First, let it be distinctly understood that we believe in full and ample preparedness for any eventuality; second, we are willing that this preparedness shall go beyond

what we regard as adequate. If we err, we prefer to err on the side of safety.

I shall support the Senate bill. I believe the vast majority of the people of the country would rather be long on expense than long on apprehension. They want to feel absolutely safe, and are willing to pay the cost of such tranquillity. While the bill reported is not such an increase as extremists demand, neither does it provide for such a great increase as many pacifists would have the country believe.

Our present standing army numbers 103,660. The proposed bill increases that army to 194,586. Both include Quartermaster Corps and Hospital Corps, and so forth. The actual fighting force under this bill would be about 174,500. All told, that means 1 soldier for about every 500 of population.

I certainly am as much opposed to militarism as anyone, but this proportion of military to civil population is so meager that it can not arouse the fear of militarism in any reasonable mind. With such a vast preponderance of the civil population, military sentiment and influence will be readily absorbed in the great civil activities of the country.

Mr. President, I believe the world has outlived one feature of militarism that has been responsible for most of its faults and nearly all the criticisms directed against it; that is, the non-producing standing army, that unit of society whose sole function is destruction in war and consumption in peace. There ought to be no such army in the world. Military exigencies require no such army. In my opinion, every male citizen ought to be physically and mentally capable of serving his country in time of war in some capacity.

But all the citizen needs in order to fit him for military service in the ranks is sufficient training to acquaint him with the manual of arms in the particular service to which he is assigned, marksmanship, camp fare, and camp life. He does not need years of training to meet this requirement. The portion of time expended in daily routine to meet this demand would be but little, if any, more than any student ought to take in daily exercise. The remainder of the time, outside of some routine work, ought to be given to such instruction as should fit this soldier of the standing army for his civil duties, such as should make him a self-supporting citizen whose energy should be a practical asset in time of war and add to the enrichment of his country and the happiness of his community during the longer years of peace. Whether the enlistment be for two years or three years—and in my opinion it should be no longer than necessary to fit him for military service—in consideration for the benefit bestowed upon him in giving him a civil education in connection with his military training, he should then be subject to the first call of his country in case of war so long as he is within the age limit.

Mr. President, as the real, the highest, duty of mankind is to prolong and embellish life rather than to shorten and mutilate it, so men's thoughts, efforts, and occupations should primarily be along the divers pathways of civil life, and they should devote only such portion of their energies to war instruction and training as should be necessary to preserve their civil rights, and all should share alike in both military and civil duties. There should be no private soldiers enlisted except those who are of the student age, and as rapidly as both civil and military education is completed they should be sent back into civil life with the knowledge that their few years of military service have been well expended and they are better prepared to fulfill their civil duties. That is the way that our Regular Army, 200,000 strong, in round numbers, should be recruited and kept up. With such a system of recruiting our Regular Army and changing its units we need never have any fear of the military idea, the war sentiment of the country, submerging the peace sentiment and leading us into an unnecessary conflict. The danger of militarism lies in a war organ whose units do not change and are not reabsorbed into the avenues of civil life. I agree entirely with the senior Senator from Georgia [Mr. SMITH] that in our standing army civil instruction should go hand in hand with military training. This much for the Regular Army.

How then should we provide for the Volunteer Army, that vast auxiliary upon which we must draw in case we should be engaged in a great war? We should do just what I have provided in an amendment which I have offered to this bill, and the principle of which is contained in sections 42 to 50, inclusive. The principle of my amendment is injected into the bill in that it provides, in the sections mentioned, for training camps and training of students in educational institutions, without mentioning the character of such institutions. The method of carrying these provisions into effect is left with the President.

Mr. President, I have gone further than that in my amendment, and have indicated how all of this vast student army, without any loss of the energy that should be directed to their studies, could be made a great army, constituting from 750,000 to 1,000,000, capable of performing military duties whenever the exigencies of their country demanded their services.

I believe that the bill should have gone further and provided for several camps in each State, where high-school and college students, with their organizations, could be gathered together by the Government and their expenses paid and given from two to two and a half months' camp life and training each year. Rules and regulations could be adopted which should provide for the continuation of such training at intervals, say weekly, during the school year. And this is what I hope will be the final result and outcome of these provisions of the bill.

We should, up to a proper number, to be apportioned among the several States according to their high schools, academies, and colleges, give military instruction for two or two and a half months at one or more convenient training camps in every State to such portion of high-school cadets or college students as would care to take advantage of it each year during the vacation period of such schools or colleges. This would, of course, not be compulsory. It would not need to be. I feel that 90 per cent of the parents would be gratified to have their sons secure the benefits of this kind of a vacation. The training would be of incalculable benefit to the students. One of the insidious dangers of our present-day environments, when invention has made it possible to relieve our children from labor during their school lives, is the danger of idleness during the vacation. The tireless energy of youth demands employment. More bad company and bad habits flow from this source than we are wont to consider. Such training camps would teach the boy obedience, attention to duty, regularity, and good habits. It would not only fit him for military duty, should his country ever demand his services, but it would give to the country a clean, moral, healthy, and useful citizenship, and this with no cost to the parent and with but slight cost to the Government.

But it has been asked, Why limit this to schools? Why not take anyone who might desire to take the summer drill? My first answer is that the student drill should cover at least three years; that the student of a high school, academy, or college will, in all probability, remain as a component part of his school or college in one vicinity. Second, that there is scarcely such a school in the country that does not have its military organization, its company, and its drills. These students would go in as companies, with their own organizations, inspired with the class spirit to excel in their drill work. And, third, under the system which I have suggested, an enlistment in the Regular Army would be open to those whose education had not advanced to a high-school plane, to secure vocational education at the same time they are serving their country.

Like those who had passed through the service of enlistment in the Regular Army, I would have the boys of this auxiliary army during the enlistment age subject to call in the country's need. This would give us a civil army of between 750,000 and 1,000,000 men, trained and ready at a moment's call to join the colors, but whose thoughts and inclinations would be along the lines of peaceful pursuits.

By this method of training our young citizens to meet the emergencies of war we should never violate the historical policy and sentiment of this country in the creation of a mighty military organ whose only function would be war. By thus utilizing the otherwise waste time of these students we should have in a few years an army of sufficiently trained men to meet the demands of war at a minimum of expenditure and with practically no interference with the business pursuits and no diminution of the business ambitions of our people.

Mr. President, while a certain degree of military training on the part of the private soldier is absolutely necessary, the vast changes in methods of warfare during the past few years have rendered of little practical value much of the old-style drill and manual of arms. The present war in Europe is a chemistry war. It is fought with pick and shovel, in digging trenches, burrowing under the enemies' trenches, exploding mines. It is fought with chemical fire jets, curtains of fire, asphyxiating gases, blinding gases, and long-range and powerful guns. The training I have suggested would meet the requirements of the private soldier.

On the other hand, Mr. President, if the private soldier does not require as much training as under the older systems of warfare, the officers of the Army require far greater training and military learning than ever before. All the successes scored

In this great European war on either side can be expressed in two phrases—efficient officers, long-range guns. All the failures recorded in this war can be expressed in two phrases—inefficient officers, short-range guns. This is the grand lesson of this war. To provide the greatest possible efficiency in officers and guns is the goal toward which the main efforts of this country should now be directed.

Mr. President, in a previous discussion of this preparedness question I sought to show how ill-founded was the growing fear of the danger of invasion of this country in case of war. I tried to show by what I considered conclusive evidence the remote possibility of any country attempting to invade the United States. I sought to allay unfounded fears and to direct public thought to two most important facts that seemed to have been overlooked: First, that none of this preparedness created by this legislation could be utilized if circumstances should make it necessary that we enter into conflict with any belligerent during the present European war, because it would require about five years to produce this additional war power, and this European war can not last more than two years more at the longest. Second, that if we have a war it will be a war which we will make on the other power, and such power would act on the defensive only. We would have to cross the ocean to find our enemy. At some length I sought to point out the grave difficulties and obstacles which any country across the ocean, and especially a maritime nation, would encounter in a war with us. I sought to show their far greater vulnerability and our vast advantages, and how foolhardy it would be for any nation to attempt an invasion. I had not at that time read the testimony of Gen. Miles given before the Committee on Military Affairs. Gen. Miles is one of those American citizens who won his position through his own force and competency. Those of the American people who know him have, and may well have, faith and confidence in his views on Army and Navy questions. Speaking on the question of fortifications and danger of invasion, Gen. Miles testified:

Senator FLETCHER. Speaking about fortifications, as I remember the views of some experts who testified, they held that the concrete walls and emplacements are rather a back number; that the way to place a gun now is to place it behind a sand embankment.

Gen. MILES. Ours are both, about 16 feet of solid concrete and about 30 feet of embankment in front of that. You can examine any of these fortifications and you will find that is the condition they are in. Certainly the most powerful ships of the British Navy and the French Navy have not been able to make any impression on the fortifications of the Dardanelles, although they have lost 125,000 men and expended a billion six hundred million of treasure.

Senator FLETCHER. What do you think of the plans for moving heavy guns on railroads and by motor transportation?

Gen. MILES. I do not know that we need to consider that at present. The fortifications have been selected with great care by the best engineers in the country, and constructed by the best engineers, and are in good condition for the defense of the harbors. If we were contending against a country that was fortified with permanent fortifications, then it might be necessary to construct those heavy 16-inch mortars, that have to be transported by rail and put on a concrete base, to be used to batter down fortifications. But an enemy that would undertake to invade the United States would not bring that kind of fortifications along with them, so that it has not been thought necessary to construct that kind of guns. The guns that will be placed near the Panama Canal will be very heavy, high-power guns, as good as any in the world.

Senator FLETCHER. General, perhaps you would not want to express any opinion about it; but, frankly, it seemed to me rather far-fetched and absurd that it was a feasible thing for an army to be transported across the ocean and landed on Rockaway Beach or Block Island in such a way that it could take that portion of the country and then come on down and string a 400-mile line from Chesapeake Bay to Lake Ontario. That is one of the important dangers, apparently, in the minds of some people. I would like to get your views about that, if you care to express them.

Gen. MILES. I dislike to give my views on that, as I consider it is an unreasonable and impossible proposition. That is assuming, I presume, that some enemy had transportation enough to embark 400,000 men, with 80,000 horses, with all the ammunition transportation and munitions of war required, and supplies enough to feed the men and the animals for at least 90 days, because it would be easy to burn anything within their reach, then supposing our own Navy at the bottom of the sea, it might be possible to reach our shore. The placing of an army on American soil is the last thing any European Government would attempt; it could never be reembarked. It would dissolve like the snow beneath the midday sun. Whenever it has been attempted it has resulted in disaster. Many of the French soldiers deserted in Mexico and are now citizens of the great Republic.

Senator FLETCHER. It would be impossible for those ships to carry coal enough to bring them over here and take them back, would it not?

Gen. MILES. If they could not be destroyed by the patriotism and the valor of the American people before they could send their ships back and get another load, then I would want to live in some other country.

Senator FLETCHER. That is rather my view of that situation.

Gen. MILES. But as a safeguard, as I suggested a little while ago, I think you could very wisely make a liberal appropriation for the new engines of war—that is, the aeroplanes and the submarines. If you can imagine a great fleet of transports moving slowly across the Atlantic or across the Pacific, you would not want a better target for a fleet of submarines, which could go out among them.

The testimony of Admiral Grant and many others agrees with that of Gen. Miles. Gen. Weaver declares our coast defenses

equal to the best in the world. All they need is more men to man the guns and in some instances newer and more powerful guns. President Wilson himself declares that no sensible man for a moment will believe that any foreign nation will attempt to invade us, and yet that continues to be the stock argument of the alarmists.

I am aware that this invasion scare is a potent element in overcoming the natural hostility of the country to a large standing army, and it has been developed for that purpose. This proposed legislation, Mr. President, should have rested on its true foundation. No one in this Senate anticipates that this Army is for defense of the realm. No one who has a judgment and will use it is afraid of an invasion, and by that I mean an invasion of continental United States. However, we shall need these soldiers if we ever get into a war. To-day we own the Philippine Islands. In a war with any great power we should need every one of these 200,000 men to defend those islands. How we would get them over there with no merchant marine is a question yet to be solved. We would need them if the Hawaiian Islands should be attacked. We would need them to guard Porto Rico and the Canal Zone and entrances. And, Mr. President, if we are to be sponsor for the good behavior of every Latin-American country in the Western Hemisphere, and also to guard these countries of everlasting revolutionary tendencies, assume responsibility for their misdeeds, and cover them under the protecting wing of the Monroe doctrine, we shall need this standing army of approximately 200,000 men.

We know where our vulnerable points are in case of a war, and we are providing for an army to meet the situation. With the additional coast defenses which are included in our preparedness program, long-range and powerful guns, harbor mines, submarines, scout ships, and aëros, we are invasion proof. But if we war with any other great naval country we have outlying possessions which must be guarded, and there is where we shall need these soldiers.

Mr. President, the bill reported by the Committee on Military Affairs will give us a Regular Army sufficient to cope with any condition that can arise within continental United States, and a Volunteer Army many times greater than we could possibly transport to any foreign country with all the transports we can possibly have or could purchase in event of a land war carried on far from our shores.

Mr. President, this amendment, which I introduced originally in the form of a bill, has had consideration by others than by myself. Shortly after it was introduced I received from the Secretary of the Interior a letter—which I am certain he would have no objection to having read—in which he spoke favorably of this proposition, and inclosed me a formula which is called the Wyoming system. I ask that the Secretary may read the letter and that I may insert this formula at the end of my address.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered. The Secretary read as follows:

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR,
Washington, January 25, 1916.

MY DEAR SENATOR: The Commissioner of Education has called my attention to Senate bill 3062 and has talked over with me the general principle of providing opportunity for military drill for boys in our high schools. The commissioner is of the opinion that the opportunity which this bill seeks to provide would prove attractive to many thousands of boys in the public and private high schools of the United States; that the military instruction and drill which could be given in the two vacation months would have considerable value, especially to those boys who went into camp for a second and third summer; and that the general educational results of the outdoor life and the discipline of the camp would be good. In this opinion of the commissioner I concur.

In this connection I desire to draw your attention to the accompanying plan for training high-school students which has been drafted by Lieut. E. Z. Steever, of the United States Army, which is presented in rough outline. He calls this the Wyoming plan, because it has been put into effect in the high schools of Wyoming. He is at present engaged in introducing it in the high schools in the city of Washington. He tells me that, while the system is voluntary, from 90 to 98 per cent of the students adopt it. Its foundation is to give physical and military training as a game rather than as a forced task by making the game attractive, and to work the boys in gangs, thereby calling upon the gang spirit, each gang or group being competitive with the other and disciplining itself. I have no doubt but that the States would in large part adopt some such plan if it were presented to them, and that teachers could be found in each of the high schools who could make it effective.

Cordially, yours,

FRANKLIN K. LANE.

Hon. P. J. McCUMBER,
United States Senate.

Mr. McCUMBER. Mr. President, having prepared for a more than adequate Army to defend our outlying possessions and our Monroe doctrine and to defend ourselves against invasion were that a possibility, we must give our attention to our naval power. And here again, because of so much erroneous litera-

ture on the subject, we are compelled to remove certain errors so that the public will freely comprehend the purpose of our naval preparedness.

Warships are primarily for offensive war—not for defensive war. The only sense in which they can be said to partake of defensive character is that they are supposed to go out on the sea in search of the enemy's navy and destroy it, and thereby prevent it from destroying our commerce.

In case of a war with any country having foreign ocean commerce our warships would not be hovering about our coasts. Their first purpose would be to destroy the enemy's commerce, and if the enemy had a navy too powerful for us to hazard battle with, we should try to avoid the encounter with them and seek out and destroy their unprotected merchant vessels. As no maritime nation can convey any considerable portion of its merchant fleet, we could create havoc among its merchant vessels. If the enemy's sea power was less than ours, we would do as we did in the Spanish War, first destroy their navy and render their commerce subject to our mercy.

Our coast guns, our submarines, aeroplanes, and mines will take care of our coasts. So, outside of the submarines and aeros, the purpose of our Navy is, first, to protect our commerce on the sea and destroy the commerce of the enemy; second, to convoy ships to defend our outlying possessions. And, Mr. President, to do that we should have a Navy at least the equal of that of any country we are liable to have a war with, unless that enemy has such vulnerable points of attack as would more than offset any advantage it may have in naval strength. I have shown in a previous address on the subject of general preparedness the disadvantages of Great Britain in a war with us, due to the fact that her very life depends on of her principal possession, subjecting it to our easy invasion. Though she had a navy of four times our naval power she keeping open channels of trade all over the world that her people may be clothed and fed, while we can produce everything we need in peace and war, though we were cut off entirely from the outer world. I have pointed out the proximity could not strike us a vital blow. No person who has studied the situation has ever claimed that we needed a Navy as large as that of Great Britain in order to prevent a war with her or to meet her advantageously in case such war was a possibility. Our other advantages and her other weaknesses more than offset her superiority in naval equipment.

But neither Germany, France, nor Japan has great possessions on this continent subject to our seizure, and neither is so dependent as Great Britain on ocean commerce to feed and clothe its people. We should, in my judgment, in order to be absolutely safe, have a Navy equal to any of them. While my

belief is that our far greater population and far vaster resources, our capabilities of recovery, even though at the outset of a war we might be weaker in some particulars, would of themselves deter any nation from warring with us except in self-defense, nevertheless I believe the people of this country wish this Congress to provide for a Navy able to cope with any of these three powers. And, Mr. President, that has been our policy right along. But the increase in naval power of these countries of late has been more rapid than ours, and the increase here provided enables us to overtake them and, in my judgment, surpass them, gives us a commanding position, and places us on an absolutely safe basis.

Mr. President, the committee of neither House has as yet perfected a proposed naval bill. We can, therefore, only premise what kind of a bill will be presented. In all probability it will not materially differ from the administration's naval program as recommended by the Secretary of the Navy. In order to more clearly show what this proposal is, I have prepared a table showing our present naval power and what it would be at the expiration of five years if the Secretary's program should be carried out. In the preparation of this table allowance has been made for those war vessels which must be eliminated because of age or inefficiency.

	Present number.	Number built or building in 1921.
Battleships, first line.....	17	27
Battle cruisers.....		6
Battleships, second line.....	25	25
Armored cruisers.....	10	10
Scout cruisers.....		13
Cruisers, first class.....	5	5
Cruisers, second class.....	4	3
Cruisers, third class.....	15	10
Destroyers.....	74	108
Fleet submarines.....	16	18
Coast submarines.....		157
Monitors.....	9	6
Gunboats.....	30	20
Supply ships.....	5	4
Fuel ships.....	25	15
Transports.....	6	4
Tenders to torpedo vessels.....	9	3
Special types.....	8	8
Ammunition ships.....		2

I also ask to have printed here the table prepared by the Secretary of the Navy, showing the numbers of ships of each kind to be constructed each year and their annual cost for each year from 1917 to 1921, inclusive.

	1917	1918	1919	1920	1921
Dreadnaughts.....	(2) \$15,593,000	(2) \$26,589,000	(2) \$37,600,000	(2) \$37,600,000	(2) \$37,600,000
Battle cruisers.....	(2) 11,158,000	11,921,000	(1) 17,500,000	(2) 17,118,500	(1) 23,460,500
Scout cruisers.....	(3) 6,900,000	(1) 6,350,000	(2) 10,000,000	(2) 8,650,000	(2) 10,000,000
Destroyers.....	(15) 10,500,000	(10) 16,900,000	(5) 10,000,000	(10) 10,300,000	(10) 13,600,000
Fleet submarines.....	(5) 4,425,000	(4) 5,577,500	(2) 5,437,500	(2) 4,215,000	(2) 3,400,000
Coast submarines.....	(25) 5,750,000	(15) 13,950,000	(15) 9,750,000	(15) 9,750,000	(15) 9,750,000
Gunboats.....	(2) 780,000	(1) 1,140,000	380,000		(1) 380,000
Hospital ships.....	(1) 1,250,000	1,200,000			
Ammunition ships.....				(1) 799,587	(1) 1,766,000
Fuel-oil ships.....				(1) 709,000	655,250
Repair ship.....					(1) 1,175,000
Total.....	57,003,000	84,274,750	90,767,500	89,133,087	101,786,750
For completion of ships previously authorized.....	28,369,127	20,140,000			
Total.....	85,372,127	104,422,750			
Aviation.....	2,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000
Reserve of munitions.....	8,000,000	5,000,000	5,000,000	5,000,000	2,000,000
Grand total.....	95,372,127	110,422,750	96,767,500	95,133,087	104,786,750

Grand total for 5 years, \$502,482,214.

This grand total of \$502,482,214 is for construction only. The maintenance and cost of operation will add enormously to this sum.

Notwithstanding the testimony of some of our naval experts that the dreadnaught must still remain the commanding power of the sea, I am glad to note that the Secretary advises the continuation of our old policy of two dreadnaughts yearly. The testimony of one of our experts is to the effect that Great Britain has been able to maintain the supremacy on the sea because of her dreadnaughts. How on earth this claim can be made surpasses my comprehension. There has not been a single dreadnaught engaged in a naval battle. The only engagement of large vessels of the dreadnaught or predreadnaught type was at the Dardanelles, and vessels of that type to the number of six, I believe, with their entombed victims of this colossal blunder, are at the bottom of the sea.

The only battle craft that have won renown in this war are the fleet cruisers, carrying long-range guns, and the submarines, whose toll of death and destruction is appalling. In one respect, and only in one respect, can you say that the British dreadnaught has assisted in holding this sea supremacy. Their number has possibly made it too dangerous for the German dreadnaughts to come out of their protected harbors to engage them.

But, Mr. President, because of the mines and submarines neither of these dreadnaught fleets dares come out. Within the limits of the mine-strewn, submarine-infested war zone, these dreadnaughts are practically bottled up. While I would not entirely discontinue them, I would not greatly increase them at the expense of a sufficient number of swift cruisers. The dreadnaught has not proved a success. The cruiser has demonstrated its value. We should give special attention to perfecting and increasing the efficiency of the under-sea craft—not that I do

not hate them as I do a rattlesnake, but every day demonstrates their awful destructiveness to the enemy's commerce and war vessels. So long as "war is hell"—and hell is adopted as the means of settling international differences or of satisfying national greed—these diabolical instrumentalities will be used. I may, however, harbor a hope, Mr. President, that the very hideousness of these many new instrumentalities of death will be a potent influence in bringing nations to a proper sense of their responsibility to humanity.

And right here, Mr. President, I shall have the temerity to suggest to our naval experts another thing to which I think they have not given sufficient attention; and here again we must draw our lesson from this war. I can not but believe that if the same attention had been given to means of defense against an enemy's war craft that is given to offense against it, we would not behold a great nation almost helpless against mine, submarine, and aero. Against the submarine the genius of invention seems almost hopelessly paralyzed and only weakly responsive to the other dangers. Here is a field for American genius and originality. Why it is that no simple device which could be attached to a vessel to find a mine and explode it before the vessel proper has reached it, has not been invented? This is a question to which we have had no satisfactory answer. But the most important of all, and one which demands most speedy solution, is some proper method of coping with this undersea destroyer, either by such contrivance as shall shield the vessel from its torpedo or one that shall make the life of the undersea craft more hazardous than that of its present helpless victims.

If this is not done, Mr. President, the commerce of no nation in the world can long survive these rapidly increasing serpents of the sea, whose unseen stroke is death, and against which no vigilance can guard. The number of vessels already destroyed by submarines is greater than the number of merchant vessels in the marine of most of the maritime nations of the world.

While the bomb-dropping aëros have so far proven of no great value, because of inaccuracy of aim at heights of safety to themselves, there is a field of wonderful possibilities for these new war machines. With telescopic apparatus and instruments which will measure and make accurate allowance for reflection of different strata of atmosphere, with divers densities, I have no doubt that in a short time these machines will be so perfected that they will be able to drop bombs with accurate aim from distances beyond the range of any gun that could be developed.

There should be a bureau in the War Department whose sole purpose should be to originate and develop new devices of both defensive and offensive utility; and this should be open to the competitive efforts of all our people.

Mr. President, the false philosophy that preparedness for war is the best assurance of peace is responsible for most of the wars of the world. It is a philosophy which is never wholly true and is nearly always absolutely untrue. If each of two great nations were equal in military and naval strength, equal in wealth and resources to carry on a war, the fact of such equal preparedness and capacity might cause each to pause before proclaiming a war against the other that must result in the annihilation of one or both. But as those conditions of equality can never obtain in the world, as no two nations are ever just equal in preparedness or resources, such ever-increasing preparation is not only a menace to every weaker nation on the globe, but is also an assurance of a final outbreak between the greater and better-prepared nations. The present European war is due to the preparedness of nations for war, not their unpreparedness. What is really meant by this philosophy is that a country whose position in the world is such as to invite the attack of another prepared nation coveting its territory or desiring to supplant it in the commercial world, the preparedness of the former might operate to prevent the latter from attempting to carry into effect its hostile designs. Within this rather narrow limitation, preparedness for war is an assurance of peace. On the other hand, it might just as logically be stated that unpreparedness for war is an absolute assurance of peace; for if neither nation is prepared, then surely there could be no serious war; and in this enlightened age of the world, before either could get ready for modern warfare, before they could change unpreparedness into preparedness, in nine hundred and ninety-nine cases out of a thousand, the incident which would cause war would be amicably settled. The human mind working normally recognizes justice, and given time for anger and resentment to subside, an offending nation or people will make amends for every international wrong.

But here, Mr. President, we are confronted by a condition, not a theory. Other great nations are armed. One of them

at least believes we have slighted it in our immigration laws; others may be jealous of our prominence and dominating influence on this side of the ocean. These known facts, considered in connection with our outlying possessions, some of them on the far side of the Pacific, our necessity to protect such possessions, including the Panama Canal, our assertion of the Monroe doctrine may well, it seems to me, require the construction and maintenance of the program proposed by the administration. While I do not believe there is a single nation in the world that would be likely to declare war upon us, though we should follow a less rapid program of development for our Navy, with the present trend of world conditions, I am not so certain that this country, in order to maintain what it believes to be its rights, might not be the one to declare the war. And no matter by whom the war was declared, the war measures would be both offensive and defensive in character, and would require the same naval power to protect our possessions as though the other nation made the declaration.

Mr. President, I am one of those optimists who believe that there will come a time when great wars will cease, and this notwithstanding the fact that one of the most horrible wars of all the ages is now drenching the world with blood. It may be that the world needed such an experience, such an impressive object lesson as this to make it realize its duty to provide against war rather than to provide for war.

We have no more reason, Mr. President, for asserting to-day that war will continue to devastate the earth than there was reason to assert 5,000 years ago that the right of the individual to settle his own disputes with his neighbor in his own way, to rob him if he saw fit, to murder him if he resisted, would continue forever.

The same process of evolution, carrying with it the same sense of public justice, which caused the organization of communities, then tribes, and then nations, to compel the individual who could wield the biggest club to lay down that ancient weapon of warfare and submit his dispute to the judgment of his fellow beings—the same evolution that evolved from this meager beginning the great courts of to-day, which settle every human grievance and punish every crime, is an unending immortal force ever working toward nobler ideals and higher standards of rights and duties. And, Mr. President, this process of evolution will not be completed until the same sense of justice which culminated in the protection of the weaker individual against the stronger shall be enlarged and broadened until finally it shall bring every nation of the world within its scope and settle every international difference.

The people of the world to-day, even those engaged in the conflict, are asking questions which will not down, which will not be settled until the answer satisfies the world conscience. They are asking why nations, which are but collections of individuals, should not abide by the same code of morals in their international relations that they by law enforce upon their citizens in their individual relations. Why should any nation be exempt from that moral code which governs its people? Why should not each and every nation submit itself to the rule that it rob no other nation of its liberty or its territory; that it murder not its people; that it deprive it not of its natural rights; that it take no advantage of its weakness; and why should not all the great nations of the world unite to check international wrong and compel international right, just as the people unite to check individual wrong and enforce individual right?

The present obstacle to an international agreement is the everlasting fear on the part of every great nation that it might in some slight degree surrender its sovereignty. Every individual, in order to secure protection, is compelled to surrender a moiety of his sovereignty; but in that security he is able to achieve a thousandfold more than would be possible without the surrender and the corresponding security. What is true of the individual is equally true of the nation.

Let us pause for a moment to consider what could be done for humanity, what blessings could be purchased with the more than a hundred billion of expense and damage that this war has cost to the present time; let us stop to contemplate what even the expenditure for war in time of peace means to the world. The most beautiful structure ever conceived by the mind, or wrought by the hands of man, one of those which have filled the world with pride and wonder as the achievements of the human intellect, costs less than one battleship. A mighty structure that will continue for a thousand years, a glory to the world, would cost less than one hour's expense of this brutal conflict which is to-day bringing the blush of shame to the cheek of every thinking man and woman in the world.

Think of the energy, now a slave of the god of war, which could be released and brought into service for the happiness

and comfort of humanity if the nations of the world would unite to form an international compact, signed by every great nation of the world, prescribing the rights, duties, and obligations of nations, endowing a court for the settlement of every international question and the enforcement of the decrees of the court by the combined power of all the nations against the offending one.

Mr. President, we have reached a stage where nations, great and small alike, should unite to compel international arbitration. And this bloody conflict, covering more than three-fourths of the world, reddening every stream with slaughter and filling the earth with misery and want and death, brings this truth home to us with ever-increasing force.

For the benefits which we and the remainder of the world might secure we could well afford to surrender that little moiety of our sovereignty which would be required to bring us into the family of law-abiding, law-enforcing, right-living nations of the world.

Mr. President, as this Nation was the first which gave to the world the fullest realization of human liberty, that first united and gave under a great written constitution the idea of liberty governed by law, that first demonstrated the success of popular government, that first made itself the haven for all the oppressed peoples of the world, it may well be its crowning glory and achievement to inaugurate and bring all countries of the earth into one family, ruled by one great code of international law, such as the enlightened justice and judgment of the world shall approve—a code that shall pledge the physical power of the whole to uphold its standard of ethics and enforce its provisions against any whose ambitions may override the rules enacted for the common good.

If one one-hundredth part of the energies of the nations of the world which are directed toward the destruction of each other could be utilized in providing means for the protection of each other, war would be no more.

APPENDIX.

There are instances where "militarism" accompanies "preparedness." There are also instances where "militarism" does not accompany "preparedness." Switzerland is surrounded by warring nations, yet Switzerland, nonmilitaristic, is "prepared," and at "peace." The Swiss train all boys of high-school age, and with that idea we should find no fault, at least those of us who believe in "a nation with arms," not "a nation in arms."

It may surprise you to know that in the schools of a Western State there has been developed in the past four or five years, quite apart from any idea of "militarism," a State-wide "citizenship training," that embraces some of the elements of "preparedness."

CITIZENSHIP TRAINING IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS.

THE WYOMING PLAN.

Good citizenship is the fundamental principle underlying the Wyoming State-wide high-school cadet system.

The Wyoming school authorities hold:

1. That good citizenship involves a willingness on the part of each able-bodied youth to make such effort and sacrifice as will prepare him for the obligations and duties of citizenship.
2. That this preparation embraces the following:
 - (a) National defense preparation.
 - (b) Moral preparation.
 - (c) Civic preparation.
 - (d) Educational preparation.

(a) National defense preparation.

It is unsound to assume that any system of training its adolescent youth will remove from the Nation the responsibility of training its manhood.

Trained youth can not take the place of trained manhood.

A thorough preliminary national defense training of its adolescent youth has been recognized in primitive as well as modern civilizations as the first step in the greater training of the tribe or nation.

With the civilized as with the primitive youth, the "game" is the medium of all successful training. "Competition" is to youth what "security" is to old age.

According to the Wyoming plan, all cadets are organized into competition units.

Leaders take "turnabouts" choosing the members of their units, so that each unit (squad, platoon, or company) is made up of an equal number of strong, medium, and weak lads.

After final choosing up, these units are fixed and can not be added to nor subtracted from.

All the work is done by competition units.

There are: Wall-scaling units, troop-leadership units, scholarship units, field-firing units, camp-and-field units.

Sponsors are elected from the girls in the mixed schools and assigned to the competition units. The sponsors are in every sense members of the cadet organization. They attend all drills, are the leaders in all social functions, and while they do not actually drill, the young ladies are entitled to and receive such individual rewards as may be won by their units.

Medals, ribbons, and distinctive marks on the uniform are given each member of a winning unit, the sponsor, of course, included. The sponsor idea obtains in some schools only. It is rather an addition and is not a fundamental part of the plan.

Each cadet organization is based on the voluntary-enlistment plan. Form for joining the cadet class is inclosed herewith. The cadet classes are held generally during, and not after, school hours, and credit toward graduation is awarded therefor.

Cadet tournaments are held during the school year between the different high schools, to which the public is invited, and at which

are held the wall-scaling, field-firing, and camp and field troop leadership competition "games."

From the Wyoming experience is deduced the following theoretical system of training, adapted to the adolescent American youth. Local conditions will necessarily modify the application of this so-called theoretical system of training, but the general principles on which it is based will obtain in any part of the United States:

1. Cut the school year into separate, short, intensive training periods, working up through preliminary to final competition dates, with the fixed competition units.

2. September 1 to December 31, wall-scaling calisthenic events; minimum of drill, maximum of body building.

3. January 1 to February 28, troop leadership competitions, 12-inch Gettysburg map.

4. January 1 to February 28, minimum of drill, maximum of gallery practice, group competitions.

5. March 1 to May 15, minimum of drill, maximum of range practice and field-firing competitions.

6. May 16 to June 15, minimum of drill, maximum of camp and field problems, competitive between high schools.

7. All through school year, commencing in the spring and running through the following fall and winter, take boys into camp each week end and harden them to the rigors of camp life. Teach them sanitation, cooking, woodcraft, plains craft, simple field engineering, castrametation, sketching, scouting, patrolling, the service of security and information, and qualify them as guides in their own immediate surrounding territory.

8. Summer camp, immediately after closing of school, 14 days.

The modified Washington High School cadet season, January to June, 1916, follows: (Please note that this does not represent a normal-school year, but shows a transition from an old antiquated, close-order drill system to the new Wyoming system.)

RIFLE PRACTICE.

January and February: Drill period—close-order drill, 20 minutes; gallery practice, 70 minutes.

March 1 to April 15: Outdoor shooting period, target ranges, Congress Heights and Winthrop.

April 17 to 24: Field-firing competition between platoons of each company to determine marksmanship platoons. Decorations awarded to winning marksmanship platoons.

April 27 to May 1: Interhigh-school competitions between marksmanship platoons to determine winners of semifinal decorations.

May 6: Competition between four semifinalist platoons, competitive field firing for championship of the District of Columbia.

TROOP LEADERSHIP COMPETITIONS (12-INCH GETTYSBURG MAP).

Friday and Saturday evenings, from January 7 to 29, inclusive, lectures on patrolling and battalion combat exercises.

February 4 to 12: Preliminary troop leadership game competitions between Eastern, Western, Central, McKinley, and Business High Schools. Winners to receive first preliminary ribbon.

February 18 to 19: Semifinal competition. Winners awarded semifinal ribbons.

February 25: Final troop leadership competition. Winners to be awarded District of Columbia championship.

Review on White Lot about May 25.

Competitive drill about June 15, preceded by try-outs in different high schools the week immediately preceding competition.

WEEK-END CAMPS.

Officers and faculty advisors, April 7 to 15.

Selected cadets, April 21 to 29.

All cadets, May 12 to June 3.

SUMMER CAMP.

June 23 to July 6, inclusive.

DISCUSSION OF COURSE IN MILITARY PREPARATION.

The organization that puts into effect the "game" idea differs fundamentally from the modern American athletic system. The cadet leaders choose up each in turn, so that each fixed competition unit represents a certain proportion of strong, of medium, and of weak lads.

In football and basket ball and track only the few physically fit take part. In this system each squad represents an average. Every boy takes part. There is as much "in it" for the weak as for the strong, and the survival of the fittest units—whether they be squads, platoons, or companies—insures the competition spirit.

(b) Moral preparation.

A nation stands or falls, succeeds or fails, just in proportion to the high-mindedness, cleanliness, and manliness of each succeeding generation of men. There can be no question but that the single standard of morality is the only one worthy of a great people, and history shows countless examples of nations that have fallen when they departed therefrom.

In the Wyoming system the fundamental factor is the competition between equally balanced units. The individuals are forced by public opinion amongst their fellows to go into training, and this training means clean thinking and nonsmoking. It is shown conclusively in the various competitions that those clean morally are the surest kind of winners. Smoking and immoral practices must go. Under the fiercest kind of competition the adolescent youth is better enabled to negotiate that difficult period of life.

It is only necessary to point to the Casper, Wyo., third squad, all of them boys, no one of whom had ever smoked, and a squad that successively lowered the world's wall-scaling record from 10 seconds to 8 seconds, 7½ seconds, to 6½ seconds, to 6½ seconds. This squad was not a picked squad—just an average squad.

The single standard of morality is taught frankly and fearlessly and efficiently to each and every individual in the Wyoming cadet organization.

(c) Civic preparation.

It is almost a fundamental principle of a military organization that the leader should not be voted for. The Wyoming system is not intended to make soldiers. The Wyoming schoolmasters are of the opinion that soldiers can only be made from mature manhood, and that the preparation of the adolescent youth should be such that when he reaches manhood he may then be made into the highest type of citizen. Hence the objection to voting for leaders, perfectly valid in a military organization, does not obtain in the cadet organization.

The cadet leaders are chosen at the beginning of each year by vote of the older cadets. The leaders are selected on merit, very much as

the captain of the football team is selected for his merit. It has been noticeable that on the first organization boy politics elect a certain percentage of popular and inefficient leaders, whose very inefficiency is a terrible punishment to the members of their own units. The stress of competition soon brings out the real leaders. The cadets never repeat their mistake. After the first election they insure a very wise and careful selection of leaders.

This civic lesson can not be wholly lost to them in years to come, when they are called upon, as citizens, to elect leaders of their city, county, State, and National Governments.

(d) Educational preparation.

This subject is a matter wholly within the province of school boards and schoolmasters, and embraces the entire school curriculum, which obviously can not be discussed here.

However, the cadet organizations have their competition scholarship squads made up of equal numbers of good, medium, and poor scholars. These compete for group scholarship honors.

Mr. BRANDEGEE. Mr. President, the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. McCUMBER] alluded, in the early part of his speech, to the value of an expert's opinions on this highly technical question of the military art. As is well known, one of the most celebrated American military experts was Maj. Gen. Emory Upton. I have here a short pamphlet entitled "Epitome of Upton's Military Policy of the United States," which was an unpublished manuscript by Gen. Upton, found after his death and rescued by ex-Secretary Root. It has been printed by the War Department for the War College, I believe. I think it is a very important document, and I ask unanimous consent that it may be printed in the RECORD.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it will be so ordered.

The matter referred to is as follows:

EPITOME OF UPTON'S MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.

PREFACE.

"Bvt. Maj. Gen. Emory Upton, United States Army, who graduated from West Point in 1860, and who became while almost a boy one of the most distinguished officers of the Civil War, rising to the command of a division of cavalry, left upon his death, in 1881, an unpublished manuscript bearing upon our military history and military policy. In 1904 the Secretary of War, Hon. Elihu Root, rescued this work from oblivion and directed its publication at the Government Printing Office, Washington, under the title 'The Military Policy of the United States,' for the reason that—

"The work exhibits the results of such thorough and discriminating research, such a valuable marshaling of the facts of our military history, and such sound and ably reasoned conclusions drawn from those facts as to the defects and needs of our military system, that it clearly ought to be made available for the study of our officers and for the information of all who may be charged with shaping our military policy in the future.

"A preface was written by Secretary Root, who, after showing that many of the mistaken practices pointed out by Gen. Upton in 1880 had been abandoned by 1904, went on to say:

"One other field of great importance remains to be covered by legislation; that is, the establishment of an adequate system for raising, training, and officering the volunteer forces of the future. It is of first importance that the distinction between volunteers and militia shall be observed, and that, while the selection of officers of militia shall continue, as it must under the Constitution, to rest with the States, following such mode of selection as they prefer, the officers of the volunteer forces of the United States shall hold their commissions from the President, who is to command them during the war for which they are called out, and shall look to their Commander in Chief for the promotion which should reward their good conduct, as well as for such discipline as they may merit; and that an adequate system shall be provided for the selection of such officers and the direct recruitment of the enlisted volunteer force under the authority of the National Government. In this work will be found collected the facts, which it is sometimes unpleasant to consider, but which ought not to be ignored, supporting this view.

"In order to bring to the attention of our citizens the facts of our military history as bearing upon the present problem of national preparedness for defense, the following extracts from Gen. Upton's work are republished.

"H. L. SCOTT,

"Secretary of War *ad interim*."

"FEBRUARY 18, 1916."

THE MILITARY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.
INTRODUCTION.

"Shortly after the disastrous battle of Camden Washington wrote to the President of Congress 'What we need is a good army, not a large one.' Unfortunately for the country, the object sought by this assertion, so thoroughly in harmony with our cherished institutions, has only been partially attained in time of peace.

"Our military policy, or, as many would affirm, our want of it, has now been tested during more than a century. It has been tried in foreign, domestic, and Indian wars, and while military men, from painful experience, are united as to its defects and dangers, our final success in each conflict has so

blinded the popular mind as to induce the belief that as a nation we are invincible.

"History records our triumph in the Revolution, in the War of 1812, in the Florida War, in the Mexican War, and in the great rebellion, and as nearly all of these wars were largely begun by militia and volunteers, the conviction has been produced that with us a Regular Army is not a necessity.

"In relating the events of these wars the historian has generally limited himself to describing the battles that have been fought, without seeking to investigate the delays and disasters by which they have been prolonged till, in nearly every instance, the national resources have been exhausted.

"All of our wars have been prolonged for want of judicious and economical preparation.

"To such volunteers as enlisted for the period of the Mexican War, and particularly for two and three years during the War of the Rebellion, with whom it is my pride to have served and to whom I owe all of my advancement in the service, I but express the opinion of all military men in testifying that their excellence was due not to the fact that they were volunteers, but to the more important fact that their long term of service enabled them to become in the highest sense regulars in drill, discipline, and courage.

"Up to the Mexican War there was little that was glorious in our military history.

"In the Revolution the Continentals or Regulars often displayed a valor deserving of victory, but which was snatched away by the misconduct of undisciplined troops.

"In the War of 1812 the discipline and victories of the Navy alone saved the country from dishonor. On the land the historian of the Army was glad to slur over needless disasters, to dwell on the heroism in the open field displayed by the Regulars at Chippewa and Lundys Lane. The Mexican War was a succession of victories. The Volunteers as well as the Regulars were disciplined troops.

"The Rebellion began with the defeat at Bull Run, but a multitude of subsequent battles again proved that the valor of disciplined American troops, be they Regulars or Volunteers, can not be excelled by the best armies of Europe.

"In order that this work may not be misjudged, we will first indicate to the reader the chief causes of weakness of our present system, and next will outline the system which ought to replace it.

"The causes of the weakness are as follows:

"First. The employment of militia and undisciplined troops commanded by generals and officers utterly ignorant of the military art.

"Second. Short enlistments, from three months to three years, instead of for or during the war.

"Third. Reliance upon voluntary enlistments instead of voluntary enlistments coupled with conscription.

"Fourth. The intrusion of the States in military affairs and the consequent waging of all our wars on the theory that we are a confederacy instead of a nation.

"Fifth. Confusing Volunteers with militia and surrendering to the States the right to commission officers of Volunteers the same as officers of militia.

"Sixth. The bounty—a national consequence of voluntary enlistments.

"Seventh. The failure to appreciate military education and to distribute trained officers as battalion, regimental, and higher commanders in our volunteer armies.

"Eighth. The want of territorial recruitment and regimental depots.

"Ninth. The want of postgraduate schools to educate our officers in strategy and the higher principles of the art of war.

"Tenth. The assumption of command by the Secretary of War.

"The main features of the proposed system are as follows:

"In time of peace and war the military forces of the country to consist of—

"The Regular Army;

"The National Volunteers; and

"The Militia.

"The Regular Army in time of peace to be organized on the expansive principle and in proportion to the population, not to exceed 1,000 in 1,000,000.

"The National Volunteers to be officered and supported by the Government, to be organized on the expansive principle, and to consist in time of peace of 1 battalion of 200 men to each congressional district.

"The militia to be supported exclusively by the States, and as a last resort to be used only as intended by the Constitution, namely, to execute the laws, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.

"Military resources are one thing and military strength another. For military resistance the strength of a government is the power it can wield on the field of battle. In the War of 1812 the strength of the Government at the Battle of Bladensburg was measured by 6,000 militia, at Bull Run it was measured by 35,000 of the same kind of troops. In one case the Capital fell into the hands of the enemy, while in the other our existence as a nation possibly depended upon the irresolution and supineness of a band of insurgents. At Gettysburg the wave of rebellion was resisted by 80,000 veteran troops; had we trusted to the same number of militia the Capital would have been captured and the Government hopelessly destroyed. Unable to suppress in two years an insurrection which culminated in a great rebellion, the representatives of the people were forced to adopt conscription and to concentrate in the hands of the President all the war powers granted by the Constitution, whereupon weakness gave place to strength, but at the expense of a needless sacrifice of life and property.

"If in time of rebellion our own Government grew more despotic as it grew stronger, it is not to be inferred that there is any necessary connection between despotism and military strength.

"Twenty thousand Regular troops at Bull Run would have routed the insurgents, settled the question of military resistance, and relieved us from the pain and suspense of four years of war.

"E. U.

"FORT MONROE, VA., 1880.

THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR. BATTLE OF BUNKER HILL.

"As early as the year 1774 several of the colonies began to make preparations for an armed conflict with Great Britain. In Massachusetts, although the royal governor had countermanded the summons convening the colonial assembly, the members came together and resolved themselves into a provincial congress, with John Hancock as president.

"The Massachusetts troops were organized by giving a captain's commission to anyone who could enroll a company of 50 men, and the commission of a colonel to anyone who could get together 10 such companies.

"This system, under which ability to raise men is made the sole qualification for command, deserves particular attention, since it has come down to our own times and has been employed, without exception, at the beginning of all our wars.

"Immediately after the engagement of Lexington, militia and minute men from all the New England colonies—individually, by company, and by regiment—began to assemble near Boston, and these half-organized troops, which only by courtesy recognized a common commander, fought, on the 17th of June, the Battle of Bunker Hill.

"In the three assaults upon the redoubt and breastworks held by the Americans the British lost 1,054 men, including 85 officers, an aggregate in killed and wounded almost one-half greater than that sustained in any subsequent battle of the war; the casualties on the American side, 490 in all, mostly took place while the troops were retreating across Charlestown Neck, after the capture of the works.

"The lesson to be learned from this remarkable conflict is the value of trained officers in command of raw troops, a lesson which neither our statesmen nor our historians have ever been able to appreciate.

"In the battle, conspicuous above all for bravery, were Prescott, Putnam, Stark, Knowlton, and many other officers who had received a military training in the French and Indian Wars.

"The troops in the redoubt and behind the rail breastworks were rendered calm and determined by the coolness, judgment, and resolution of their commanders.

"Without pausing to discover the secret of the defense of Bunker Hill, the mistaken conviction seized the public mind that the militia were invincible and that patriotism was the sole qualification for a soldier's calling—a fallacy which paralyzed the military legislation of the Revolution and constantly jeopardized our liberties by inducing the political leaders of the time to rely too confidently upon raw and undisciplined levies.

CONTINENTAL ARMY MILITIA.

"Soon after the troops began to arrive in the neighborhood of Boston it became evident that the contest would extend beyond New England, and that to prevent the dissolution of the force already gathered together it must be adopted as a Continental Army.

"Recognizing the importance of having a body of men to reinforce the Regular Army in times of emergency, Congress recommended 'to the inhabitants of the United English Colonies that all able-bodied, effective men, between 16 and 50 years of age, be formed into companies of militia. That the officers of each company be chosen by the respective companies.'

"The militia could only be called out with the consent of the State legislatures. They were specially intended for home defense and to make head against forays of the enemy in the absence of the Regular or Continental Army.

"The slow increase of the Continental Army shows that Congress was committed to a dual Military Establishment, one class of troops being Continental or Regular, the other militia. In the former the gradual extension of enlistments to two and three years enabled the men to acquire the discipline which ultimately proved the salvation of our cause. The natural disposition of men to seek the easiest and shortest service prompted them to enlist in the militia in preference to the Continental regiments, and thus the only force which could be depended upon to cope with the British, both offensively and defensively, was always from one-third to one-half below its prescribed strength.

JEALOUSY OF A STANDING ARMY.

"During the Revolution the intense feeling of opposition to a standing army almost wrought the ruin of our cause. Since then this feeling has been diligently kept up and has formulated itself into the maxim that 'A standing army is dangerous to liberty.' Without considering the distinction between the hirelings of a despot and an army of citizens created by the representatives of a free people, it has been and still is the policy of our Government to maintain an inexpensive Military Establishment and upon the smallest possible basis. To such an extent has this been carried that our Regular Army has not been able to meet even the ordinary exigencies of times of peace.

"The annals of the Revolution show conclusively that for the lack of a well-disciplined Regular Army, enlisted for the war, we were continually forced to call out double and treble the number of raw troops. So far as the Army is concerned, it is believed that a careful study of the history of this period will convince the candid inquirer that our liberties can be imperiled only by a policy which eschews well-grounded principles of military organization and compels us in time of danger to call forth vast bodies of men, when smaller numbers should suffice.

"Washington writes:

"The jealousy of a standing army and the evils to be apprehended from one are remote and, in my judgment, situated and circumstanced as we are, not at all to be dreaded; but the consequence of wanting one, according to my ideas formed from the present view of things, is certain and inevitable ruin. For if I was called upon to declare upon oath whether the militia had been most serviceable or hurtful, upon the whole I should subscribe to the latter.

BOUNTY.

"The bounty system was a child of the Revolution, called into being when the colonies denied Congress the power of compelling enlistments. It grew steadily during the long struggle for independence, only to reach its full maturity in our late Civil War.

"Any system of voluntary enlistments necessarily places a Government in the position of a suppliant, and when patriotism and popular enthusiasm no longer suffice to fill the ranks resort must be had to the vicious practice of giving bounties to recruits. Even at that early day the letters of Washington refer to the bad effects of this practice.

"While Congress was thus bidding for men the States began to bid in opposition, both for recruits for the Continental Army and for the militia. October 30 Congress asked Maryland to reconsider its resolution giving a \$10 colonial bounty in lieu of 100 acres of land, assigning as a reason that other soldiers would demand the same bounty and require Congress to grant it.

"While the patriotism of a people, taken collectively, is quite equal to keeping up a prolonged struggle for liberty, cost what it may, we find that the patriotism of the individual utterly fails to induce him to undergo, voluntarily, the hardships and dangers of war.

"As the war went on the increasing difficulty of procuring recruits necessitated the payment of larger bounties. In addition to the bounty of clothing, of land, and of money already voted, Congress, on the 23d of January, 1779, authorized Washington to grant a bounty not exceeding \$200 to each able-bodied veteran or new recruit who would reenlist or enlist for the war.

STRENGTH OF THE ARMY, 1777.

"At the very beginning of the year our lack of military wisdom had reduced Washington's regular soldiers to less than a thousand, while the enemy had more than 20,000 veterans in and about New York. It is needless to point out how much the fortunes of our cause at that junction were furthered by the inaction of the English commander.

"The number of men raised for the Continental Army was less than one-half of the quota, while the total number of troops fell short of the number furnished in 1776 by 20,931.

"This decline in military strength must be attributed to the system of enlistments rather than to any want of determination to carry on the war.

WASHINGTON'S CRITICISM OF THE MILITIA.

"Further confirmed in his convictions by the defeat of Gen. Gates, Washington wrote to the President of Congress on the 15th of September, 1780:

"I am happy to find that the last disaster in Carolina has not been so great as its first features indicated. This event, however, adds itself to many others to exemplify the necessity of an army and the fatal consequences of depending on militia. Regular troops alone are equal to the exigencies of modern war, as well for defense as offense, and whenever a substitute is attempted it must prove illusory and ruinous. No militia will ever acquire the habits necessary to resist a regular force. Even those nearest to the seat of war are only valuable as light troops to be scattered in the woods and harass rather than do serious injury to the enemy. The firmness requisite for the real business of fighting is only to be attained by a constant course of discipline and service. I have never yet been witness to a single instance that can justify a different opinion, and it is most earnestly to be wished that the liberties of America may no longer be trusted, in any material degree, to so precarious a dependence. I can not but remark that it gives me pain to find the measures pursuing at the southward still turn upon accumulating large bodies of militia, instead of once for all making a decided effort to have a permanent force. In my ideas of the true system of war at the southward, the object ought to be to have a good army rather than a large one.

STRENGTH OF THE ARMY.

"The number of soldiers furnished by the several States to the Continental Army during the war was as follows:

Massachusetts	67,907
Connecticut	31,939
Virginia	26,678
Pennsylvania	25,678
New York	17,781
Maryland	13,912
New Hampshire	12,497
New Jersey	10,726
North Carolina	7,263
South Carolina	6,417
Rhode Island	5,908
Georgia	2,679
Delaware	2,386
Total	231,771

"The number of militia furnished by the several States during the war, according to the returns and conjectural estimates of the Secretary of War, was 164,087.

"Total Continentals and militia furnished during the war, 395,858.

"If we examine these figures, it will appear that in 1776, when the aggregate number of our troops reached 89,600, the British had but 20,121, and that from that time our number steadily dwindled down to 29,340 in 1781, while the British strength constantly increased till it reached 42,075.

"Looking back at the whole Revolutionary struggle, notwithstanding our employment from first to last of almost 400,000 men, we find that but two military events had a direct bearing upon the expulsion of the British. One of these was the capture of Burgoyne; the other that of Cornwallis—an event which was only made possible by the cooperation of a French army and a French fleet.

PENSIONS.

"The statistics of the Revolution, already quoted, show that our extravagance called out from first to last more than 395,000 men, all of whom, under our pension system, had a claim upon the gratitude of the Nation. The greatest number of troops that Congress was able to raise during any one year of the war (1776) was 89,600 men, of whom 42,700 were militia.

"The largest force, Continental and militia, that Washington could lead to battle at any one time was less than 17,000, while at the Battles of Trenton and Princeton, during the time of our greatest peril, his effective strength was less than 4,000.

"If we now turn from the reports of the small armies in the field to the report of the Commissioner of Pensions, it will be found that a feeble military policy gave us an army of pensioners numbering 95,753, of whom 39,287 were widows.

"Unlike the dissolving armies in the field, the pension rolls for 1875 show that 92 years after the close of the war the army of the Revolutionary pensioners was still represented by 379 widows. The last Revolutionary soldier expired in 1869, 86 years after the close of the struggle.

"The total amount paid to Revolutionary pensioners up to June 30, 1876, for periods of service of six months and over was \$46,177,845.44.

"To widows of soldiers who served six months the total amount paid to June 30, 1876, was \$19,668,795.70.

"If to these figures be added \$15,000,000, the approximate amount paid to invalids disabled in the Revolution, the total of pensions, in round numbers, amounts to \$80,000,000.

EXPENSE OF THE WAR.

"Exclusive of bounties paid by individuals, towns, and counties, and of provisions seized by impressment for the use of the Army, the debt of Congress and of the States at the close of the war amounted to \$170,000,000. If to this sum be added the

two hundred millions of currency, for the redemption of which the faith of the Continental Congress and the Confederation was twice solemnly pledged, the debt actually incurred by the war amounted to \$370,000,000.

"Small as this sum may appear when compared with the Rebellion war debt of three thousand millions, investigation will show that the indebtedness of the Revolution was greater in proportion to population.

"Assuming three millions as the total number of our people at the beginning of the Revolution, the whole cost of this war to each man, woman, and child was \$123, while, upon the basis of a population of 31,000,000 in 1861, the total cost per capita of the War of the Rebellion was but \$96.

"Both of these wars were waged upon the same extravagant system, and so long as we blindly adhere to it similar pecuniary sacrifices are sure to follow in the train of every great military contest of the future.

LESSONS FROM THE REVOLUTION.

"The lessons to be drawn from the Revolution are:

"That in proportion as the General Government gives the States authority to arm and equip troops it lessens the military strength of the whole people and correspondingly increases the national expenditures.

"That when a nation attempts to combat disciplined troops with raw levies it must maintain an army of at least twice the size of that of the enemy, and even then have no guaranty of success.

"That neither voluntary enlistments based on patriotism nor the bounty can be relied upon to supply men for the army during a prolonged war.

"That the draft, connected or not connected with voluntary enlistments and bounties, is the only sure reliance of a Government in time of war.

"That short enlistments are destructive to discipline, constantly expose an army to disaster, and inevitably prolong war, with all its attendant dangers and expenses.

"That short enlistments at the beginning of a war tend to disgust men with the service and force the Government to resort either to bounties or the draft.

"That regular troops, engaged for the war, are the only safe reliance of a Government, and are in every point of view the best and most economical.

"That when a nation at war relies upon a system of regulars and volunteers, or regulars and militia, the men, in the absence of compulsion or very strong inducements, will invariably enlist in the organizations most lax in discipline.

"That troops become reliable only in proportion as they are disciplined; that discipline is the fruit of long training and can not be attained without the existence of a good corps of officers.

"That the insufficiency of numbers to counterbalance a lack of discipline should convince us that our true policy, both in peace and war, as Washington puts it, 'ought to be to have a good army rather than a large one.'

BETWEEN THE REVOLUTION AND THE WAR OF 1812.

MILITIA ACT, 1792.

"The constant Indian troubles and the possibility of a conflict with foreign powers brought about a widespread conviction that the national defense could not be neglected. The statesmen then turned to the militia and tried to satisfy public opinion by establishing a uniform militia throughout the United States.

"The first section of the act laid down the truly democratic doctrine that every able-bodied male citizen owed military service to his country and likewise provided for a system of enrollment and territorial recruiting. These two features of the law were so praiseworthy and of such vital importance that all its other defects may be overlooked. Again and again the Continental Army was on the verge of dissolution because both of these principles were ignored, and to their subsequent neglect we shall be able to trace most of the weakness and waste which still characterize our wars.

"Aside, however, from the military defects of the system, it is only when we examine it from the standpoint of the taxpayer that its fundamental errors became fully apparent. For 1 National Army were substituted 13 or more State armies. In place of having a small but efficient force of regulars, supported by indirect taxation, the citizens of each State were called upon to pay over their hard-earned dollars to maintain undisciplined bodies of militia, totally ignorant of the first principles of the military art. Even had all the States, with patriotic regard for the welfare of the whole country, maintained their quotas of militia during the long intervals of peace they would have been

at the expense of a large military force for the benefit of the General Government, and that, too, without compensation, except in time of war. If, on the contrary, as has since happened, certain States should fail to keep up a militia, the burden of their shortcomings would be unjustly borne by the remainder.

"View it in whatever light we may, the conversion of the militia into an army of the first line, as designed by the law, was a wild and impracticable scheme. This class of our citizen soldiers will never take the place wisely reserved for them by the framers of the Constitution until it becomes our settled policy to call them out as a last resort only, in case of actual invasion.

"Although this army, of which Washington was appointed commander in chief, with the rank of lieutenant general, was never called into service, the provisions of the law show that the country proposed to rely upon Regulars and Volunteers, instead of upon Regulars and militia, and that so far as the Regulars were concerned, the mistake of short enlistments was not to be repeated.

PROVISIONAL ARMY, 1798-99.

"Hail this force been raised, the Regular Army would have numbered about 40,000 men.

"Thus, in addition to the Regular Army, the military legislation of that period, profiting by our Revolutionary experience, had provided a body of National Volunteers, officered by the President, to take the place of the State militia troops. Had this organization come down to the beginning of the late war, it is more than probable that in one-half the time 300,000 men would have done the work finally accomplished by little less than 3,000,000.

THE WAR OF 1812.

CAUSE OF THE FAILURE OF THE CAMPAIGN.

"The failures and disasters of the campaign can be plainly traced to the pernicious military organization established by the act of 1792. It will be remembered that, instead of relying upon a small but well-disciplined Regular Establishment, this law intrusted the safety and honor of the Nation to armies of militia supported by the several States during the long intervals of peace. These armies, though elaborately organized on paper into battalions, brigades, and divisions, were only to receive such drill and instruction as the various States might think proper.

"Though an alarming defect became apparent at the very outset of the war, when the unlooked-for opposition of two State governors deprived the President of the control of a portion of the militia, and was thus able to paralyze for the time being the military power of their respective States and defeat the plans of the General Government, it remained for the fruitless campaigns at the West and the cruel and disheartening experiences at Queenstown to fully reveal the utter worthlessness of the new system.

"Led to a certain extent by those who had gained actual military experience during the Revolution or on the Indian frontier, endowed with perhaps more average intelligence and education than the Regulars; supplied with the same food, clothing, and equipments as they were, the marked inferiority of the militia troops was largely due to the brief period of their service, to the conviction that their time would soon be 'out,' and that others must take their places and bear the burdens and dangers of the contest.

"While their pay was no greater than that of other troops, when we deduct the time lost in coming and going, as well as that consumed in partial and unavailing instruction, their real cost to the country was infinitely greater.

THE CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON.

"No better example can be given of the mismanagement of this war than the measures adopted by the President and his Cabinet for the defense of the Capital in 1814.

"Although a British fleet with about 3,000 troops on board had been hovering along the shores of the Chesapeake for nearly a year, it was not until June that the attention of the administration was first turned to the danger that confronted the Capital. It was then found by the Secretary of War that the Regular troops in the fifth military district, embracing the States of Maryland and Virginia, numbered but 2,208 men. These troops, composed to a large extent of recruits, were dispersed at various points along the Chesapeake from Baltimore to Norfolk, and were therefore incapable of speedy concentration.

"The downfall of Napoleon having made it possible for Great Britain to reinforce her troops in America, July 2 the tenth military district was created, consisting of the State of

Maryland, the District of Columbia, and that part of Virginia lying between the Rappahannock and the Potomac.

"The command of the new district was devolved upon Gen. Winder.

"July 12 and 17 Gen. Winder was authorized 'in case of actual or menaced invasion of the district under his command' to call out the entire Maryland quota of 6,000, as also 2,000 from Virginia, 2,000 from the District of Columbia, and 5,000 from Pennsylvania—in all, 15,000 men.

"On the 24th of August the army, described by its commander as 'suddenly assembled, without organization,' or discipline, or officers of the least knowledge of service, numbered 5,401, of whom 400 were Regulars, 600 marines, and 200 sailors, the remainder being Volunteers and militia.

"The same day the army thus hastily assembled was as hastily formed in order of battle at Bladensburg, where, in the presence of the President and the Cabinet, it was attacked and routed, with the loss of but 8 killed and 11 wounded.

"The British force numbered 3,500, of which only a part of the advanced division of 1,500 were engaged.

NUMBER OF TROOPS.

"The number of troops employed at different times from the beginning to the end of the war was:

Regulars (including about 5,000 sailors and marines)-----	56, 032
Volunteers-----	10, 110
Rangers-----	3, 049
Militia-----	458, 463
Total-----	527, 654

"The terms of service of the troops were as follows, for—

12 months or more, including sailors and marines-----	63, 179
6 months or more-----	66, 325
3 months or more-----	125, 643
1 month or more-----	125, 307
Less than 1 month-----	147, 200
Total-----	527, 654

"The officers of this army of more than half a million of men numbered:

Regulars-----	2, 271
Volunteers, rangers, and militia-----	31, 210
Total-----	33, 481

"The number of officers who had received a professional education at the Military Academy up to June, 1814, was 120.

"In default of an efficient Regular Army, the number 458,463 shows to what extent the administration was compelled to rely upon the States in pursuance of the military system of 1792; the number 398,150, which represents the number of men who served for periods less than six months, shows but partially to what extent we adopted, as in the Revolution, the policy of raw troops and short enlistments.

"The failure of Congress at the beginning of the war to declare in favor of territorial recruitment and obligatory service affords another result equally striking. The Army voted in January, 1812, was 35,000 men; the number of inexperienced officers ultimately called out and whose average pay was at least four times that of the private soldier was 33,481.

"Instead of falling upon the 5,000 British regulars who held Canada, at the beginning, and crushing them in a single battle, we allowed them to baffle every attempt at invasion, and to prolong the war till our loss in killed and wounded numbered 5,614.

"In contrast with our reckless extravagance in employing more than a half million of men the largest force of British regulars opposed to us was 16,500.

COST OF THE WAR.

"These figures, \$198,000,000, which do not embrace the millions paid for pensions since 1823, may be accepted with slight variation as the immediate cost of the war.

"Had Congress from 1808 to 1811 applied one-fourth of this sum to the maintenance of an army of 15,000 men, so organized as to have been capable of expansion by the aid of voluntary enlistments and obligatory service to double or triple its numbers, there is little reason to doubt that Canada would have been ours, and the war brought to a close on a single campaign.

"In the Revolutionary War, notwithstanding the steady decline of our military strength, two British armies of more than 6,000 men each were made captive; in the War of 1812 less than 5,000 men for the period of two years brought war and devastation into our territory, and successfully withstood the misapplied power of 7,000,000 of people.

FLORIDA (INDIAN) WAR. 1836-1841.

"The lessons taught by this war are:
"First. That its expense was tripled, if not quadrupled, by that feature of the law of 1821 which gave the President in

times of emergency no discretion to increase the enlisted men of the Army.

"Second. That, as in every previous war, after successfully employing for short periods of service militia and volunteers, and exhausting their enthusiasm, Congress found it more humane and economical to continue hostilities with Regular troops, enlisted for the period of five years.

"Third. That for want of a well-defined peace organization a Nation of 17,000,000 of people contended for seven years with 1,200 warriors, and finally closed the struggle without accomplishing the forcible emigration of the Indians, which was the original and sole cause of the war.

MEXICAN WAR. CAMPAIGNS OF GEN. TAYLOR.

"The army of occupation on arriving opposite Matamoras, May, 1846, was composed of 3,554 officers and men, all of the old establishment. The weakness of its numbers in no way daunted its commander. He knew that four-fifths of his officers had received the benefits of professional training at the Military Academy or in the Florida War. Beyond this he was conscious that the discipline and esprit de corps of his troops had been brought to the highest point by six months of training in the camp of instruction at Corpus Christi. With this preparation and with practically no authority to increase his force till an invasion should actually take place, the commander was soon destined to confront a large and well-organized Mexican army.

"In concluding his official report on the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, Gen. Taylor stated:

"Our victory has been decisive. A small force has overcome immense odds of the best troops that Mexico can furnish—veteran regiments perfectly equipped and appointed. Eight pieces of artillery, several colors and standards, a great number of prisoners, including 14 officers, and a large amount of baggage and public property have fallen into our hands. The causes of victory are doubtless to be found in the superior quality of our officers and men.

"The effect of this brilliant initiative was felt to the end of the war. It gave our troops courage to fight against overwhelming numbers, demoralized the enemy, and afforded a striking proof of the truth of the maxim, 'That in war, moral force is to physical as three is to one.' In all of the subsequent battles our troops were outnumbered two or three to one, yet they marched steadily forward to victory, and for the first time in our history temporarily convinced our statesmen, if not the people, of the value of professional education and military discipline.

BATTLE OF BUENA VISTA.

"In January, 1847, nearly all the Regular troops, as also a large number of Volunteers, were withdrawn from Gen. Taylor at Monterey to take part, under Gen. Scott, in the campaign against the City of Mexico.

"This detachment reduced the force to about 6,000 men. Availing himself of this division of our forces, Gen. Santa Ana advanced to Buena Vista, where, on the 22d and 23d of February, he sought to overwhelm and capture our Army. In this battle, the most desperate of the war, our forces, numbering 4,759 men, of whom but 517 were Regulars, defeated the entire Mexican Army, estimated at 20,000. Our losses were 746 killed, wounded, and missing. The Mexican loss was estimated at 1,500. In his official report Gen. Taylor gave the Regular Artillery, composed of the celebrated batteries of Washington, Sherman, and Bragg, the credit of saving the day. But the Battle of Buena Vista, like all great battles, was fought chiefly by Infantry, and the gallant Volunteers, who, against overwhelming numbers, successfully maintained the honor of our arms, had been undergoing field training for nearly eight months, a period twice as long as the time considered necessary to transform a recruit into a Regular soldier.

CAMPAIGN OF THE CITY OF MEXICO.

"After advancing from Vera Cruz to Puebla, fearing exposure to the yellow fever, and beginning to look forward to their discharge six weeks before the expiration of their term of enlistment, Gen. Scott, on the 4th of May, 1847, parted with 7 of his 11 regiments of Volunteers, numbering in the aggregate 4,000 men. Thus reduced by discharge, by expiration of service, and by disease to 5,820 effective men, our Army, which had advanced to Puebla, within three days' march of the enemy's capital, was compelled for more than two months to remain on the defensive, while the enemy, profiting by the delay, reorganized an army of five times its number.

"Had the small force of Gen. Scott, embracing nine-tenths of the Regular Army, been captured, experience teaches us that with the system of short enlistments and inexperienced officers, 100,000 raw troops could not have retrieved the disaster.

"Reinforced in the aggregate to nearly 14,000 men, of whom 3,000 were sick or in hospital, while other detachments were made to guard the line of communications, Gen. Scott, on the 7th of August, resumed the offensive against an army estimated by the Mexicans themselves at 36,000 men and 100 pieces of cannon.

"The four Volunteer regiments with Gen. Scott had been organized in December of 1846, had had the benefit of eight months' training, had already participated in the siege of Vera Cruz and the Battle of Cerro Gordo, and were worthy of being called reliable troops. Advancing with an army of less than 10,000 effectives, the brilliant victories of Contreras, Churubusco, El Molino del Rey, and Chapultepec opened the gates of the capital, which Gen. Scott entered on the 14th of September. In the series of battles, beginning on the 20th of August, our largest force engaged was 8,479; our loss in killed and wounded was 2,703, which reduced the Army when it reached the city to less than 6,000 men.

"The aggregate strength of the three regiments of Volunteers which participated in these battles—the fourth being left to garrison Puebla—was, on the morning of the Battle of Contreras, 1,580. The aggregate strength of the Army, Regulars and Volunteers, on the same date was 11,052.

NUMBER OF TROOPS.

"With the salient facts before us, that Gen. Taylor fought the first battles of the war with 2,100 Regulars, when, but for the defect of the law, he might have had, by a simple increase of the rank and file, a force of 8,000; that the 13 regiments of the Regular Army with which Gen. Scott landed at Vera Cruz could have been raised to 15,000 men; that with such an Army he could have entered the City of Mexico on the heels of Cerro Gordo; that at no time before the event his maximum force exceeded 13,500, and that after a brilliant series of battles he finally entered the Mexican capital with less than 6,000 men, let us next consider the number of troops the Government employed:

Regulars.....	31,024
Volunteers.....	73,382
Total.....	104,356

"From these figures it will be perceived that the Regular troops, 31,024, exceeded more than six times the number of Regulars and Volunteers with whom Taylor at Buena Vista defeated the entire Mexican Army; while, omitting the three and six months' men and adding 31,024 to the 60,659 Volunteers for 12 months and the war, the aggregate, 91,683 Regulars and Volunteers, was nine times as great as the effective strength of the Army with which Scott fought the decisive battles around the City of Mexico. The greatest strength of the Mexican Army was never estimated to exceed 36,000 men.

LESSONS OF THE WAR.

"Notwithstanding its unnecessary prolongation, the Mexican War marked a great change, if not a revolution, in our military policy. This result was due to the decay and gradual abandonment of the militia system, which up to that time had been regarded as the 'great bulwark of national defense.' Bearing in mind that the laws under which military operations were prosecuted were almost identical with the laws of 1812, let us examine the composition of the forces employed in the two wars:

	War of 1812.	War with Mexico.
Regulars.....	50,000	31,024
Militia.....	458,463	12,601
Volunteers and Rangers.....	13,159	60,659
Total.....	521,622	104,284

"A comparison of these figures shows that while in the War of 1812 the combined force of Regulars and Volunteers of 12 or more months' service was but 12 per cent of the total number of troops employed, the same force in the Mexican War was no less than 88 per cent. The contrast does not stop here. In the first war, relying upon the States instead of appealing directly to the people, as intended by the Constitution, Congress became a witness of disasters like those which occurred in the Revolution; in the second, the national troops, organized and supported by Congress, achieved a series of victories unmarred by a single defeat.

"In one war an army of more than 6,000 raw troops, posted in the defense of our own Capital, fled with a loss of but 19 killed and wounded; in the other a force of less than 5,000

trained Volunteers, supported by a few Regular troops, overthrew a Mexican army of four times its number.

"In one war an enemy numbering less than 5,000 men baffled all of our efforts at invasion; in the other our Army, with less than 6,000 combatants, entered in triumph the enemy's capital.

"But the difference between the results of the two wars is not wholly to be ascribed to the substitution of national volunteers for the militia. In the War of 1812 the Regular Army, which had itself to be created, was unable to furnish a standard of skill and discipline. In the Mexican War, aside from sustaining the principal losses in killed and wounded, it furnished able commanders, and in every field set an example of skill, fortitude, and courage.

"As to the influence of military education in producing such diversity of results, Gen. Scott, who in 1814 was compelled to teach the Regular officers of his brigade the elements of squad drill, left his views to the Senate in the memorable words:

"I give it as my fixed opinion that but for our graduated cadets the war between the United States and Mexico might, and probably would, have lasted some four or five years, with, in its first half, more defeats than victories falling to our share; whereas in less than two campaigns we conquered a great country and a peace without the loss of a single battle or skirmish.

THE WAR OF THE REBELLION. CONDITIONS AT THE OUTBREAK.

"At the close of the year 1860 we presented to the world the spectacle of a great Nation nearly destitute of military force. Our territory from ocean to ocean exceeded 3,000,000 square miles; our population numbered 31,000,000 people.

"The Regular Army as organized consisted of 18,093 officers and men, but according to the returns it numbered only 16,367.

"The line of the Army was composed of 198 companies, of which 183 were stationed on the frontier or were en route to distant posts west of the Mississippi. The remaining 15 companies were stationed along the Canadian frontier and on the Atlantic coast from Maine to the Gulf of Mexico.

"The militia for a sudden emergency were scarcely more available than the Army. Nominally they numbered more than 3,000,000, but mostly unorganized. So destitute were they of instruction and training that—a few regiments in the large cities excepted—they did not merit the name of a military force.

"Such was the condition of the national defense when, on the 20th of December, 1860, South Carolina in convention passed the ordinance of secession.

"Alarmed at the impending danger, the President, as had been done so often before, turned to the militia. On the 9th of April, 1861, a call was made upon the District of Columbia for 10 companies, but when paraded for muster many, through disloyalty, refused to be sworn, while others imposed the condition that they should not be required to serve beyond the limits of the District.

"In the meantime, so prompt was the response to the Confederate call for 100,000 volunteers that by the middle of April 35,000 men were equipped for the field. Conscious of their strength, they at once seized our arsenals and began the siege of our forts.

"For the want of an expansive Regular Army or a system of national volunteers, the President was again compelled to look to the States, and therefore, on the 15th of April, issued his proclamation calling for 75,000 militia for the period of three months.

"The advantage, so far as related to the forces in the field, was at the time decidedly on the side of the Confederates. The Government had called for 75,000 militia for the period of three months; the Confederates had called for 100,000 volunteers for the period of one year. Both had repeated the blunder of short enlistment.

"Nevertheless, in default of further measures on the part of the President, the Government at the end of three months would see the forces dissolved, while the Confederate Army, constantly improving in discipline, would still be available for nine months of field service.

USE OF THE REGULAR ARMY.

"To anyone familiar with our military history the difficulties of recruiting Regulars in competition with Volunteers would have suggested the reduction of the line of the Army to a cadre and the dispersion of its officers as commanders and instructors among the new troops. Had this course been adopted every regiment of Volunteer Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery might have had a Regular officer for a leader, and, with these to guide the instruction, three months would have sufficed to give us an Army in fair drill and discipline.

"The Volunteers themselves felt the need of this policy, and when first called to arms eagerly sought trained commanders.

"At the time Congress indicated the desire that trained officers should be employed in positions of the greatest usefulness it had at its disposal more than 600 captains and lieutenants who would have made able and efficient colonels. Yet by giving to governors the authority to appoint officers, without reserving to the President the right to designate at least one field officer in each regiment, Congress not only thwarted its own intentions but needlessly jeopardized the national success.

"While our military legislation relating to the line deprived the Government of all right to appoint trained leaders to the regiments of the Volunteer Army, the great departments of supply, on the contrary, were placed wholly under the supervision and control of Regular officers.

BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

"The acceptance before the 1st of July of more than 200,000 volunteers for the term of three years did not deliver the Government from the temptation of again testing the folly of short enlistments.

"Mistaking numbers for strength and forgetting, too, that the fame of the militia at Bunker Hill and New Orleans was acquired behind formidable entrenchments, Congress and the Cabinet, the press and the people united in demanding that before their discharge the 75,000 three-months' men should be led into battle.

"The disaster that ensued demands that the causes leading to it be carefully considered. First among them was the popular but mistaken belief that because our citizens individually possess courage, fortitude, and self-reliance they must necessarily possess the same qualities when aggregated as soldiers. And next to this error was the fatal delusion that an army animated by patriotism needed neither instruction nor discipline to prepare it for battle.

"The effect of this disastrous battle (Bull Run), which gave the enemy all the advantages of the initiative had he chosen to use it, was to paralyze military operations for more than six months.

MILITARY LEGISLATION IN 1861.

"The military system under which, in two campaigns of seven weeks each, Prussia humiliated Austria in 1866 and subverted the French Empire in 1870 was the joint product of soldiers and statesmen, who began their labors (1806) immediately after the disastrous battle of Jena. The military system under which we subdued the rebellion was established by Congress in less than four weeks.

"In 1792 Congress organized the militia and declared in favor of obligatory military service, on the theory that the militia were the bulwark of the Nation. Subsequently, Indian difficulties and armed conflicts with two foreign nations compelled it to raise and support a Regular Army. Both of these organizations in 1861 it summarily rejected. Instead of expanding the Regular Army and making it the chief instrument in executing the national will, it violated the practice of every civilized nation by calling into existence an army of a million untrained officers and men.

"It should not surprise us that under a system so improvident voluntary enlistments finally proved a failure. The enormous demands for men are easily accounted for. The laws, like those at the beginning of each previous war, encouraged short enlistments by giving the President the power to call out volunteers for any term of service from six months to three years. The number of men furnished was to be equalized among the States according to population. The men having been organized into regiments no provision was made for their recruitment; there were no regimental depots, no assignments of regiments to congressional districts, no requirement that any regiment raised in any State or district should be kept full by voluntary enlistment or draft. There was but one method to prevent depletion, and that the one which, since the siege of Boston, had always proved ineffective—detaching recruiting parties from the field.

"The fourth section of the first law was prolific of causes for protracting the war; it was based on the theory of confederation; the troops were to be State and not National, and, as a consequence, the officers were to be commissioned by the governors and not by the President.

CAMPAIGN OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, 1862.

"On the 31st of March, 1862, the Government had in service an Army of 637,126 men, nearly all of whom were enlisted for the term of three years.

"The Confederate Army, composed largely of one-year volunteers, whose enlistments were on the eve of expiring, scarcely exceeded 200,000 men.

"The failure to subdue the rebellion in 1861 had already been explained by our total want of military organization and prep-

aration. The failure to subdue it in 1862, with the amazing advantages possessed by the Union, proceeded from a cause entirely different—the mismanagement of our armies.

"Humiliated and made wiser by the defeat at Bull Run, the President, the Cabinet, and the people were at first disposed to give the new commander all the time necessary to organize and discipline his troops; but when several months had passed with no indication of an advance, the Army in the meantime having increased to above 200,000 men, impatience for action returned with accumulated force.

"When Gen. McClellan assumed command he found his Army 'cowering on the banks of the Potomac,' the troops and the people alike demoralized by the defeat and panic at Bull Run. He knew that but two things—men and the time to make them soldiers—were necessary to restore the ascendancy of the Government. The men were given liberally, but time to drill them could not be accorded. When the armies throughout the country, with scarcely a shadow of discipline, had swelled to the aggregate of 600,000, the expense of supporting them was so great that the President was forced to declare if something was not soon done 'the bottom would be out of the whole affair.'

"At the time of the appointment of Gen. McClellan the fate of the Nation seemed to depend upon this single individual. In the organization of his army he stood alone. None of his brigade, division, or corps commanders had ever seen service as such. None of them, as in Europe, had exercised command at maneuvers or had been practiced in handling large bodies of troops. The colonels, from whom the future brigadiers were mostly to come, were nearly all from civil life, with but little knowledge of tactics or standard of discipline by which to gauge the proficiency of their troops. A difficulty of nearly equal magnitude confronted him in the staff. The Adjutant General's Department, for want of interchangeability with the line, could not, as in European services, furnish competent chiefs of staff to himself or to any of his corps and division commanders.

"It was during the month lost by the delay at Yorktown that the Confederate Congress abandoned voluntary enlistments, adopted conscription, and took away from the governors the power to commission Confederate officers; it was during this month, when the Army of the Potomac should have been at the doors of Richmond, that almost every regiment of the Confederate Army was reorganized; it was during this month that Confederate conscripts began to pour into the old regiments instead of being formed into new organizations; it was during this and the two succeeding months, while McDowell was held back, that these conscripts, associated with veteran comrades, acquired courage and discipline; and it was by concentration during the last month that the Confederate Army was made to equal its opponent. The loss of battles was but a trifle compared with the other consequences of this one month's delay. It arrayed against us a military system which enabled the Confederate Government to call out the last man and the last dollar, as against a system based on voluntary enlistment and the consent of the States. It was no longer a question of dealing a dissolving army its deathblow. We had permitted a rival government to reorganize its forces which we now were compelled to destroy by the slow process of attrition."

THE SUGAR INDUSTRY.

Mr. RANDELL. Mr. President, I rise to a question of personal privilege.

On the 26th ultimo my colleague, Senator BROUSSARD, made an address in this Chamber in which he severely criticized Hon. Robert Ewing, Democratic national committeeman from Louisiana, and myself, because of certain statements about Col. Ewing, alleged to have been made by me in recent political speeches in Louisiana, in behalf of the Democratic candidates for governor and other State offices, and which were characterized by Senator BROUSSARD as untrue. This address was sent in advance of its delivery to some large newspapers in Louisiana, which published it in full under flaring headlines, especially the allegations denying the truth of my statements.

At the close of Senator BROUSSARD's speech I expressed regret that he had brought into the Senate a question of purely local politics, which did not interest or concern Senators, and after declining to enter into a controversy on the subject, I secured permission to print in the RECORD a copy of one of the Louisiana speeches which had given offense, although none was intended. His address and mine appear in the RECORD for the 27th ultimo, pages 4907 to 4920.

Self-respect compelled me to reply to Senator BROUSSARD's attack in order to establish the truth of my remarks, which he had denied, and I did so in an open letter to him, which was published in the Louisiana papers. Ex-Senator Murphy J.

Foster, who for 12 years was a member of this body, and Col. Ewing issued statements confirming my allegations, which were also published. Postmaster General Burleson and Secretary of the Navy Daniels, at my request, wrote me confirmatory letters. In order to complete the record in this controversy, which no one regrets as much as myself, I ask that the statements of Senator Foster, Col. Ewing, and myself, also the letters of the Postmaster General and the Secretary of the Navy, be printed in the RECORD in order that the truth of what I said may be established beyond peradventure.

THE VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it will be so ordered.

The matter referred to is as follows:

WASHINGTON, D. C., April 1, 1916.

Hon. ROBERT F. BROUSSARD,

United States Senate.

DEAR SIR: In view of the sensational attack made by you upon Col. Robert Ewing and myself on the 21st ultimo in the Senate of the United States, I have determined to address you this open letter as an answer to your diatribe. I select this mode of response because, as stated by me immediately after the delivery of your speech, I do not think the Senate, the highest and most dignified legislative body on earth, the proper forum in which to wash soiled political linen in the discussion of purely personal and local controversies.

Your address greatly magnifies your own importance. I had no idea of antagonizing you when touring your old congressional district in the interest of Democracy. I was asked to go there by the Democratic campaign managers, because they knew it was the hotbed of Republican progressivism, and it was thought I could have some effect because of my loyalty to sugar, the principal interest of that section. You take yourself too seriously and imagine that when I gave Col. Ewing more credit in the sugar fight than to anyone in Louisiana, including Senator Thornton and myself, I intended an attack on you. My efforts were solely to aid Democracy by making the real truth known to the sugar people, who were being prejudiced because of the alleged shortcomings of Robert Ewing. I disavow absolutely any intention of humiliating or belittling you in any of the speeches made by me during that tour.

The remarks to which you took exception were published in the daily papers of Louisiana, and I doubt if they were known to a single United States Senator except ourselves. The press of the State is the medium through which you should have circulated your reply. Its columns were open to you, and while your discourse was pertinent to Louisianians it did not interest or concern Senators from other States.

For your information, let me say that while you were reading your carefully prepared treatise Members of the Senate expressed to me their regret that your sense of propriety permitted you to transgress so grossly the traditions of that body.

Your remarks purport to be a denial of certain statements made by me in recent campaign speeches in Louisiana in regard to the activities of Mr. Ewing three years ago during the fight to prevent placing sugar on the free list, but in reality, as I shall show later, they are Progressive-Republican utterances which should never have fallen from the lips of a Democratic Senator. As to charges which you bring against Col. Ewing, of which I have no personal knowledge, I shall let him make answer, confident that he will do so completely and to the satisfaction of the Democracy of Louisiana. I shall concern myself merely to prove there was no substantial misstatement of fact made by me to repel the attacks which you made upon me personally, either openly or by innuendo, and then shall expose the motive which prompted you to speak.

A newspaper account of my Lafayette speech quoted me as saying that Robert Ewing had done "more for the sugar industry than all the Louisiana delegation combined." This is not correct, and you knew it. What I said was that "to Robert Ewing, a great deal more than to any other one man, is due the extension for three years of the duty on sugar."

I told you of this misquotation on March 21, six days before your speech in the Senate, and in its delivery you admitted, under my questioning, I had so informed you; but in your address sent to the New Orleans papers you failed to take into account that significant fact.

I desire now to call your attention to other inexcusable misstatements of facts that were available from the record before you when preparing your speech.

You would lead one to believe that you did not know it was ex-Senator Foster and not yourself who accompanied me to the White House for the 15-minute interview, though when questioned by me in the Senate you admitted that I had likewise so informed you. Why, in writing your speech which was published in the press, did you fail to make frank admission of this fact instead of trying to mislead by bringing in the name of Senator Thornton? And why did you attempt to attach any importance to these matters which you admitted under my questioning were relatively unimportant?

Why, with the record before you, did you fail to say that the Underwood tariff bill was introduced in the House on April 7, the second day after Col. Ewing, yourself, and I talked to President Wilson? And that the bill when so introduced by Mr. UNDERWOOD contained the three-year sugar extension clause, practically substantiating the truth of the statement made by me, although it was not reported by the Ways and Means Committee until April 21? Why did you thus quibble?

Another point on which you lay much stress is that you, and not Col. Ewing, remained behind with the President? Col. Ewing's recollection sustains by statement that it was he, and not you, who remained, and I am positive of it.

When I gave Mr. Ewing this high credit, I did so with full knowledge of the splendid fight made by Louisiana Representatives and Senators for the retention of sugar duty. The record of Senator THORNTON and myself in regard to sugar needs no apology. We did all that mortal men could do. In Democratic caucuses and on the Senate floor we fought as desperately as we knew how, and the pages of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for the special session of the Sixty-third Congress show how earnestly we appealed to our colleagues not to put sugar on the free list. We voted against the Democratic tariff bill, the greater portion of which we approved, because of the free-sugar provision, thereby straining our relations with the Democratic administration almost to the breaking point, and did so because of our pledges to the people of Louisiana. And, as you know full well, six members of the Louisiana delegation in the House did their utmost

against the enactment of the free-sugar clause, although two of the six voted for the tariff bill on final passage.

My office was the rendezvous of the sugar representatives, and I was a party to every council and cognizant of every fact in the campaign, hence I am as well qualified as yourself to say to whom credit belongs.

You attempt to make it appear that I am subservient to Mr. Ewing in giving him praise for his efforts. This is the first time in my life I have been charged with subserviency to any man, and I spurn it with all the force of my being. I glory, however, in being fair enough to give honor to whom honor is due, regardless of whom the truth may offend.

You attempt to deride and belittle Col. Ewing, and to destroy his standing at the Nation's Capital, at a time when another crisis is confronting the sugar industry, merely to serve your personal feelings, recklessly disregarding the possible consequence of your act. You make it appear that Robert Ewing was false to sugar, and have the temerity to style him as the most "persistent and consistent enemy of the Louisiana sugar industry" well knowing that the highest place in the struggle waged was freely accorded to him then by all who were posted. That your memory may be refreshed on this point, I will quote the resolution adopted by the American Cane Growers' Association under date of March 22, 1913:

"Whereas the leading industry of Louisiana is confronted with the gravest crisis in its history, the last Democratic House having passed a bill placing sugar on the free list, which action promises to exercise marked influence in the pending revision of the tariff; and

"Whereas such a course would not only be a departure from the time-honored policy of the party and a violation of its platform pledges, but would mark the industrial ruin of this State: Therefore be it

"Resolved, That the American Cane Growers' Association of Louisiana calls upon Hon. Robert Ewing, national Democratic committeeman, to visit Washington at once and lay before the President and the party leaders the gravity confronting our people.

"The American Cane Growers' Association is mindful of the valuable services already rendered the people of Louisiana in this struggle by Col. Ewing, and of the inconveniences and sacrifices that a second trip to Washington would entail, but considering the seriousness of the situation and the fact that he, of all Louisianians, is especially qualified to make the representations, it feels warranted in calling upon him to make this sacrifice, confident that he will be willing now, as in the past, to sink personal consideration when the interests of so many of his fellow citizens are at stake.

"CHAS. A. FARWELL."

That the praise here bestowed was well merited is amply borne out by the statement of Senator Foster, whose fidelity to the cause of sugar can not be doubted, and also by the letter of Postmaster General Burleson to me, dated the 30th ultimo, which has been given to the press, and in which appear these pertinent words:

"He [Ewing] worked night and day, and I believe without disparaging in the least what may have been done by others, that it can be truthfully said that Bob Ewing did more than any one person toward those things which finally resulted in the retention of the 1 cent per pound duty on sugar, with free sugar after three years."

The purpose of this letter was not to eulogize Ewing but to repudiate the baseless attack you directed against its author, Gen. Burleson, whose friendship for the people and the industries of his neighboring State has never been questioned. Other statements equally as strong from sources as well qualified to speak may easily be secured.

And now a word or two in regard to Federal appointments in Louisiana. The importance you ascribe to Col. Ewing in regard to these offices is grossly exaggerated, and I am sure no such power is claimed by him. But one minor appointment was made individually on his recommendation, and even that could not have been confirmed had it not been agreeable to Senator Thornton and myself. We were glad in several others to have his assistance, though there were a number in which he had no part whatever. Senator Foster, at whom you slur, was appointed upon the recommendation of the entire Louisiana delegation, including yourself. In defeat at the last election he received more votes than you in victory. Gov. Sanders, at whom you also sneer, was appointed upon the recommendation of Senator Thornton and myself, though it was clearly recognized that it was Senator Thornton's patronage. In regard to the other Federal officeholders in the State, I shall not attempt to particularize, except to say that I take direct issue with you in imputing that they are not in every way worthy of the honors that have been conferred upon them, and it is my belief that they are acceptable to the great majority of the Democrats of Louisiana. A number of enthusiastic recruits to the Progressive-Republican Party, who are close friends of yours, come from the ranks of disappointed seekers for office at the hands of President Wilson.

Now, Senator BROUSSARD, I wish to expose the motive which prompted you to describe "Robert Ewing and his kind" as "hang-nails on the hands of the Louisiana Democracy" and then, in another flight of imagination, as the giant "boss" of the "bosses" in whose grasp the people of Louisiana are held powerless. This has a familiar sound. It is the rallying cry of the Progressive-Republican candidate for governor of our State, "Ewingism" is the issue on which he would deceive the people and ride into office, and you now openly strike hands with him. No such muddying of the waters will be permitted. Democracy's candidate, Ruffin G. Pleasant, could never be the creature of any ring or boss. He is one of the bravest, truest, and most independent spirits ever produced in Louisiana, and, if elected governor, will represent all the people honestly, wisely, and impartially. His candidacy is due to the support of the people of the country parishes. Their loyalty to him was secured in the fight he made against the constitutional convention, which was supported by both the State and city administrations at Baton Rouge, and was looked upon in its incipency as invulnerable. The combination was so strong that everyone said it could not be defeated. But do you not recall what took place? Have you forgotten that it was Ruffin Pleasant who, at Baton Rouge, against these assembled powers, with the mighty force of the people of the country parishes behind him, changed the convention bill materially in the legislature, and later crushed it in one of the most remarkable political battles in the history of the State? Ewing and all the leaders of New Orleans whom you deride, backed by the almost unanimous support of their people, gave the convention measure an overwhelming majority; but the people of the country parishes heard the voice of Ruffin Pleasant, enlisted under his banner, and decreed that the convention should not be held in the midst of a political campaign.

Pleasant under the control of the bosses! Why, the mere thought of such a thing is absurd. The fight against the convention is the reason for his candidacy for governor. He did not go to the New Orleans organization, but those in charge of the administration of that great city, seeing his remarkable popularity and desiring to bring together in harmonious concert the people of both country and city and to set at rest the idea that it had designs on the control of the State administration, accepted Pleasant as its candidate for governor, to confront and conquer John M. Parker, who had announced on the Republican-Progressive ticket.

Then followed the Democratic primary election, in which Pleasant received considerably more than one-half of the total possible vote of the State, inclusive of Progressive, Socialist, and Republican.

He ran as strong in north Louisiana as in south Louisiana. Organs of the Progressive-Republican candidate stood aghast. Their candidate and his campaign committee and supporters had been prophesying a total vote of only eighty to ninety thousand. They had inserted, during the primary campaign, advertisements appealing to the people to remain out of the Democratic primary. They freely admitted that one who voted for either Democratic candidate for governor was morally bound to support the nominee, but when they saw that the Democrats had polled 114,000 votes out of a total of 145,000, and that there were only left 30,000 votes for their candidate, they set about to revise their moral code and to create an issue with which to deceive the people of the State. And what is their issue? "Bossism" and "Ewingism!"

Senator BROUSSARD, permit me to say that while your address purports to be an attack on Robert Ewing and a correction of my alleged misstatements, it is, in fact, a Progressive campaign document. It is meat and bread to Louisiana Democracy's bitterest enemies; it is a sharp criticism of an address made by a Democratic Senator in behalf of the Democratic nominees for governor and the other State offices; it is an assault upon a staunch Democrat, Bob Ewing, who is drawing the heaviest fire of the Progressives and Republicans; it was played up in glaring headlines by several big dailies in Louisiana; it is heralded by Peterman, campaign manager for the Progressive-Republican candidate, John Parker, as insuring his triumph in the election now only 17 days off; it is a Progressive-Republican speech, out of the mouth of a United States Senator, chosen in a Democratic primary.

Regardless of your purpose in making this address, the fact is that it can and will be franked by the Progressives and Republicans all over Louisiana, and I venture the assertion that no true Democrat will mail a single copy of it to influence votes for Democracy. I understand that many thousand copies of this speech, so warmly welcomed by Progressives and Republicans, have been ordered, and I anticipate that they will be circulated in Louisiana either under your frank or that of some Republican or Progressive Member of Congress. Your duty to your Democratic constituency should have caused you to hesitate long before placing ammunition in the hands of the enemies of Democracy, though it may prove a blank cartridge, and I believe it will.

Does not your party perfidy stand revealed by this speech, and will not the Democracy see through your cunning? You, a Senator holding commission from the Democracy of the State, would covertly sacrifice it as a victim to John Parker, who for years has been false to Democracy's teachings and by every means at his command has attempted its destruction. He it was who brought to Louisiana Theodore Roosevelt, who may be the candidate of the national Republican Party for the Presidency of the United States against Woodrow Wilson, in whom the plain people of this Nation believe, and who they are determined shall continue in control of our country in crises such as it has never faced before. Has this been your game? Was this your reason when, two years ago, in the campaign in the third congressional district, you failed to respond to the call of the party to support the candidacy of its nominee, Gueydan, against Martin, the Progressive, who had obtained the nomination over Peterman, campaign manager for Parker, and Edwin Broussard, your brother, and the present candidate for lieutenant governor with Parker?

Was it on this account that when the Times-Picayune, in its editorial of August 13, 1914, entitled "A Democratic Campaign," called upon you to declare where you stood, John Parker came to your defense in an open letter published the following day in the same paper?

It is time in the history of the affairs of Louisiana for men to step forward and be counted. Come out, Mr. BROUSSARD, and fight in the open.

In the name of Democracy I ask, Do you intend to support and vote for Pleasant and his Democratic associates?

Do you intend to visit Louisiana before the election and make at least one speech in support of the Democratic ticket? If you should reply that you can not leave your duties here, will you issue a statement in favor of the Democratic candidate and urge your friends to support the ticket?

If you are not in favor of the Democratic ticket, does not common fairness in a great fight like the present require you to make your position perfectly clear? Where do you stand? There is no middle ground. You must be for Democracy or against it. The people of Louisiana have a right to an answer to these questions, and, as their representative, I demand it.

If you do not promptly avow your support of the regular Democratic candidates, I shall assume, and every honest man will be justified in assuming, that you are opposed to them and in favor of their Republican-Progressive foe, Parker. Fight, if you so desire, with all the power of your being for the destruction of the Democratic Party in Louisiana, if you will not fight in favor of it, but stand forth like a man and be counted. Even should you decide to espouse the cause of Parker, the cause of the Republican Party in both State and Nation, against the party which has so highly honored you I have no fear of the result. The 114,000 loyal Democrats who voted in the primary insure victory. The united voice of the unconquered party of the State of Louisiana, the party of the South, which for the first time in 16 years is in control of the affairs of this Nation thunders "Victory." Under the matchless leadership of Pleasant it will sweep on to a glorious triumph on the 18th, forever crushing the hopes of Parker and Roosevelt to break the solid South.

How can any Democratic Senator halt or hesitate in such a battle? Whatever others may do, I shall stand by my party and its flag. I shall stand by that flag because it is the flag of the Democratic Party and represents what is best in the hopes and aspirations of the surging mass of America. If that party should fall through the conduct and utterance of those it has trusted and raised to power, at least no man can say accusingly to me, "Through this rent was thrust the dagger of an envious Casca."

Respectfully, yours,

JOS. E. RANDELL,
United States Senator.

[From the New Orleans States of April 2, 1916.]

MR. EWING'S STATEMENT.

Although I am a candidate for no office, Senator R. F. BROUSSARD has seen fit, in a speech in the United States Senate, to make me the object of a bitter and uncalled-for personal attack in connection with the present campaign in Louisiana.

The character of the speech, the time of its delivery, the fidelity with which it follows the line of attack here in Louisiana, the promptness with which the manager of Mr. Parker's campaign, who, as does the Senator, holds the commission of the Democratic Party, has announced Mr. BROUSSARD as a recruit to the movement to defeat Col. Pleasant, the Democratic nominee, leave no room to doubt its political purpose.

I regret the necessity which compels me to ask the public's indulgence of a reply to this attack which is a tissue of misstatement and suppression of fact. I am not an issue in the campaign, and I have no interest in its outcome except as a citizen of Louisiana who believes that the efficiency of our Government and the supremacy of our race alike require the triumph of the Democratic Party over the mongrel elements which Mr. Parker has organized in opposition to it. But justice to truth and a duty I owe to myself leave me no alternative.

THE CHARGES MADE BY MR. BROUSSARD.

Mr. BROUSSARD'S charges fall mainly into four parts:

(a) That by voting for the unit rule at the Democratic convention in Baton Rouge, June 4, 1912, I was insincere in my support of Woodrow Wilson.

(b) That I have been a "persistent and consistent enemy of sugar," and that Senator RANSDELL and ex-Senator Foster did not bear truthful witness in telling the people of the third district that it was due to my efforts more than any other man's that sugar was saved from immediate destruction in 1913.

(c) That I permitted an agent of the Sugar Trust to embody an attack on sugar in the Democratic textbook in violation of the doctrine of the Baltimore platform.

(d) That I am the dispenser of Federal patronage in Louisiana and have filled the Federal service with men repudiated by the white people of Louisiana.

I shall take these charges up in turn and show them to be without foundation.

I.

The attitude of the States, from its foundation by the late Maj. H. J. Hearsey until now, has been that the only real and permanent security for the sugar industry lay in the Democratic policy, maintained until three years ago, of treating sugar as an ideal article of revenue taxation. Such treatment was consistently advocated by Cleveland, Carlisle, Morrison, Mills, Wilson, and other conspicuous advocates of Democratic tariff policy.

At the inception of the last national campaign I felt that the most serious blow which could be dealt the industry would come from the nomination of either Mr. CLARK or Mr. UNDERWOOD, because of the extreme position each had assumed in favor of immediate free sugar. I opposed both unrelentingly, personally and through the columns of the States and the Shreveport Times.

M'COMBS'S ASSURANCES IN CONFERENCES HERE.

On the other hand, my inclination was to Gov. Wilson, who then loomed large on the political horizon, provided Gov. Wilson was found to be in sympathy with the tariff policy as respects sugar which the party had always maintained. In the spring of 1912 Mr. William F. McCombs, now the chairman of the Democratic national committee and then Gov. Wilson's manager and personal representative, came to Louisiana seeking support for Gov. Wilson. He invited me to a long interview in the Grunewald Hotel. Mr. J. Walker Ross and myself called on him. In reply to my inquiry regarding Gov. Wilson's probable position on sugar, Mr. McCombs pointed to his recent speeches, and particularly one delivered at Brooklyn, as a guaranty that Gov. Wilson's election would involve no injury to any legitimate industry. During the tariff fight Mr. McCombs, at my request, went to Washington to confirm to President Wilson that he had given this assurance.

It was clear, well before the meeting of the Democratic convention at Baton Rouge, on June 4, that the whole drift in Louisiana was to Wilson, with south Louisiana bitterly antagonistic to CLARK and UNDERWOOD because of their stand on sugar. Theodore Wilkinson; Thomas H. Lewis; J. Zach Spearing, chairman of the State executive committee of the Good Government League; Donelson Caffery; ex-Gov. Newton C. Blanchard; J. P. Parker, of Monroe, all conspicuous Democrats and supporters of Gov. Hall, and the Times-Democrat, were for Wilson.

THE GOVERNOR'S ENTRANCE UNEXPECTED.

It is characteristic of the "littleness" of the item that its policy invariably is gauged by the States. It is against what I am for and for what I am against, without reference to the merits of any given proposition.

The fact that the States was for Wilson therefore led the item to espouse the cause of Mr. CLARK. But up to May 26, when Gov. Hall suddenly and unexpectedly declared for Mr. CLARK, following the visit of CLARK agents here with rainbow promises in the event of his election, no one in Louisiana accepted seriously the item's agitated attacks on Wilson or dreamed of the possibility of a CLARK man on the Louisiana delegation.

Nevertheless it then became clear that, with his prestige and influence as the newly elected Democratic governor and his power as the party leader over the State convention, the governor would be able at least partially to change the complexion of the delegation.

Since, however, the Times-Democrat was pronounced for Wilson, my expectation was that an evenly divided delegation was possible, and my hope that the exigencies of the political situation in the Nation would make Mr. CLARK'S nomination out of the question and give a chance for the eventual nomination of Wilson or some other candidate not an avowed enemy of sugar.

MR. MOORE'S INTEREST IN THE MATTER.

When I reached Baton Rouge June 3 it was my understanding that, as a result of the protest of Mr. Moore, who, feeling keenly the rebuke to the Times-Democrat in the governor's espousal of the item's candidate, had sent Mr. Norman Walker to the governor on Sunday, the governor would be satisfied with a divided delegation without instructions, it being the expressed judgment of the Times-Democrat, Picayune, and States, and of many of the leading men of the State, that an uninstructed delegation of big men should be sent to Baltimore with ample freedom of action to enable them to protect the interests of the sugar industry and the Democratic Party.

I did at that time visit the governor and did in casual conversation say, in answer to his inquiry, that I saw no objection to a unit rule; but the details were not discussed, and it is absurd for Mr. BROUSSARD to say, in the light of my strong feeling on the subject, that I did assent or could have assented to any plan of gag based on a bare majority of the delegation.

The governor's own position at that time is explained in a dispatch which Mr. Stanley Ray, his closest newspaper friend, sent to the Times-Democrat and which was printed the morning of June 4. It said:

"The governor is willing to accept an uninstructed delegation and have some Wilson men named on it, but he desires the majority of the delegation friendly to CLARK. The delegation then would be free to use its discretion, but would be prone to favor the Speaker if his chances looked good."

I did not disagree with the principle of the unit rule, but it was a matter of the conditions of its application. Such was, I think, the position of a large majority of the delegates.

MR. BROUSSARD'S ATTACK ON HALL ADMINISTRATION.

Mr. BROUSSARD, with characteristic lack of modesty, claims credit for having defeated the unit rule. I concede the vigor of the fight he made against Mr. CLARK, resenting as he did the fact that it was Mr. CLARK and Mr. UNDERWOOD who had dismissed him from the Ways and Means Committee for his apostasy in the CANNON fight. But I do not believe any attempt would have been made by Mr. Claiborne, always a disturbing element, to inject the unit rule into the proceedings, but for the feeling engendered by Mr. BROUSSARD'S attack on the State administration for its support of Mr. CLARK.

Mr. BROUSSARD says I voted for the unit rule, and that if it had been carried Louisiana would have gone to Baltimore solidly against Wilson. That is false, as are so many of Mr. BROUSSARD'S statements.

I did not vote for the unit rule. The unit rule was never voted on by anybody at Baton Rouge June 4, 1913.

The record shows the convention had met; seated its delegates; listened to the fiery speeches of Mr. BROUSSARD and Mr. Wickliffe; grown excited when as Mr. BROUSSARD mounted the rostrum the second time some one in the chamber shouted to him, "Go back to Ireland, where you belong, you Republican scoundrel"; elected its delegates at large; ratified the selections of the congressional districts; named the presidential electors; chose the national committeemen unanimously; and was about to adjourn in a perfect bubble of harmony when Mr. Claiborne appeared and sprang his motion for the unit rule.

Mr. Webster, of Ascension, promptly moved to adjourn, and the convention did so. It did not, as Mr. BROUSSARD says, vote on a motion to table Mr. Claiborne's resolution.

WHY HE VOTED AGAINST AN ADJOURNMENT.

I voted not to adjourn. I never run away from a fight. I was perfectly willing to have Mr. Claiborne's motion discussed, in full confidence that the sentiment of the convention was against it; and, so far as my vote on the proposition was concerned, I should have felt that any implied obligation in my casual statement to the governor would have been fulfilled by my support of a resolution leaving it to the discretion of the delegation at Baltimore, by a two-thirds vote, to apply the rule whenever in its judgment such a step was to the interest of the State and the Democratic Party.

Any insinuation that I was ever for a hard-and-fast unit rule by a bare majority of the delegation is without foundation.

The record of the Baltimore convention shows that Mr. CLARK received 11 votes on the first ballot and Mr. Wilson 9. On the fourth each received 10. Thereafter until the end of the struggle Mr. Wilson never received less than half the delegation, even when Mr. CLARK'S vote reached its high-water mark of 556 on the tenth ballot, and it increased to more than two-thirds of the delegation before the decisive ballot.

The only unit rule which I would have supported could therefore never have operated to the advantage of Mr. CLARK. But it would have given Mr. Wilson the solid vote of Louisiana on the forty-third ballot.

II.

Mr. CLARK'S nomination, assuming he was thereafter elected, would have meant immediate free sugar. A sense of modesty restrains me from referring to my own share in achieving the defeat of Mr. CLARK and the nomination of Mr. Wilson.

But the fact that I was invited by Gov. Wilson to be one of the 14 Democrats to manage his campaign, the second time Louisiana and both times in my person was so honored since the late Senator F. B. Jonas similarly served in the first campaign of Mr. Cleveland, sufficiently attests the President's appreciation of those services and explains why the financial and commercial interests of New Orleans and the sugar planters themselves felt that perhaps I could do more than anyone else at Washington to persuade the President to include sugar in the Democratic tariff bill.

THE BRYAN FREE-SUGAR RESOLUTION.

I have no wish to detract from the earnestness with which Mr. BROUSSARD labored at Baltimore. But at least I may mention, as part of my own service there, that when Senator-elect RANSDELL came to me with a message from Mr. BROUSSARD that Mr. Bryan had a free-sugar resolution to be introduced in the resolutions committee, which he feared, if offered, would become a plank in the platform, and invoked my intimate personal relations with Mr. Bryan to prevent its introduction. I pressed my views with so much earnestness upon Mr. Bryan that free sugar was not mentioned by the resolutions committee and Mr. Bryan's indorsement of the work of the Democratic House of 1912, as the resolutions will show, became general in its terms. This was in the face of the fact that Senator JAMES, of Kentucky, the permanent chairman, in his speech on taking the chair, declared emphatically for free sugar.

If the secret history of the Ways and Means Committee which in 1912 reported the first free-sugar bill is ever written, it probably will be found that Mr. BROUSSARD'S own betrayal of the Democratic Party in his support of Speaker CANNON and Republican robber tariff bills was not the least of the influences which led the Democratic House to reverse a traditional policy of the party. However that may be, the passage of the bill gave the excuse for the sugar passages in the campaign text book, and gave Democratic Congressmen in nonsugar States, who were candidates for reelection, an opportunity to go before their constituencies and preach the doctrine of a cheaper breakfast table through free sugar, with the result that when Mr. Wilson and the new administration came into power there was a widespread sentiment in Washington, supported by the country, in favor of free-listing sugar;

and it was this sentiment which I believe inclined the President to let it be known that he was favorable to free sugar in the new tariff bill.

SHARED DISAPPOINTMENT OF LOUISIANIANS.

I shared the disappointment of the people of Louisiana over his attitude. I thought it a departure from the spirit of the plank adopted by the Baltimore platform and the policy of the party in the past to treat sugar, an article of universal consumption, as an ideal article on which to lay a revenue duty. Moreover, I felt that to free list sugar was to discriminate against a Louisiana industry which, while properly subject to tariff reductions along with the industries of the North and East, should not be ruthlessly destroyed; and more particularly did I feel that, if the industry was to be destroyed, it should not be suddenly, leaving ruin and bankruptcy in its wake, but that ample opportunity should be given to the people of south Louisiana to readjust themselves to new agricultural and economical conditions.

At Washington, following the inauguration, I urged these views with all the vigor of which I was capable on the President and those who were influential in the party councils, and then came back to Louisiana to pick up the threads of my business, which necessarily had suffered from eight months' absence in the interest of the Democratic national campaign.

I had no wish to return to Washington. I did not feel that I was called upon to make further sacrifices of my time. Mr. BROUSSARD had not been modest in saying to the people of Louisiana that at Seagirt, before the Democratic convention, he had had understandings with Gov. Wilson which assured the protection of sugar and that as a member of the resolutions committee at Baltimore he had incorporated into the platform a resolution which he had drafted at Seagirt with the President to safeguard the industry. I had no desire to usurp any of the functions of the Louisiana delegation, in whose patriotic devotion to the interests of the State I had the fullest confidence, and I was justified in feeling that if Mr. BROUSSARD reminded the President of the understandings which he represented they had had at Seagirt the threatened blow at sugar eventually would be averted.

SUGAR PLANTERS INSISTED UPON HIS RETURN.

But notwithstanding that my attitude was well known the financial interests in general and the sugar planters in particular insisted upon my return to Washington as the man who, in their judgment, could do more than any other to bring the President and the administration to stay the paralyzing attack on the industry which was then impending.

The planters were not my friends nor friends of the States. Merely because I conscientiously believed in and continued to preach the doctrine of Maj. Hearsey and the Democratic Party that sugar ought to have a revenue rather than a protective tariff for many years they ranked the States and myself as enemies of the industry rather than its friends. But in this instance they believed that my relations to the Democratic President and his campaign and the consistency with which I had preached the Democratic tariff doctrine put me in a peculiarly favorable position to serve them and their industry in the crisis then upon it.

Neither the States nor its publisher has ever cried from the house-tops his services to the industry and the local financial interests so deeply involved in its welfare. I have remained silent under the aspersions of Mr. John M. Parker and his ranting menagerie. I have ignored the consistent misrepresentations of envious competitors who, if they had rendered similar service and been the recipient of similar testimonials to those I refer to for the first time, they would long since have capitalized and commercialized these testimonials and paraded them in flaming advertisements in all the trade papers of the country. I even refrained from comment when after the 1915 extra session of the legislature the Sugar Planters' Association met and thanked the item and the press for aid rendered in the passage of the so-called antitrust sugar legislation and concluded with a gratuitous paragraph thanking the Porto Rican delegation for valuable assistance rendered two years prior in the 1913 struggle at Washington to prevent the adoption of free sugar, although these gentlemen never by word or letter had indicated any appreciation of my work undertaken at their own earnest request. I attributed their course to ignorance of the facts and not ingratitude and said nothing.

Neither the States nor myself is given to horn blowing. It is only because of Mr. BROUSSARD's wanton assault that I am moved to make use of these testimonials.

After I had said repeatedly to gentlemen who had come to me that I did not feel it was fair to ask me to make further business sacrifices, the American Cane Growers' Association, the official body of the sugar planters, summoned a meeting and embodied their appeal to me to return to Washington in a resolution never heretofore made public.

As an evidence of their earnestness, a large delegation, headed by President Charles A. Farwell and including Charles Godchaux, James Davidson Hill, and Mr. Burgieres, came to my office and presented the resolution with verbal assurances of their profound desire that I should act favorably on them. The resolution follows:

THE RESOLUTION OF THE PLANTERS.

"Whereas the leading industry of Louisiana is confronted with the gravest crisis in its history, the last Democratic House having passed a bill placing sugar on the free list, which action promises to exercise marked influence in the pending revision of the tariff; and

"Whereas such a course would not only be a departure from the time-honored policy of the party and a violation of its platform pledges, but would mark the industrial ruin of this State: Therefore be it

"Resolved, That the American Cane Growers' Association of Louisiana call upon Hon. Robert Ewing, Democratic national committeeman, to visit Washington at once and lay before the President and the party leaders the gravity of conditions confronting our people.

"The American Cane Growers' Association is mindful of the valuable services already rendered the people of Louisiana in this struggle by Col. Ewing and of the inconvenience and sacrifices that a second trip to Washington would entail, but considering the seriousness of the situation and the fact that he, of all Louisianians, is specially qualified to make these representations, it feels warranted in calling upon him to make this sacrifice, confident that he will be willing now, as in the past, to sink personal considerations when the interests of many of his fellow citizens are at stake.

"I hereby certify the above and foregoing is a true and correct copy of the resolution passed by the American Cane Growers' Association at its meeting of March 22, 1913.

"CHARLES A. FARWELL, President."

SAID BROUSSARD URGED THAT HE BE SENT.

Notwithstanding the appeal which the resolution made to me, I still was unwilling to make the trip to Washington unless my doing so carried with it the approval of the Louisiana Senators, the congressional delegation, and especially of Mr. BROUSSARD, whose political antipathy to me was a matter of wide knowledge. I was assured that Mr. BROUSSARD had been consulted and had urged my going.

These telegrams, which were published in the Times-Democrat of March 23, 1913, show how scrupulous were the planters to remove any ground for friction:

NEW ORLEANS, March 20, 1913.

Senator JOSEPH E. RANDELL,

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.:

Noticing that the Senate committee and the House committee are trying to frame tariff legislation without any interference from outside, we are very much worried and are trying to get Messrs. Foster and Ewing to go to Washington to give you assistance and cooperate with you. What do you think of the plan, and have you any suggestions?

AMERICAN CANE GROWERS' ASSOCIATION,
CHARLES A. FARWELL, President.

To which Mr. RANDELL answered:

WASHINGTON, March 20, 1913.

CHARLES A. FARWELL,

President American Cane Growers' Association,

New Orleans:

Responding to your telegram, think it quite important for your association to have several able representatives come here as soon as possible and remain until understanding is reached in regard to duty on sugar. Senator Foster and Col. Ewing can both be of great assistance. I am doing my utmost but need help.

J. E. RANDELL.

Under the circumstances, I did not believe that I could refuse to go to Washington. I so told the delegation, but said I would only consent to do so at my own expense.

The intense interest of the financial institutions of the city in the mission was evidenced in the letters which came to me from their heads and which not only portrayed the calamitous conditions which free sugar would bring but attached what I considered an undue value to the results which my trip would bring.

BANKERS PRAISE HIM FOR AGREEING TO GO.

These letters were from Sol Wexler, vice president of the Whitney-Central National Bank; W. R. Irby, president of the German-American; J. J. Gannon, president of the Hibernia Bank & Trust Co.; and Charles Janvier, president of the Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., and I give herewith that of Mr. Wexler as typical of these letters, showing how grave the bankers, as well as the planters, considered the situation from a financial, commercial, and industrial standpoint and how anxious they were that I should go:

NEW ORLEANS, March 24, 1913.

Col. ROBERT EWING,

Daily States, New Orleans.

MY DEAR COLONEL: I learn with great pleasure from Mr. Godchaux that you are going to Washington to-night to see whether you can not be of some assistance in the framing up of the present tariff bill, especially that portion referring to sugar.

I am sure that your cooperation will help matters materially. Your views are well known, and, being more or less disinterested, you can give facts concerning sugar which many others could not.

The report that sugar is liable to be placed on the free list must surely be a mistake. The Government can not ruin an industry without giving due notice. It is the opinion of many that the facts which have been placed before Congress are not correct, in so far as the sugar industry of Louisiana is concerned. That sugar can be grown without a tariff is believed by many, but I know it to be a fact that this is absolutely impossible; in fact, it is questionable whether it can be grown with any reduction in the tariff whatsoever. Therefore it is urgent that only a small reduction be made, and we sincerely trust that the view you have expressed of a 25 per cent reduction will be the maximum.

Should the sugar industry in Louisiana be destroyed or crippled, the injury to New Orleans will be very great; in fact, with the disaster of 1911, due to the freeze of the sugar crop, and the disaster of 1912, due to the floods and weather conditions, New Orleans has been crippled materially. The bank deposits, owing to the failure of the two successive sugar crops, have been reduced almost \$10,000,000. This shows in a few words how much Louisiana, and especially New Orleans, is dependent upon the sugar industry.

The statements made by the sugar planters as to the cost of production, etc., are correct, and, as I have had occasion recently to investigate same, although not directly interested, I desire to state that you can place the utmost confidence in the figures which have been submitted.

As above stated, any reduction in the tariff on sugar in excess of 25 per cent will be most disastrous not only to New Orleans but to the entire State of Louisiana; and I trust you will endeavor to convince the powers in Washington of our critical condition.

If I can be of any service, please do not hesitate to call upon me, as the time has now come when every patriot and citizen of Louisiana, and especially New Orleans, must put their shoulder to the wheel to save an industry which means so much to the State at large.

Thanking you sincerely in advance for anything you may do on behalf of the sugar planters, I am, with kindest regards,

Yours, very truly,

SOL WEXLER, Vice President.

THE SITUATION HE FOUND AT WASHINGTON.

When I reached Washington on March 26, I found the situation most serious, with the President, who had not then publicly committed himself but was believed to be strongly inclined to free sugar, holding the situation in the hollow of his hand.

There was a powerful element in the Senate favoring free sugar. From Mr. UNDERWOOD, then chairman of the Ways and Means, I learned that the passage of a free-sugar bill by the House was inevitable, owing to the feeling of Democratic Members who had declared for it on the stump, that they were under an obligation to make good.

The only ray of hope I found was Mr. UNDERWOOD's statement to me that if the Senate should amend the act and provide a reasonable duty, it was his judgment that the House would agree in conference to a reasonable but reduced duty.

Mr. UNDERWOOD having given me authority to do so, in one of my early interviews with the President I urged Mr. UNDERWOOD's suggestion as opening the door to a just compromise. I was greatly disappointed to find the President apparently immovable in the position that he could not consent to an administration measure in the Senate carrying a different provision from a similar measure in the House.

In view of the attitude of the President and Mr. UNDERWOOD, I could see no hope of escaping free sugar. There was left only a campaign to stare off the evil day; and I then began to press upon the President with all my earnestness the justice of allowing a space of seven years before the final extinguishment of the duty.

MR. BROUSSARD INVISIBLE FOR SEVERAL DAYS.

Mr. BROUSSARD reached Washington March 27, the day after I did. He neither saw the President nor put himself in touch with Senator RANDELL, ex-Senator Foster, or myself on Thursday, Friday, or Saturday; and I violate no confidence when I say that it was the opinion in many quarters that his violent criticism of the President in public, soon begun by him, made him so lacking in influence with the administration as to hold out little hope from him of useful service.

Sunday he visited Gov. Hall at the Willard, and on Monday, the 31st, for the first time he went to the White House to present Gov. Hall. The visit was brief and fruitless, as the Washington dispatch to the Times-Democrat the following day showed. On Thursday of the same week he saw the President with Mr. Wexler to suggest the Canadian plan of taxing sugar, but while the President was interested he said the suggestion ought to have been made 10 days before and was then too late. Why it was too late I shall show.

Between the day of my arrival, March 26, and Wednesday, April 2, one of the two vital days in the struggle, I saw the President on several occasions, alone and in company with others. Senator RANDELL will not want for witnesses to bear out the implication in his statement that, in these critical days, it was my good fortune to get audiences when others failed.

THE ACCESS HE HAD TO THE PRESIDENT.

Dispatches to the New Orleans papers of the time showed that I was with the President an hour on Tuesday, April 1. Tuesday is Cabinet day, and callers are rarely received and their time is limited.

When Mr. Wexler returned from Washington he gave the press an interview. In it he said:

"The presence of Democratic Committeeman Ewing and of Senator Foster has been of inestimable benefit. Mr. Ewing has had the ear of the President because of his association with him before and after the campaign, and because of his services during the campaign he enjoys a prestige which enabled our representatives and others to at least obtain audiences and an opportunity to protest against the proposed measure."

It will be denied by no one at this time that if the sugar industry, by the act of the present session of Congress, is preserved for four years or indefinitely, it will be because, after the President first declared for immediate free sugar, he yielded to argument and importunity and authorized Mr. UNDERWOOD to write into the tariff bill the three years' provision under which the administration may now continue the duty on sugar without reopening the tariff law.

If Mr. BROUSSARD, who has constituted himself for many years the special champion of the sugar industry, was responsible, directly or indirectly, for this change in the President's attitude, a natural assumption is that he would have been the medium through which the concession, with its conditions, was offered. That he was not and I was will be accepted as circumstantial proof, I take it, that Mr. BROUSSARD has a doubtful claim to the credit he is trying to appropriate and as warranting the statements of Senator RANDELL and ex-Senator Foster which have so upset the junior Senator.

SENT FOR EWING TO OFFER THREE YEARS' GRACE.

Early on the morning of April 2, while still in my room at the Powhatan Hotel, I was called to the telephone by the White House and told that the President desired to see me at 9 o'clock. I was in good condition and I responded to the summons on time.

It was to communicate to me the fact, to be in turn communicated to the planters and the Senators, that while he was definitely committed to free sugar, he had been moved to see the justice of the plea that time ought to be given to those directly and indirectly dependent on the industry to adjust themselves to the new conditions. The condition was that the planters should accept the concession and the Senators agree to support the bill.

I laid the matter promptly before the congressional delegation and the Louisianians then in Washington in the interest of sugar, and wired it to New Orleans.

"You have saved the State \$30,000,000," was Sol Wexler's statement to me in Senator RANDELL's room, in the Senator's presence, when I told him of the President's proposition.

I submit these telegrams as suggestive of the medium through which the planters were seeking relief:

Col. ROBERT EWING,
Powhatan Hotel, Washington:

Proposition as wired, while unsatisfactory and can not be accepted, shows that President has receded from his previous position and is now open to argument, no doubt thanks to your good work, which we all highly appreciate. Now that you have gotten him in this position, hope you will keep at it and get better deal, as we can not accept one he has proposed.

CHARLES GODCHAUX.

NEW ORLEANS, April 3, 1913.

Messrs. EWING, FOSTER, and MILLING,
Powhatan Hotel, Washington:

At your suggestion have called together such planters as could be assembled. They are of the opinion that the proposition made by the President should not be agreed to. Ultimate free sugar would be ruinous. They believe that our Senators, Congressmen, and Representatives in Washington, by continuing the good fight they are now making and which the justice of our cause warrants, will obtain better consideration at the hands of the President and Congress.

CHARLES A. FARWELL, President.

These telegrams were not conclusive, pending a formal meeting of the American Cane Growers' Association. But the President grew impatient for an answer. On Friday afternoon, April 4, he sent Senator HUGHES, of New Jersey, and Secretary Tumulty to see Senator RANDELL and myself, finding us in Senator RANDELL's office. They wanted an immediate answer, saying the bill was ready and must

include either free sugar or the President's concession, subject to the condition already referred to. We advised them the planters had called a meeting in New Orleans for Saturday, and that we would inform the President at an appointment Saturday night, April 5, at 8 o'clock, of their action.

On Saturday the planters acted, declining the proposition. It was evident then that we had reached a critical phase of the negotiations, and that our only hope was to persuade the President to withdraw the condition accompanying his concession. Meeting Mr. BROUSSARD at Saturday evening's conference, we invited him to go with us to the White House.

The President received us at the hour appointed. We consumed the full 50 minutes of our time, during which Senator RANDELL made a powerful appeal for the continuation of the three years' clause despite his inability to vote for the bill. In the conference neither side yielded.

MIL. EWING REMAINED WITH PRESIDENT.

Mr. BROUSSARD now contests Senator RANDELL's statement that when they left I remained, and Mr. RANDELL's inference that what occurred after their departure influenced the President's eventual decision to yield the three years without condition.

Mr. BROUSSARD is mistaken. Mr. RANDELL's recollection is perfect with respect to who remained. I did. I told Mr. RANDELL as we rose it was my desire to do so.

I cite Mr. BROUSSARD himself as a witness against himself. In his statement he says:

"As we walked out of the front door of the White House we met and stopped and shook hands with Congressman UNDERWOOD on his way to keep his appointment."

Our conference was held in the President's library on the second floor of the White House. The front door is downstairs. I myself met and stopped and shook hands with Mr. UNDERWOOD as he entered the library. Mr. RANDELL and Mr. BROUSSARD had gone 10 minutes before.

WHAT WILSON SAID TO UNDERWOOD.

What occurred between the President and Mr. UNDERWOOD was narrated in a dispatch printed on the first page of the States, April 8, 1913. Here it is:

"Mr. UNDERWOOD was informed that the Louisiana interests had refused to agree to the alternative proposal, and that he might go ahead with the bill. This would have meant free-sugar immediately."

"What is your desire that we should do?" asked the Ways and Means chairman during the hesitation that followed the President's announcement.

"Notwithstanding their declination, I would like to see those fellows get the benefit of the three years anyway," said the President.

"Then the bill shall be changed," replied Mr. UNDERWOOD.

On the next day, Sunday, April 6, it was announced that the President had agreed to the three-year clause. On April 7 the bill was reported to the House—not 16 days later, as Mr. BROUSSARD, erring again, alleges.

This extract from the second paragraph of the press report printed in the newspapers on Monday, April 7, 1913, convicts Mr. BROUSSARD of this misstatement, all the more remarkable from the fact that at Washington he had full access to the facts and ample time to verify them:

"WASHINGTON, April 7.

"* * * Just as Speaker CLARK was dropping his gavel in the House, Majority Leader UNDERWOOD dropped the tariff-revision bill into the hopper, and thereby officially started a business that promises to keep Congress at work through the Washington 'dog days' and well into August."

This practically completes the record of my activities at Washington. A later service, however, I was called upon to render the planters.

ANOTHER SERVICE TO THE INDUSTRY.

When the Ways and Means Committee presented the bill it set March 1 as the date of the first cut in the duty. Evidently Mr. BROUSSARD, pretending always to be alert to the interests of sugar, did not realize the injustice to the third district growers of a reduction before the season was entirely over.

Be that as it may, Congressman ESTOPINAL, on the representation of the planting and financial interests, subsequently introduced a bill to extend this date to June 30.

Is it not significantly indicative of Mr. BROUSSARD's poor standing with the Democracy that it was Mr. ESTOPINAL, and not Mr. BROUSSARD, who was asked by these gentlemen to introduce their bill?

On October 24 I was handed this telegram from Col. James D. Hill and Mr. Paul Christian:

WASHINGTON, October 24, 1913.

Hon. CHARLES A. FARWELL,
New Orleans, La.:

It is very important that Col. Ewing see UNDERWOOD, when he goes to Mobile, and impress on him the necessity for passing the Estopinal joint resolution. UNDERWOOD left for Alabama last night. ESTOPINAL wrote Ewing strong letter to-day, and this office also wrote him.

HILL and CHRISTIAN.

It was also desired that I should see the President, and I make this excerpt from the letter of Mr. Christian, now closely identified with Mr. BROUSSARD, to show how little foundation there is for Mr. BROUSSARD's present statement that I have been a consistent and persistent enemy of sugar.

WANTED HIM AGAIN TO SEE PRESIDENT.

"I believe, Colonel, that if you were to lay this matter before the President he would see the justice of our contention and at least agree not to interpose his objection to any relief that Congress may see fit to extend to the people of Louisiana."

"Postmaster General Burleson spoke in the most sympathetic tone for our people, stated how he had always been for a duty of 1 cent, and dwelt on the hard fight you had made for the Louisiana sugar industry. To use his own words, he said that the people of Louisiana would never know how hard you had worked to save their industry, and that the concession that had been secured from the administration was entirely due to your efforts, as the President had been intent on making sugar free at once. He said that you had secured the three-year clause."

I went to Mobile and spent several hours with Mr. UNDERWOOD. I found him most sympathetic toward the State and the industry. I failed only in my mission because he said he and the President feared the amendment might open the door to a general attack on the tariff

law. But he took occasion to add that the committee had amended the bill to protect the planters on the crop of 1913-14; that they had extended the date exactly as requested by the Louisiana people, and that they would as readily have made the extension to June 30 if at the time they had been requested to do so.

Why did Mr. BROUSSARD, setting up title to a monopoly of knowledge of the sugar question and the self-constituted and anointed apostle of the industry, let this golden opportunity slip to save a considerable fortune to the district he then represented?

MR. BURLISON GIVES HIM THE CREDIT.

It is appropriate to include in this record an extract from a letter written by Postmaster General A. S. Burlison to Senator RANDELL, dated March 30, 1916, in answer to Mr. BROUSSARD's attack. Mr. Burlison is the political adviser of the President and, among the Cabinet, one of his most intimate friends. He said:

"I know Col. Ewing labored without ceasing in his efforts to keep sugar from going on the free list, and he left nothing undone at that time to accomplish his purpose. He worked night and day, and I believe, without disparaging in the least what may have been done by others, that it can be truthfully said that Bob Ewing did more than any one person toward those things which finally resulted in the retention of the 1-cent duty on sugar, with free sugar after three years."

Thus completing a record, unimpeachable by Mr. BROUSSARD or anyone else, I am willing the public shall judge whether I have been a "persistent and consistent enemy of sugar"; whether, as Parker headquarters has said, I merely "went along with the others to Washington" or responded to a call of distress of the planting and financial interests, and whether Senator RANDELL and ex-Senator Foster spoke within the record when they told the people of the third district that, in the matter of the three years' concession, their real debt of gratitude was to me.

III.

Mr. BROUSSARD charges that, through the indifference or forgetfulness of the national committeeman, F. G. Lowry, the hired agent of the Federal Sugar Co., was permitted to write into the Democratic Campaign Textbook "a vicious attack on the leading industry of his State."

The charge is gratuitous. He might as reasonably have laid the war in Europe at my doors.

Mr. BROUSSARD quotes at length from the official proceedings of the Senate lobby investigating committee to prove that Mr. Lowry furnished the material for the book. Mr. Lowry's own evidence offers sufficient proof that the charge is without foundation.

The campaign committee was divided in halves, one with headquarters in New York, the other with headquarters in Chicago. I was placed at the head of one of the bureaus in Chicago. The textbook was prepared and issued from New York.

My first knowledge of the gross attack on sugar came through a newspaper. I was outraged. I considered the attack a clear breach of faith after what I had done to persuade Mr. Bryan not to introduce a free-sugar resolution at Baltimore. I considered it a violation of the tariff plank we had written into the platform.

As soon as my attention was directed to the matter I left Chicago for New York in the hope that there was still time to have the obnoxious matter expunged. Unfortunately, it was too late. The book was printed and already had been widely distributed. The damage could not be repaired; but I did not hesitate to express to the New York headquarters my disapprobation of the lack of foresight which had permitted the inclusion in the book of matter affecting an industry in my State unwarranted by anything in the party platform.

Since Mr. BROUSSARD has seen fit to charge the injury done to sugar to my "indifference or forgetfulness," I am justified in retorting that Mr. BROUSSARD's "indifference or forgetfulness" has cost it more.

The levying of an income tax was long advocated by the Democratic Party. Was it "indifference or forgetfulness" which led Mr. BROUSSARD, always proclaiming his readiness to sacrifice everything—even "party regularity"—for sugar, to join in its advocacy and vote for it in Congress? For everyone with common sense knew that the tax would yield so great a revenue that the reason for keeping sugar on the dutiable list would disappear; and, as a matter of fact, it was the income tax which was largely responsible for and made possible the free-sugar legislation of 1913.

John Marks gave that very reason in the Louisiana Senate in 1910 for his vote against ratification of the amendment. Did Mr. BROUSSARD really care nothing for sugar when he urged and voted for the amendment or was he merely too stupid to recognize the consequence of his course?

IV.

Mr. BROUSSARD's charge that I am seeking to become the political boss of the State and that I have claimed "the credit for every Federal appointment made in Louisiana" are the vapors of a man with a grouse. They but echo the mouthings of Mr. John M. Parker and his spellbinders and organs, and they prove nothing except that Mr. BROUSSARD has joined the pack now barking at my heels.

Since the pack is made up of men no longer in sympathy with the Democratic Party or its principles, Mr. BROUSSARD, who is a Democrat in name and a Republican in faith, must find himself in congenial company. But if he were honest he would not continue to hold goods obtained by false pretenses. He would resign his senatorial commission, as did Dr. Labbe, of St. Martin Parish, and become an open rather than a covert enemy of the party which for many years has provided him with his bread and butter.

I am neither a boss nor do I desire to become one, and Mr. BROUSSARD can not galvanize Mr. John M. Parker's dead issue.

It is known to all in Louisiana that I have no political ambitions or desire to fill any salary office, nor do I derive, directly or indirectly, any pecuniary interest or gain from my political activities; while, on the other hand, Mr. BROUSSARD has held public office continuously since early manhood.

ONLY INFLUENCED THREE APPOINTMENTS.

I have made no claim to the credit of having controlled every Federal appointment made in Louisiana. I have not sought to control them. The only appointments which I personally requested are those of Mr. B. P. Sullivan, whom the Times-Democrat praised as an exceptional official and criticized the governor for failing to reappoint; of Dr. M. M. Bradburn, a leading druggist of this city, to the minor position, emoluments considered, of inspector of drugs; and Mr. Whitfield Jack, district attorney at Shreveport, than whom there is no cleaner man at the bar of Louisiana nor higher-toned citizen in the State.

All three of these appointments had the cordial concurrence of the incumbent Senators; and at least it can be said of them, as it can not be said of many of Mr. BROUSSARD's appointments in the third district, that they are true blue in their Democracy and that they are not conniving with Mr. Parker and the Republican enemy.

Mr. BROUSSARD refers to the Federal appointments here, which he charges me with dictating, as of men who, "when appointed," scarcely had recovered from the political defeats which they had met at the hands of the white people of the State."

HIS SNEERS COME WITH POOR GRACE.

Such an utterance comes with poor grace from a man who, but for a political accident and the possession of an unusual faculty for dissimulation, would not now be wearing so uncomfortably the mantle which once graced a Benjamin, a White, a Eustis, and a Gibson.

He can not, of course, refer to ex-Gov. Sanders as an appointee of mine, for he knows I had no connection, near or remote, with that appointment.

If he refers to ex-Senator Foster, who polled more votes in the last campaign than he did himself, and who deservedly enjoys the respect and affection of his people for service worthily performed, his own endorsement of Senator Foster must have been a mere pretense of friendship.

If he refers to Gen. Guion, the present United States attorney, or to former Gov. Heard, the present subtreasurer, I have only to say that I have no excuses to offer for having joined with Senators RANDELL and Thornton in recommending men who served Louisiana with so much credit in every station to which the people called them.

The fact that Mr. Fauntleroy, the collector of internal revenue, was Mr. RANDELL's secretary and Mr. Burch Lee, the surveyor, Mr. BROUSSARD's, acquits me, I think, of having controlled the selection of either.

AT LEAST THESE MEN ARE NOT LIKE HIM.

But whether I exerted myself actively or passively or not at all in the cases of these gentlemen, against none of them can the charge be brought, as it has been brought against the junior Senator, that in a campaign sharply drawn between the Democracy and its enemies he turned to bite the party hand that fed him and treacherously raised his voice in aid of a cause inimical to the interests of his people.

Mr. BROUSSARD's slurs are beneath my notice. They can not affect my standing among the people, among whom I have lived for 35 years.

If Mr. BROUSSARD desires it understood that he wants no comparisons with me, nor desires to follow the banners of me or my class, the feeling is reciprocal. The comparisons would be to his disadvantage, and my class is not made up of political mongrels and deserters.

Finally, whatever faults I possess, there is some consolation in the knowledge that I have never aspired to rank with the double-dealer or the ingrate, and Mr. BROUSSARD was the one in the campaign of four years ago, as he was the other in the Gueydan congressional campaign of 1914 and is in the campaign of to-day.

ROBERT EWING.

RANDELL RIGHT, SAYS M. J. FOSTER.

Former United States Senator Murphy J. Foster, now collector of the port, confirms the statements of Senator RANDELL in his Franklin speech as to Mr. Ewing's part in postponing the free-sugar schedule. Mr. BROUSSARD had said in his tirade on Messrs. RANDELL and Ewing that he would not believe Mr. Foster had "concurred."

He not only "concurs," but goes into the matter at length in support of Mr. RANDELL's declarations in a statement as follows:

"Senator BROUSSARD, in his late speech in the Senate, stated:

"I can not conclude this explanation, Mr. President, without notice of the fact that former Senator Foster, of Louisiana, is reported in the account of the Franklin meeting to have concurred in the statement made at that place by my colleague."

I will not believe, I can not believe, upon the mere statement of a publication of the character of the Daily States, under the controlling management of Robert Ewing, that former Senator Foster concurred in what my colleague stated. Nay, Mr. President, I would not believe it on the statement of any man short of the former Senator himself.

"In the many talks which I had with the former Senator regarding the details of these matters I am quite clear in the statement that the facts which I recited to him are at utter variance with the statement of my colleague, in which the former Senator is reported to have concurred."

"In reply to these remarks of the Senator, I wish to state that at the meeting in Franklin I did concur in what Mr. RANDELL stated in reference to the services which Mr. Ewing rendered in the sugar fight. I stated that I knew he had been requested by the Louisiana Sugar Planters' Association to go to Washington in behalf of the sugar interests."

"I was upon the ground during practically the whole of that fight. I further stated at the Franklin meeting that I knew Mr. Ewing, in and out of season, by day and night, had labored assiduously for the cause of the sugar interests of Louisiana, and that in my judgment he had rendered valuable assistance in the defeat of the passage of a free-sugar tariff measure. I further declared that, in my opinion, it was largely, if not entirely, due to his efforts that the rate of duty provided in the bill had been extended three years. That was my opinion when I was in Washington; I have repeatedly stated this opinion in private conversation, and it is now my opinion."

"In making this statement I had no intention or purpose to reflect upon the efforts of the Louisiana delegation of Congress or upon the efforts of any other friends representing the sugar interests at Washington or in Louisiana. There was nothing in my remarks that could possibly bear any such construction."

"This sugar fight has many sides to it, and I do not feel that just at the present time it would be wise on my part to go into any detailed history of that struggle."

"Mr. BROUSSARD further says, speaking of Mr. Ewing:

"He has claimed the credit for every Federal appointment made in that State. And what sort of appointments have been made there? With few exceptions, those who have been appointed to Federal office had scarcely, when appointed, recovered from the political defeats with which they met at the hands of the white people of the State."

"With scarcely an exception all of them had gone down to overwhelming defeat and had to be picked up from their place of retirement to take charge of the Federal affairs in the State of Louisiana. This has been done over the protest of the right-thinking independent Democracy of that State. With scarcely an exception, no one else was given recognition."

"Of course this fling at the appointments of President Wilson includes, and was intended to include, myself among the other defeated candidates."

"It is true that I was defeated by Mr. RANDELL in the last senatorial contest. The voice of the Democratic Party, as expressed in a Democratic primary, is a law unto me. I did not sulk in my tent after my defeat, nor did I for a moment falter or waver in my support

and allegiance to the great party which had so often honored me. Neither did I know or suspect that my defeat in a Democratic primary would be considered by my Democratic friends as a bar to my recognition for appointment to any office to which I might subsequently aspire.

"When some of my friends were kind and thoughtful enough to suggest my name as collector of this port, I stated to one and all that, while I would be pleased to accept the appointment, I would not consider or even apply for the position if my appointment was not acceptable to the Democratic Members of the House and Senate from this State. At a meeting of the Members of the House and Senate held in Washington I was unanimously indorsed and recommended to the President for this appointment by the entire Louisiana delegation. This recommendation was indorsed by National Committeeman Ewing. I felt then, and feel now, deeply grateful for the cordial and unanimous support which my friends at that meeting accorded me. It is true that Mr. Ewing supported me, but his support was voluntary, and the only comment or reference that he ever made to me on the subject of his indorsement was that he believed I was entitled to this recognition by the party.

"I wish further to state that I did not know that my appointment was made over the protest of the right-thinking independent Democracy of my State. I thought, and still think, that the indorsement of the Democratic Members of the lower House and of both Senators is a pretty fair reflex of the Democratic sentiment in Louisiana.

"I can at present recall only two appointees to Federal offices besides myself who had been lately defeated for positions which they had sought at the hands of the Democratic electorate of this State. These appointees are ex-Gov. Sanders and Judge Guion. Gov. Sanders has stated publicly that Mr. Ewing had nothing, either directly or indirectly, to do with his appointment; and if the national committeeman joined the two Senators in their recommendation of Judge Guion, it is to his credit that he did so, for there is no citizen of Louisiana who bears a more enviable reputation for professional ability, for personal integrity, and for all those qualities which go to make a splendid citizen than does Judge Guion."

OFFICE OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL,
Washington, D. C., March 30, 1916.

HON. JOSEPH E. RANDELL,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR SENATOR RANDELL: Your letter of this date has just been placed before me. I recall quite well the activity of yourself, ex-Senator Foster, and Col. Robert Ewing, in the spring of 1913, to retain a tariff duty on sugar. Personally, I was in sympathy with the effort being made to retain 1 cent duty on sugar, believing that it was an excellent means of raising revenue. I had voted for the Underwood tariff bill in July, 1912, which placed sugar on the free list, but Mr. UNDERWOOD and those who had the responsibility of framing that measure knew quite well at that time that I did not favor free sugar, and that I had earnestly urged that a tariff tax be continued on sugar strictly for revenue purposes.

In the conduct of the national campaign I was closely associated with Col. Robert Ewing at the Chicago headquarters, and during its progress more than once he made known to me his deep concern about the effect the coming revision of the tariff would have on the sugar interests of his State. I told him what my own attitude had been with reference to the retention of a tariff duty on sugar. In 1913, while the Underwood bill was in course of preparation, Col. Ewing was in Washington and stopped at the hotel where I was living. He again made known to me his anxiety about the action to be taken by the Ways and Means Committee with reference to sugar. Because of his knowledge that I had favored the retention of a duty on sugar he talked freely with me about his efforts in that direction. After our first talk he had a number of interviews on the same subject with me, and on two occasions I recall that you and ex-Senator Foster were present. I know Col. Ewing labored without ceasing in his efforts to keep sugar from going on the free list, and he left nothing undone at that time to accomplish his purpose. He worked night and day, and I believe, without disparaging in the least what may have been done by others, that it can be truthfully said that Bob Ewing did more than any one person toward those things which finally resulted in the retention of the 1 cent per pound duty on sugar, with free sugar after three years.

Col. Ewing at that time was indefatigable in his efforts in behalf of the retention of a duty on sugar, and it is thoroughly unjust for anyone now to attempt to make on any mind an impression to the contrary.

My attention has been called to a statement made by Senator BROUSSARD in his speech on the 27th instant that "the effort in the House to put a production or consumption tax on sugar met with the approval of the Postmaster General." I am at a loss to know why such a statement should have been made. It is of small consequence, but the truth is I was not aware that such an effort had been made until the Senator alluded to it in his speech. I not only did not favor such effort, but did favor the action taken by the House, and am opposed to fixing any limitation of time on the continuance of the 1 cent per pound duty on sugar, and I sincerely hope the Senate will pass the bill in the same terms as it passed the House.

In conclusion, permit me to express the hope that you may succeed in the splendid fight you are making for the Democratic ticket headed by Attorney General Pleasant, and that the hypocritical thrust being made at our party by the so-called Progressives, who are but thinly disguised Republicans, will fall as such efforts have always failed in the past.

Very sincerely, yours,

A. S. BURLISON.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Washington, April 5, 1916.

DEAR SENATOR RANDELL: Replying to your inquiry with reference to the attitude of Hon. Robert Ewing, member of the Democratic national committee from Louisiana, as to tariff tax on sugar, I have the honor to make the following statement:

The duty of issuing the Democratic Handbook for the campaign of 1912 was intrusted to me, and one of the chapters in the book was headed "The family sugar bowl," which favored putting sugar on the free list. When the handbook was printed and was being circulated Hon. Robert Ewing, member of the national Democratic committee, as soon as he had seen the book—he never had the opportunity of seeing it while it was in the making—protested with vigor against the free-sugar chapter, and insisted that I call in the edition and omit

all reference to free sugar. This I firmly declined to do. Mr. Ewing complained bitterly of the position taken in the textbook and contended in favor of continuing a tariff tax on sugar. When Congress met and the tariff act was in the making Mr. Ewing spent much time in Washington and was most earnest and insistent in advocacy of a tax on sugar. When it became clear that free sugar would prevail in spite of his opposition, which he exerted with all the influence he could command, he was zealous in advocacy of the postponing of the date when the schedule for free sugar would go into effect. In view of the serious efforts Mr. Ewing made and his attempt to secure a recall of the handbook when he learned of its advocacy of free sugar, and his insistence upon a tax upon sugar, I am astounded that anyone should think that Mr. Ewing failed at any time to espouse the cause for which the sugar producers were making an earnest fight. Upon this question my view and the views of Mr. Ewing were wide apart, for I favored the free-sugar legislation, and the most persistent opponent of such legislation with whom I talked was Robert Ewing. He tried to convince me that he was right, and failed. I would as soon have tried to make the Mississippi River run upstream as to induce Mr. Ewing to abate one jot or tittle of his unceasing and untiring advocacy of a tax on sugar.

Sincerely, yours,

JOSEPHUS DANIELS.

HON. JOSEPH E. RANDELL,
United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

NATIONAL DEFENSE.

The Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, resumed the consideration of the bill (H. R. 12766) to increase the efficiency of the Military Establishment of the United States.

MR. THOMPSON. Mr. President, I am favorable to the general plan of military preparedness proposed by this bill, except as to some of the nonessential details. I am opposed to a large standing army, but a reasonable increase, such as provided for in this bill to meet new conditions, is absolutely necessary. I am against militarism and against enforced military service in time of peace, and if this bill contemplated either proposition I would vote against it. Militarism is obnoxious to the thought and spirit of the American people. It is contrary to their high ideals. If the spirit of militarism had not prevailed in Europe, the terrible European war would never have occurred. But an army of less than two men per thousand of our population, as provided by this bill, can not be said to be a large standing army or any indication that this country is advancing toward militarism.

There can be no objection to reasonable preparedness to preserve peace, but there is serious objection to such extensive preparations as would tend to promote war. It is necessary to be prepared to defend ourselves as a Nation so long as there is militarism anywhere in the world, just the same as it is necessary to be prepared to defend ourselves as individuals against unlawful attack so long as there are law violators abroad; but this is the only extent to which any nation or any person is justified in going.

Under existing conditions we would be derelict in our duty if we did not profit by what we have learned from observing the awful conflict in Europe.

The experience of the nations engaged in this deplorable war has demonstrated that we need plenty of guns and ammunition, manufactured by the Government itself, and a sufficient number of experienced men and officers to make proper use of them, and strong coast defenses, an adequate number of submarines and aeroplanes, to prevent the landing of any foreign foe.

This bill simply provides an adequate armed force for defensive purposes only. There is a great difference between preparation for defense to maintain peace and preparation for war. One may involve an additional expenditure of perhaps \$100,000,000 annually, while the other would involve an expenditure of more than \$100,000,000 per week. There are two extreme views on this question: One, that there should be no additional preparation whatever; and the other, that we should go the limit and build up a large Army and Navy second to none in the world. The President in his program proposed a sensible middle ground. He simply recommended a reasonable increase in armaments for defensive purposes, which he believes necessary to maintain the honor and integrity of the Nation.

Mr. President, the report of the Committee on Military Affairs sets out the proposed increase in the Army and the changes in the military forces of the United States so clearly and completely that I wish to insert that portion of the report as a part of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SIMMONS in the chair). Without objection, it will be so ordered.

The matter referred to is as follows:

The bill increases the Regular Army by the addition of the following units:

- 34½ regiments of Infantry.
- 10 regiments of Cavalry.
- 15 regiments of Field Artillery.
- 5 regiments of Engineers.
- 93 companies of Coast Artillery.
- 2 battalions of Mounted Engineers.
- 7 aero squadrons.

And the necessary increases of other auxiliary troops and staff departments.

These new organizations will increase the authorized Regular Army in time of peace about 74,789 enlisted men. The authorized strength of the Regular Army under ordinary circumstances will be about 174,789 men, or less than two men per thousand for our population, and can in emergency be raised to about 236,000 by the addition of men trained in its own ranks and then passed to the Regular Army Reserve.

These numbers need some explanation as do all statements regarding the strength of the Army, for otherwise no accurate comparison can be made. The present authorized strength as limited by law is 100,000 enlisted men of the line, including Philippine Scouts, but to this must be added 6,000 Quartermaster Corps enlisted men, 4,012 enlisted men of the Hospital Corps, and 4,000 unassigned recruits, which, under existing laws, are not to be counted as part of the strength of the Army, making a total force authorized of 114,012 enlisted men. The present actual strength is 89,324 so-called "line including the Philippine Scouts," plus 4,900 enlisted men of the Quartermaster Corps, 4,436 enlisted men of the Hospital Corps, and 4,000 authorized unassigned recruits, a total actual strength of 103,660. This number is limited by appropriations for the support of the Army and is fixed by the President.

The proposed force will include 174,789 enlisted men "line of the Army and Philippine Scouts," plus 6,409 enlisted men of the Quartermaster Corps, plus 7,290 enlisted men of the Hospital Corps, plus 6,098 unassigned recruits, an actual total of 194,586, or an actual increase in the authorized strength of 74,789 enlisted men of the "line and Philippine Scouts," 409 Quartermaster Corps men, 3,278 Hospital Corps men, and 2,098 unassigned recruits, a total actual increase of 80,574 enlisted men.

The total commissioned strength at present is 5,045. The proposed bill increases this number to 10,726. This number seems out of proportion to the proposed increase in the enlisted force, but in this number are 124 veterinarians not heretofore counted as officers, 822 officers for detached service with the National Guard and at educational institutions, etc., and a largely increased number of officers (88) for aviation service. The proportional increase in reality is not as large as the increase in enlisted men because of the increased size of the company units.

The proposed Regular Army will consist of seven Infantry divisions and two Cavalry divisions, in addition to the Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry, the Philippine Scouts, and one regiment for Alaska, and the various small detachments for special purposes throughout the Army.

The principal changes in the Infantry, Cavalry, and Field Artillery consist in the addition of a headquarters and a supply company to each such regiment, the addition of a machine-gun company to each Infantry and Cavalry regiment, and an increase of the minimum strength of the Infantry companies.

No detailed argument is required to show the necessity for a separate organization to operate and care for the machine guns of a regiment. The instruction of the personnel charged with this weapon is so essentially different from that of the other companies of the regiment that such companies should be permanent and self-contained, as are the other companies of the regiment. The proposed company will be armed with six machine guns, with one extra gun in case of breakage.

The minimum strength of the Infantry companies is increased from 65 to 100 men. This is an exceedingly important provision. A company of only 65 men, out of which the sick, the furloughed men, and other inevitable absentees must come, leaves only about 40 or 50 men for duty, a number totally inadequate for purposes of instruction either of officers or enlisted men. The proposed strength of 100 men will provide a company double the size of the old one and will far more than double the efficiency of the company units. A company of 50 men can not be raised to 150 men in case of war without seriously impairing the company's efficiency, but a company of 100 men can be increased by 50 men, some of whom will be from the reserve, and the company will still be an efficient organization.

The commissioned personnel of the Medical Corps will furnish approximately 1 surgeon to each 200 men in the field forces. This is an adequate provision for both the medical and sanitary duties in the Army and compares very favorably with the numbers of that corps in foreign armies.

The Signal Corps is increased sufficiently to provide the necessary telephone, telegraph, and wireless companies and the aero squadrons and staff officers necessary for the proposed increase in the rest of the Army, and the aviation section has been more than doubled to provide for that important branch of the service.

The Ordnance Department is increased by a sufficient number of officers to provide for the increased staff duties of that department and for the designing and experimental work involved in the production of new arms and armament shown to be necessary by the present European war.

The Corps of Engineers is increased by the necessary officers for the proposed increase in engineer troops and by additional 51 officers necessary for duty with the National Guard, at educational institutions, and for other similar detached duties not heretofore provided for.

The Quartermaster Corps, the Inspector General's Department, the Adjutant General's Department, and the Judge Advocate General's Department have each been increased sufficiently to provide for the increased staff duties required of each department incident to the increase in the Army.

The General Staff Corps has been increased sufficiently to perform its proper functions. Heretofore it has been very inadequate in numbers and has never been able to undertake the solutions of many of the problems devolving upon the general staff in foreign armies. Germany has a general staff of 309 general staff officers, with 228 other officers attached for general staff work. France has a general staff of 612 general staff officers, with 263 other officers attached for duty. Austria-Hungary has a general staff of 508 general staff officers, with 421 other officers attached for duty. Great Britain has a general staff of 171 general staff officers. In view of these numbers the increase in our general staff to 88 must be considered as very moderate indeed.

The so-called detached officers list is increased from 200 to 1,022. This will provide officers for duty with the National Guard, at educational institutions, as military attachés, and other detached duty authorized by existing law without depleting the commissioned personnel of the companies, troops, batteries, and higher units and thereby crippling the efficiency of the Army to a deplorable extent.

The status of dental surgeons and veterinarians is materially improved in this bill. The dental surgeons and veterinarians are commissioned as dental surgeons and veterinarians, respectively, but inasmuch as they are never called upon to command troops they are not given rank, but only the pay and allowances of the grade in which

commissioned. The number of chaplains has been increased to meet the increased strength of the Army.

Provision is made for citizens of the United States who have served as officers of Philippine Scouts who, after having served faithfully therein, are permitted to retire with the highest pay and allowances of a retired enlisted man of the Regular Army.

The enlisted period has been retained as heretofore, but provision has been made to encourage men to enlist by making it possible for a bright, intelligent man to qualify in his duties and pass to the reserve in a shorter time than possible heretofore. Young men are also to be encouraged to enlist by giving men who have served honorably and faithfully further preference in regard to appointments under the civil service of the Government.

A new class of reservists is created, to consist of men who, by the nature of their civil occupation or profession, are peculiarly fitted for the special technical work of the Quartermaster, Engineer, or Signal Corps, or the Ordnance or Medical Departments of the Army. The number of this class of men that would be needed in time of war is far in excess of the numbers that will ever be maintained in the Regular Army. This class of men do not require drilling and training in field exercises as do infantrymen or cavalrymen, but they must be technically skilled in their own particular occupation, whether it be that of chauffeur, automobile engineer, railroad man, bridge builder, surveyor, gas-engine man, telegrapher or telephone engineer, wireless operator, machine-shop expert, powder expert, doctor, nurse, or pharmacist. The daily occupation of these men in civil life is the best training they could have for the functions that they would perform in time of war, and therefore all that is required of them is that they should enlist in some reserve so that the Government may be sure of their services when it needs them. It is not expected that these men will be called out in time of peace for any drill or training, but it is expected that they will be arranged in organizations and that officers of the officers' reserve corps will be assigned to such organizations, thereby creating units which will be immediately available for active service upon the very shortest notice.

The members of the Regular Army reserve will be paid a small sum of \$2 a month to keep them in touch with the War Department, but the large bonus contemplated in existing law will be done away with and more assurance of service in time of need and more economy will result under the proposed law.

One of the greatest causes of delay in training a force of citizen soldiers is usually the lack of training that exists in its commissioned personnel. The officers must learn their functions at the same time that they are endeavoring to teach the enlisted men the part that they have to play. It is proposed to create an Officers' Reserve Corps, consisting of men who have been partially educated and trained along military lines for use in such an emergency. They will have few or no functions to perform in time of peace, but the idea is to have them examined mentally, morally, and physically in time of peace to determine their fitness for command in time of war. This will allow the examinations to be carefully conducted when there is no emergency and will insure a far better personnel than could possibly be raised in the confusion incident to a state of war. It is proposed to commission these men in time of peace as reserve officers in the various arms, corps, or departments, and their commission renders them liable for service when called upon by the President, but his authority so to call them is limited to the time of actual or threatened war, except for short periods of training and for other purposes when authorized by Congress and with the consent of the reserve officers concerned, as, for instance, the use of certain of them as Medical Reserve officers are now authorized to be used. This reserve of officers is intended to supply wastage amongst the forces in active operation, to officer the depot battalions and companies which train the recruits, and to officer new organizations of volunteers raised in time of war. Of all the proposed provisions for preparedness there are few of more importance than this one, and none from which the Government will receive so great a return for the small expenditure involved.

To furnish the personnel for the Officers' Reserve Corps it is proposed to utilize the educational institutions of the country which have adopted or will adopt approved courses of study, including a certain amount of military instruction. The students who enter into this plan will form the Reserve Officers' Training Corps, and the provisions for this corps have the approval of the representatives of the educational institutions concerned and of the War Department. These provisions for an Officers' Reserve Corps and the Reserve Officers' Training Corps do what no previous legislation has ever done—i. e., they give the members of those organizations certain rights and responsibilities and make them a real and valuable asset to our military strength and in a true sense will mobilize, in time of peace, our national assets in trained military and professional men for time of danger.

Section 56 proposes to create a volunteer force in which citizens can be enrolled who for any reason can not join the National Guard or the Regular Army. This is to be purely a Federal force, not to be used except in case of actual or threatened hostilities. The plan to maintain such a force in time of peace being an entirely new idea, it was deemed best to give the greatest possible latitude to the President regarding the rules and regulations under which these volunteers should be raised, limited, however, by certain fundamental restrictions which, in addition to those imposed by a voluntary enlistment and public sentiment, will prevent any abuse of such a force.

The volunteer force so created will have a maximum strength of about 261,000 officers and enlisted men.

The patriotism and enthusiasm that has animated the members of the Organized Militia during the many years of our national indifference on the subject of preparedness has received its just recognition in the bill as submitted and the National Guard, as it is now called, will be found to be amply provided for. The bill increases the scope of usefulness of the National Guard and binds the 48 small disconnected detachments, that now exist, into one great national force as far as constitutional limitations will permit. Pay is provided for the members of the National Guard who give a great deal of time to that work and largely increased appropriations for the National Guard are anticipated in the provisions of the bill. Under the new plans the future of the National Guard looks brighter and better than ever before in our history. Existing defects regarding the appointment of officers and the system of training have, to a large degree, been remedied. No constitutional right of the States is invaded, but certain rules are laid down, upon compliance with which is based participation in the Federal appropriations for the support of the National Guard, and in addition thereto certain heretofore unused powers of the Federal Government under the Constitution have been assumed.

An increased number of Regular Army officers for instructing the National Guard is provided for. A uniform law governing enlistments

in the guard and uniform methods of administering discipline through National Guard courts-martial are laid down in the bill.

The National Guard authorized under the proposed act will be about 280,000 officers and enlisted men in the active guard.

A National Guard Reserve is created to which men who have served can be furloughed so that their services will not be lost when they leave the active organizations of the guard. The annual period of training is somewhat increased, but is still well within the limits of time that any man can give to his country without injuring his personal interests, especially in consideration of the pay involved. The period is still too short to produce trained soldiers, but it will enable them to acquire the rudiments of military training and will be a great improvement upon existing conditions.

Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. President, the most objectionable feature of the original Army plan was the continental army proposition, which has been practically eliminated by this bill and superseded by the increase and betterment of the National Guard, which change I heartily approve. The only remaining vestige of this scheme is embraced in section 56, which I shall vote to strike out because of the enormous expense, amounting to \$25,000,000 annually, with so little benefits to be received, and also because of the injury it would cause to the National Guard. If we are going to adopt the National Guard plan, which I understand to be the sentiment of the country and the Congress, we should do so in a manner to get the best results from that plan, and should at least do nothing that would in any way cripple it. The National Guard has always given a good account of itself in the past when called upon in any emergency, and will do so again should occasion ever arise to require it. There is a great difference in the National Guard of to-day and its feeling toward and relations with the Regular Army than in times past. In the past there was an estrangement and jealousy between the two institutions which have practically disappeared to-day.

The National Guard organization to-day is anxious to cooperate with the Regular Army, and the Regular Army organization is anxious to have it do so. This bill gives the National Guard the chance it has wanted for these many years. Give these brave men, who have freely and voluntarily, without compensation or consideration in the past, left their places of business and their usual avocations of life to devote time to aid their country in preparation for defense, a fair opportunity, which this bill contemplates, and no one will be ashamed of the showing the National Guard will make.

In our plan for preparation we have already doubled the number of cadets at West Point and the number of midshipmen at Annapolis, for which I am especially glad, because it embraces ideas presented in bills introduced by myself on the same subjects. We have also passed the Government armor-plate bill, which will result in great good. When any private industry becomes so arrogant and greedy as to take advantage of its own Government, it is high time that the Government should step in and take a hand in the business itself, and I am glad it did so in this important matter, so essential for preparation for defense at this time. We should also provide additional plants for the manufacture of arms and ammunition by the Government. This should not be left to the greed and avarice of private corporations, who sometimes think more of the almighty dollar than the safety and life of the Nation.

This bill also provides for military instruction in our high schools and colleges, which I regard as one of the best features of the bill, for I believe that this after all is the greatest and best source from which to secure a reserve for our Army. I am especially favorable to this feature of the bill, and to any other plan that will secure military training for our boys who may desire it during school age, and of making it attractive and advantageous to them to take such a course. There is a time in the life of nearly every young man when he craves military training; and the time to give it to him is when he wants it, and once mastered, it will always remain with him. He will not only be personally bettered by it physically and intellectually, but he will be more valuable as a citizen of the Nation should his Government ever need his services in this direction. If called from the reserve, he will be in a much better position to not only take care of himself but to defend his country. I believe from this source alone the very best military preparation for a citizenry army could be had for the least expense, the least sacrifice to the citizen, and with the least danger of the Nation developing an aggressive military spirit, which no good American wants.

While we all regret that in this day and age it has become necessary to make any additional preparation along military lines, yet with war raging on all sides, in most every other great country on earth, it is only the part of wisdom to make proper preparation for any aggressive action toward us. We can all rest assured, however, that whatever this administration does toward preparation will be for the purpose of maintaining the rights of our citizens and the honor of the Nation,

and is in the interest of preserving peace. The time has about arrived in the history of this country when nothing short of invasion, or a direct attack on our citizens on land or sea, will justify war. Certainly nothing that can be recompensed in dollars and cents will ever again justify it. The dawn of a new day is near at hand, and the position of America in the pending crisis is doing more than anything else to bring it about.

President Wilson at the Fiftieth Gettysburg Anniversary used language equaling the famous classic delivered by President Lincoln years before at the same place, which is extremely appropriate for to-day:

"Do not put uniforms by. Put the harness of the present on. Lift your eyes to the great task of life yet to be conquered in the interests of righteous peace, of that prosperity which lies in the people's hearts and outlasts all wars and errors of men. Come, let us be comrades and soldiers yet to serve our fellow-men with quiet counsel, where the blare of trumpets is neither heard nor heeded, and where the things are done which make blessed the nations of the world in peace and righteousness and love."

May the day soon come when it will be demonstrated the world over, and the accepted policy of all the nations of the earth, that "The pen is mightier than the sword"; when "Spears shall be beaten into pruning hooks and swords into plowshares," and war shall be no more.

Mr. KENYON. Mr. President, I only desire to take a very few moments to place in the Record my reasons for my vote as to this section, which it seems to me is really the vital part of the whole bill at this time.

As I understand, there are only two ways of raising troops under the Constitution. In Article I, section 8, paragraph 12, the power is given to Congress "to raise and support armies." Second, in Article I, section 8, paragraph 15, Congress is empowered "to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions."

The constitutional question is plainer of discernment than its solution.

Section 4 of the act of 1908 provided, among other things, that the militia "shall secure to serve either within or without the territory of the United States." The Attorney General held, February 17, 1912, with reference to this law—and part of his opinion I quote:

I think that the constitutional provision here considered not only affords no warrant for the use of the militia by the General Government, except to suppress insurrection, repel invasions, or execute the laws of the Union, but by its careful enumeration of the three occasions or purposes for which the militia may be used, it forbids such use for any other purpose.

I realize, of course, that the opinion of such an eminent lawyer is entitled to great weight. Eminent constitutional lawyers of this body have disagreed on the floor as to whether or not the National Guard, under the Constitution, can be federalized. Strong arguments can be made on both sides of that proposition, and I confess to very grave doubt on the proposition. I am unable to see, as yet, just how Congress could train the State militia, and what Congress could do if the States declined to train them. However, I am going to resolve that doubt in favor of the proposition of the federalization of the National Guard, because when trouble comes these questions melt away, and I do not believe these constitutional questions will ever arise. To assume that they will is to assume that the States and their governors will not do their duty. The patriotism of the men of the National Guard is sufficient guaranty that they will not seek to avoid service to their country because of fine-haired constitutional distinctions.

The country is asking now for some reasonable and adequate preparedness. Just what that preparedness is or just what preparedness is adequate no one is prophetic enough to know. It must embrace a strong Navy as the first line of defense; a Regular Army of such size, in cooperation with the National Guard, as may hold any invading force, if the first line of defense, the Navy, should be broken down, and hold that force until volunteers in sufficient quantity would be raised and trained to repel the invader. The invader, of course, is a somewhat mythical institution just now, but for the purpose of any argument for preparedness we must assume a possible invader.

It has always seemed to me that the stronger our Navy the less the need of a large standing Army, though I have heard argument here to the contrary. How to secure an Army that shall be efficient is the question. It is unfortunate, I think, that any conflict should exist between the Regular Army and the National Guard. The membership of both are equally patriotic. There is no particular monopoly of patriotism in this country with anyone.

I do not agree, as was expressed in debate the other day, that there is no unity of American citizenship. Our people naturally differ in their opinions, as all thinking people will, in a democracy, but any flame of war would quickly melt all elements of our population into one great citizenship, with an abundance of patriotism and a unity of devotion to our country.

In any scheme of national defense, as is shown by the provisions of this bill, the National Guard must be a great asset. I confess, as did the Senator from Illinois [Mr. Lewis] on Saturday, something of a prejudice in favor of the National Guard. The guard consists of the best boys of our States, representing its highest development, of young men who have made sacrifices in order to keep up a military spirit. They are anxious to serve their country. They have given their time, foregone pleasures that they might have otherwise indulged in. They are, of course, compelled to make their living, and so can not give all their time to the work of drilling and training. In my judgment they are our very best asset for defense.

The militia of to-day can not be compared with the militia of olden times, which, it must be confessed, was not satisfactory in its operations.

I have heard various objections raised to the National Guard, such as, "If certain governors do not sympathize with the work it would make the guard inefficient." The incident has been cited by some of the governor of South Carolina some years ago mustering out the militia. Others suggest that if one section of our country was attacked political pressure would be brought to bear to prevent the guard from going to the relief of that section if their own section might perchance be fearful of attack; that the guard do not receive so much instruction as the Regulars and can not be so efficient.

I am familiar with the fact that the last report of the Chief of Staff states that "over 30 per cent failed to attend 24 drills," and that "it is believed to be a safe conclusion that not a single unit at its maximum strength marched a distance of 10 miles fully equipped and armed," and, of course, other objections can be cited.

The Volunteer Army plan as proposed by this section, it seems to me, does conflict with the National Guard proposition.

The Volunteer Army plan as it appears in the bill now is practically good for nothing. It creates no unit of an army.

The Senator from New York [Mr. WADSWORTH] a few days ago in his brief address seemed to puncture the proposition full of holes. It appears merely as a sort of a 30-day outing for some distinguished gentlemen who think thereby they are giving a very patriotic exhibition for the people of the country.

One may have serious doubts as to what most of them would do if they were requested to walk up and sign the muster roll.

It seems to me, considering especially the question of expense, that we are called upon to decide between the continental army and the National Guard. We can not well have both.

Aside from the Regular Army, the only organized military force of the United States is the National Guard. Many of its officers have been enthusiastic students of military affairs. The members themselves evidence a desire for military knowledge and a patriotic devotion to country highly commendable.

They have not had, it seems to me, a fair chance. The antipathy of the Regular Army toward them has been rather marked—and I say it in no spirit of criticism, because I have the greatest respect for the Regulars and for our Army officers. They have shown their splendid ability to render service to their country, as they are doing now in the deserts and the mountains of Mexico. The Regulars are made of the right stuff, and just the same stuff as the guard, but I fear some of the Army officers are determined to force the Nation into a process of conscription, which is not desired by the great body of our people. Everyone wants an effective Army. That is the main consideration.

Some of the newspapers in the last few days have said that politics are creeping into this matter, because it was claimed the members of the National Guard had great political influence. I had hoped that this question of preparedness might be discussed and settled without any thought of politics. I believe every Member of Congress absolutely eschews any thought of politics in this matter. It is to be hoped that all local interest and all political interest may be set aside, and that this legislation at least may be for the good of the entire Nation and on a broad national basis. I shall vote as at present advised on the various amendments to this bill in favor of what seems to me giving the National Guard a fair trial. If that trial does not prove successful, then I am willing to favor different legislation. But for the years of devotion and sacrifice that the members of the National Guard have passed through they ought to have a fair chance to show what they can do along military lines.

Agreeing that our need is an effective Army, the question suggests itself, Is the Regular any more effective than the guardsman?

There are three great things in training a soldier:

First. He must be trained to discipline.

Second. He must be trained to take care of himself and his health.

Third. He must be trained to be an expert in the use of his arms.

As a comparison in this debate is being made between the efficiency of the Regular Army and the National Guard, the results of the achievements of the National Guard in rifle practice, which is the third great requirement of the trained soldier, would be interesting.

In order to develop the highest and the best systems of training in rifle practice the national board for the promotion of rifle practice provides for a national rifle match each year. In this match each State has a team of 12 shooting members from the National Guard and like teams from the United States Infantry, United States Cavalry, the Navy, and Marine Corps, and sometimes from the Naval Academy and Military Academy.

In 1910 the Iowa rifle team of the National Guard not only defeated all the National Guard teams but defeated two of the regular service teams.

In 1911 Sergt. Charles M. King, National Guardsman and blacksmith at the city of Waukon, Iowa, won the military championship of the United States, defeating many hundred competitors from the Army, the Navy, Marine Corps, the National Guard, and the experts of the powder companies, and his score was 11 points higher than his closest competitor.

The same year Lieut. Don A. Pruessner, a bank cashier at Manchester, Iowa, won the special medal for rapid fire in the national individual match.

In 1912 Col. Brookhart selected three Iowa National Guardsmen—Capt. Fred S. Hurd, of Des Moines, who has charge of the State arsenal; Capt. Don A. Pruessner, the same banker from Manchester; and Sergt. John E. Jackson, a farmer from Washington—and after giving them one week's training sent them to Winthrop, Md., to the Marine Corps rifle range, to compete for places on the American Olympic team. These Olympic matches were a part of the great international Olympic games held in Sweden that year. These men had to compete with the best riflemen of the regular service and the best experts of the powder companies. At the end of the competition Sergt. Jackson was in second place, Capt. Hurd in seventh place, and Capt. Pruessner in ninth place. Ten men were selected to make up the team, and the National Rifle Association reserved the right to select the two lowest arbitrarily and without reference to their standing in the try out. As two Iowa men had won places on the team, Capt. Pruessner being in ninth place, was ruled out, and another rifleman chosen who had not done so well. Sergt. Jackson and Capt. Hurd both went as members of the Olympic team, Sergt. Jackson shooting as a principal and Capt. Hurd being an alternate.

The American team won first place and the Olympic gold medals for the championship of the world.

In the individual matches Sergt. Jackson won third place at the longest range of 600 meters and Capt. Hurd won first place in the short range of 50 meters and the Olympic gold medal.

In 1912 Canada challenged the United States in the famous Palma match. This was for the long-range military championship of the world.

Col. Brookhart was selected as team captain of the American team, and held the tryout at Seagirt, N. J., almost in the doorway of Woodrow Wilson's home, who was then governor of that State. All branches of the regular service, except the Navy, competed for places on this team, but the places were won by National Guardsmen. The only member from the Regular Army was Capt. Mumma, whom Col. Brookhart selected as adjutant. This team went to Ottawa, Canada, defeated the Canadian team for the world's championship and made the world's record score, which is to-day the world's record score in that match.

In 1913 the Iowa rifle team defeated the United States Infantry in the national match, and the Oregon rifle team defeated two of the regular service teams.

In 1915 Sergt. Jackson, of Iowa, won the long-range championship of the United States in the famous Wimbledon cup match.

At the conclusion of the national matches each year there is held a final rifle match called "The United service match." This match is made up of a team of 16 from the National Guard of the United States, 16 from the Regular Army, and 16 from the Marine Corps and the same from the Navy, if present.

In 1915 Col. Brookhart was coach of the National Guard team and Sergt. Durchdenwald, of Waterloo, Iowa, and Capt. Hurd were shooting members of the team. The National Guard team defeated the Army and the Marine Corps, which were the only other competing teams, and to-day hold the medals as the winner of the united service match. This match consisted of 10 shots rapid fire at 200 yards, 10 shots slow fire at 600 yards, and 10 shots slow fire at 1,000 yards for each member of the team.

Col. Brookhart has the official record of all the above achievements, in so far as they relate to the State of Iowa, and there is not another record in the world which contains so many high triumphs in national and international events in military rifle practice.

In addition to winning in these high places the Iowa National Guard has developed two dozen officers who are the equal of any officers in the world for efficiency in rifle practice.

Many of the other States also have a like record, and all of the States are showing very great development.

I cite this because in the course of the debate there has been a great deal said about the lack of efficiency on the part of the National Guard. I cite it as showing that at least as to one of the great requisitions of the soldier the National Guard have held their own and even surpassed their own in contests with the Regular Army.

The amendment adopted a few days ago proposed by my colleague [Mr. CUMMINS] was not dependent upon any of the constitutional propositions discussed, and the general argument has gone on more along the general line of the federalization of the Guard. Under that amendment the General Staff will have 92 officers and the National Guard 5. Certainly those who are advocates of the Regular Army and opposed to the Guard ought to have no fear of the advice of these officers of the National Guard being persuasive on the General Staff unless their views from a military standpoint are absolutely sound.

Section 56 will mean heavy expense. It is nothing but an experiment. I believe it will be useless if the Guard is recruited to its full strength, and its adoption in itself may make more difficult the recruiting of the Guard to its full capacity. It seems to me that we are compelled to choose between the Guard and section 56, and being compelled to do that, as I view it, I shall vote in favor of the Guard by voting to strike out section 56.

Mr. SIMMONS. Mr. President, I do not propose to detain the Senate more than 5 or 10 minutes at the outside. Aware, as I am, of the anxiety of the Senate to reach a vote on this section and the amendments, I would not trespass upon the time of the Senate to any extent at this late hour in the discussion but for the fact that when in favor of a general scheme of legislation proposed by a committee of this body, as I am in favor of the idea of enlarged military preparedness provided in this bill, it is with reluctance that I antagonize the details and methods by which it is sought to work out that general purpose. For these reasons, Mr. President, I feel constrained to take a few minutes to state the reasons which impel me to vote against the Volunteer Army provided in the Senate committee bill as a part of the general scheme of preparedness provided in that measure.

The Volunteer Army provided in the fifty-sixth section of the bill—by whatever name it may be called, whether a volunteer army or a continental army—is in essence and in substance nothing more than a national militia. The National Guard, as it exists under the present law, by whatever name it may be called, is in essence and in substance nothing except the old State militia a little more closely connected with the Federal Treasury. The amendment of the committee federalizes the present National Guard by enlarging the powers of the Federal Government over it and makes it in essence a national militia, notwithstanding its State connections.

So, Mr. President, we have an amendment here which will in effect establish two national militia systems, one absolutely controlled by the Federal Government in all its details, in all its functions, and in all its operations, and the other under certain conditions and circumstances equally subject to the control of the Federal Government.

So far as the method of training, so far as the course of discipline under which the training is to take place, so far as the hours of training during the year, and so far as the general control of the Government are concerned, if this federalizing process is constitutional, there will be substantially little difference between the national militia called a volunteer army and this national militia called the National Guard.

I repeat, so far as the methods of discipline, of training, and of governmental control is concerned, exercised in the one

instance directly by the Federal Government and in the other instance indirectly by the Federal Government, I do not see very much difference between the two systems. I do not believe that the proposed volunteer army, compared with the federalized National Guard, as a result of discipline and training and control, directly in one case and indirectly in the other case, will in all probability result in giving us any better trained and better prepared soldiers than we will get under the method and system provided for the same purpose in the bill with regard to the National Guard.

Both the old militia system and the present National Guard system have been severely criticized and the charge of inefficiency has been emphasized. I do not deny that these charges with respect to the past are more or less justified, but I do not think this altogether the fault of the system. It was due as much, and probably more, to the indifference and inadequate assistance both from the State and National Governments. Certain it is when the old State militia, which had been but little encouraged, if not neglected, by the States, was merged into the National Guard the assistance given by the Federal Government in connection with training, equipping, arming, and so forth, this force was immediately felt and seen in the greater interest and improved conditions in many, if not all, the States of the Union. I know that in my State there has been a distinct revival of interest in the National Guard since this change, and I firmly believe that with the additional encouragement which will come from the assistance provided in this measure we will see that the National Guard will take on new life; that it will become immensely more attractive than it is now; and that the results in a short time will be the establishment in every State of the Union of a National Guard that will turn out trained and efficient soldiers.

Mr. President, I doubt, when you analyze like conditions with reference to the proposed Volunteer Army, whether you will find them any more conducive, if they are as conducive, to better training, equipment, and preparation for active and effective service than those provided in the bill with reference to the National Guard.

Mr. President, with this help from the Federal Government, with this supervision of the Federal Government, with the aid in various ways that will be given the Guard by this bill in developing and to strengthen their efficiency for war purposes, I have no doubt that the highest expectations of those who have seen fit to present this as a proper method for supplementing our Regular Army will be realized.

The House ignored the scheme for a continental army so much pressed by the War College and the Regular Army. Instead, they federalized, I think in an effective and a constitutional way, the present National Guard and substituted it for the proposed continental army.

That, Mr. President, made a logical and a consistent measure. It provided for a Regular Army, and it provided for an effective method of increasing its strength in times of stress and of need. It did not inject into our military system two different systems operating in practically the same field, trained and developed along practically parallel lines and subject to the same general control of the Federal Government.

The Senate committee, departing from the precedent set by the House, provided not only for the federalization of the National Guard but for a national militia, thus setting up two distinct and independent forces, one wholly controlled by the Government and the other practically controlled by the Government, working upon lines of rivalry, almost certain to produce demoralization of the one force or the other, resulting in the end, in all probability, in one swallowing up the other or in the hopeless disorganization of both.

Mr. President, because I believe the National Guard can be made an effective system, because I do not desire two systems maintained and developed on practically the same lines, I am constrained, although I regret to disagree with the committee, to vote for the elimination from the bill of section 56.

Mr. President, if the National Guard is to be federalized, I do not think we need the volunteer army; and if we are to have the volunteer army, I do not see any great reason for federalizing the National Guard. These are both volunteer forces. They can be maintained only at a large public expenditure, and I think it is better for us to work out the problem of a reserve force exclusively through the one or the other rather than through both combined.

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. President, very reluctantly I take the time at this stage of the discussion to submit some views which I have on the motion proposing to strike out section 56 of the bill. I shall not address myself to the part of the measure which requires military knowledge, for the very evident reason that I myself have none. So far as the State militia, the Volunteer

Army, or the Regular Army connect themselves with congressional action, I desire to submit some observations which I consider pertinent.

It is a matter of regret always when it becomes necessary in a legislative body to read or even to quote from musty law books. A large part of this discussion, however, Mr. President, has been devoted to the power which Congress has over the State militia. That necessarily connects itself with adjudicated cases on this branch of congressional power. One of the decisions has been referred to a great many times in Fifth Wheaton, as I remember it, of Houston against Moore. I do not desire to quote from this opinion more than to say that the decision is now nearly 100 years old. The opinion was filed in 1820. There is a separate opinion, scarcely to be dignified with the designation of a dissenting view of Justice Story. The majority opinion, in which five of seven justices seemed to concur, prepared by Mr. Justice Johnson, presents the view of the court. Justice Story takes the precaution to observe in his separate opinion that at least one other of his brethren concurred with him in his expressed views.

This decision—calling it a majority decision—is more remarkable for what it does not decide than for what it does. The point in issue does not require the part of the opinion alluded to with considerable satisfaction by those who question congressional power over the State militia. The part of the opinion often quoted in this discussion in the last two weeks says:

Indeed, extensive as their power over the militia is, the United States are obviously intended to be made in some measure dependent upon the States for the aid of this species of force. For, if the States will not officer or train their men, there is no power given to Congress to supply the deficiency.

This part of the decision, Mr. President, is a dictum. It is not required in the decision of the case presented to the court. That part of the reasoning or that portion of the opinion could be left out and still every valid argument drawn from the majority opinion would be as powerful as if it were there. The point to be decided in this case, Mr. President, was whether an act of the State of Pennsylvania passed in 1814 authorized the conviction of a member of the Pennsylvania State militia who refused to respond to the call of the President for volunteers in the War of 1812. Having failed to respond he was prosecuted under a State statute. The question was, How far had Congress in the act of 1795 covered the question of the failure of a private in the ranks of the State militia to answer a call for the public defense?

In deciding this question Justice Johnson expressly refers to the fact that Congress has not covered fully the domain it might have covered. He refers especially to the fact that the State of Pennsylvania was intending to supplement defective action of Congress in the act of 1795. This portion of the opinion I desire to embody in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. It says:

With regard to militiamen ordered into service there exists a peculiar propriety in leaving them subject to the coercive regulations of both Governments. The safety of each is so worked up with that of all the States, and the honor and peculiar safety of a particular State may so often be dependent upon the alacrity with which her citizens repair to the field that the most serious mortifications and evils might result from refusing the right of lending the strength of the State authority to quicken their obedience to the calls of the United States.

* * * * *

The Legislature of Pennsylvania—

Continuing reading from the opinion and omitting part of another branch of the discussion of the opinion—

The Legislature of Pennsylvania, influenced, no doubt, by views similar to those in which I have presented the subject, saw the defects in the means of coercing her citizens into the service; and unwilling to bear the imputation of lukewarmness in the common cause, legislated on the occasion, just so far as the laws of the United States were defective or not brought into operation.

So the point to be decided in this case, Mr. President, was not the validity or the extent of the power of Congress over the State militia, but a question of whether an act of Pennsylvania was valid in going into territory already covered or not covered by the act of Congress. It is to that particular territory to which this portion of the opinion refers. The act of 1795 not having provided for the punishment, it seems, in a like case, the court very properly alludes to the fact that a State legislature may supplement a defective act of Congress where it leaves the matter unoccupied by the exercise of power constitutionally vested in Congress. The State may act concurrently with Congress until the latter does act. The power of Congress becomes exclusive only when exercised in such instances. So upon this ground the decision rested.

The part referring to the helplessness of the General Government in the event that the States refused to support militia, refused to appoint officers, refused to make appropriations, refused to furnish headquarters, refused to train, is not drawn

necessarily into the issues decided in this case. This part of the opinion is more powerful in deciding what this opinion does decide and the weight it has in this discussion than anything else. In the concluding paragraph of Justice Johnson's opinion he says:

In this case it will be observed that there is no point whatever decided, except that the fine was constitutionally imposed upon the plaintiff in error. The course of reasoning by which the judges have reached this conclusion is various, coinciding in but one thing, viz, that there is no error in the judgment of the State court of Pennsylvania.

That was the point decided—not whether a State might be so negligent of the public defense as to refuse to provide a State militia or to appoint officers or to provide for the training of the troops at proper intervals.

There has been a good deal said here with reference to the fathers of the Republic. I have no special guardianship over the fathers of the Republic, Mr. President, nor have I any special means of information about what they intended, save the records that they preserved. Happily, those records, as records went in those days before the art of shorthand had been perfected, are, for a long-hand transcript, fairly complete.

Who was in the convention which framed the organic instrument from which the Senate derives its powers in connection with the other House? During the greater part of the time, Mr. President, there were representatives or delegates from 11 States in the Union, among which the State of New Jersey, which the present occupant of the chair [Mr. MARTINE] has the honor to represent in part, was continuously present by its delegates. The States of North Carolina and South Carolina were present, through names that are historically high in the annals of legislation and statesmanship. New York was represented. Virginia at that time was the great mother among the States—greater in her population and in her resources, but infinitely greater, Mr. President, in the personality and the power of her men. Edmund Randolph was present in that convention at Philadelphia. He sat on the committee that framed vital portions of this charter. At the time he was in the convention he was also the governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia. James Madison was another. George Washington was the chairman. From Pennsylvania came the philosophic Franklin, who was 82 years of age at the time he shed upon that convention the beneficence of his knowledge. Why, if the bill that proposes to retire the Federal judges had been applied to Franklin, he would have been out of the public service 12 years before that time. There sat with him, as his colleague, James Wilson, one of the early lawyers whose reputation has survived more than a hundred years, and who was a most eminent chief justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. These, with the other States, including Massachusetts, Maryland, Delaware, Connecticut, New Hampshire—altogether, 12 out of the 13 States—were present when this document was framed.

I do not care to quote extensively from what they said or what they did. I shall at the proper time ask to have printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD such parts as I think material, in order to save time and preserve what I consider to be material in the investigation of this question. It is sufficient to say that we are no better and no worse than those men who sat in the convention to frame our Constitution. They differed from each other; they had radically divergent views on this identical question. They had only recently emerged from the Revolution. There was no General Government save that—and it is only by mere courtesy that we call it "national"—which the Articles of Confederation gave to them. So the States met, and their purpose was, if possible, to obtain a more stable form of organization. I think they succeeded.

When it came to the provision in question, clause 16, section 8, of Article I, and other provisions of Article I of the Constitution affecting the incidental powers of the General Government over the militia, the same controversy arose. Mr. President, some of the delegates from the States refused to surrender any power over the State militia. They said it was a matter of purely domestic concern; that if they surrendered the power sought to be taken by others, those of the Alexander Hamilton school, it would result in a military dictatorship; that it would destroy the State militia and would give such power to the General Government as ultimately would be tyrannical in character.

There was the other school, the Hamilton school, from whose articles a great deal has been quoted and placed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. I do not care to say very much except to allude to this difference. Out of it came the sixteenth clause of section 8, which is in controversy, and which has very often been quoted in the course of this discussion. I want to read, Mr. President, very briefly from certain of the arguments

offered by these gentlemen. I read first from the observation of Charles Pinckney, of South Carolina. He says:

The exclusive right of establishing regulations for the government of the militia of the United States ought certainly to be vested in the Federal councils.

That was one of the early names by which Congress was known in the discussions—

As standing armies are contrary to the constitutions of most of the States, and the nature of our Government, the only immediate aid and support that we can look up to in case of necessity is the militia. As the several States form one government, united for their common benefit and security, they are to be considered as a nation, their militia therefore should be as far as possible national, and uniformity in discipline and regulation should pervade the whole, otherwise, when the militia of several States are required to act together, it will be difficult to combine their operations from the confusion a difference of discipline and military habits will produce.

From the opinion of Luther Martin, who was a delegate from the State of Maryland, I read the following. He was opposed to it, both in the convention and in his own State when the question of ratification was considered, and before the State Legislature of Maryland he presented a lengthy argument against ratification. When he referred to the power contained in clause 16 of section 8, Article I, he uses the following language:

By organizing the militia Congress have taken the whole power from the State governments; and by neglecting to do it and increasing the standing army, their power will increase by those very means that will be adapted and urged as an ease to the people.

Alexander Hamilton later presented his views, in which he criticized the grant of power as not being sufficient. He thought Congress ought to have more power over the State militia than they were given finally in the perfected draft of the Constitution. In some things I suppose those of the party with which I am affiliated regard Alexander Hamilton as a patron saint. As to some of them I uniformly possess about the same opinion, but as to a good many of them, Mr. President, I totally dissent. Hamilton wished to build too strong a central Government. I doubt very much, even in his most extravagant moments, in his greatest flights of imagination as to the power he sought for the Federal Government, he ever conceived it in its present form, in its development brought down by a process of liberal construction, until we have it to-day with all of its expressed powers, carrying with them a mass of incidental or implied powers greater than the original conception of the granted power, which sometimes go to the extreme verge, not only of legislative, but judiciary construction.

So these gentlemen debated it pro and con, and after many proposals were submitted, they committed all of the propositions to a committee of 11, being one delegate from each of the 11 States constantly represented in this convention. I wish to insert in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Mr. President, the membership of this committee, made up of John Langdon, of New Hampshire; Rufus King, of Massachusetts; Roger Sherman, of Connecticut; William Livingston, of New Jersey; James McHenry, of Maryland; George Clymer, of Pennsylvania; John Dickinson, of Delaware; George Mason, of Virginia; Hugh Williamson, of North Carolina; Abraham Baldwin, of Georgia; and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, of South Carolina.

Going through all of the records, comprising many hundreds of pages, Mr. President, all of the propositions submitted as to the power proposed to be lodged in Congress over the State militia were at last referred to this committee whose names I have just given. They considered all of the questions, and finally, in August, 1787, they reported the present form, found in clause 16, with the change of simply the word "Congress" substituted for the words "United States." So practically this committee presented exactly the same form that vests in Congress the power we are now discussing.

These 11 men, after hearing all the reasons that could be submitted, presented it in this form as a unanimous report. They gave it the strength of their influence on the floor of the convention. Arguments were made, some of which I have cited, for or against the power proposed to be vested in Congress. What was the purpose? Was it to leave it as it was under the Articles of Confederation? Hardly. It was to strengthen and not to weaken; it was to build up and not to destroy; it was for the purpose of creating a power in Congress that would be adequate to the remedy desired for the evils that were admitted, and which grew out of the old Articles of Confederation.

What is clause 16, section 8, of Article I of the Constitution? Is it an incidental power? Is it something to be found by construction? Hardly. It is a grant of power; it is an affirmative act; it is the creation of a power where before there was no power. It gave to Congress, which was created under the same charter, a power it would not have had and that did not before exist under the Continental Congress. It is no

construed power; it is an express power; it is an enumerated power; and it was put there for the purpose of curing an admitted evil which existed under the Articles of Confederation.

There is an old rule of construction that is just as powerful to-day as it was when our ancestors evolved it. As exception strengthens in things not excepted, so enumeration would weaken in things not enumerated. The power excepted out of the general power is to the States, reserving to them the appointment of officers and the training of the militia. Those powers being excepted, it strengthens in Congress every other part of the granted power not so reserved. We have enumerated powers here; all of them specific. Constitutional sections—in fact, the entire document—are always to be considered, even as statutes are, so as to advance the remedy and not to delay it or destroy it. This was a remedial section, as so many of the powers lodged in Congress are found to be upon a close examination. They were made to remedy existing evils. Many thought that all that had been gained in the Revolution would be lost in the anarchy and quarrels and jealousies among the States. There was no power to maintain an army in time of peace, save as the 13 States maintained their National Guard or State militia. So this power was taken from the States by their voluntary action and vested, under clause 16, section 8, Article I, in the National Government. It is an affirmative grant of power; it is to be construed for the purposes of advancing the remedy and curing the evil complained of.

There have been no authoritative decisions for 100 years on the direct question, and the last decision rendered only contains consolation for the critics of this power when they refer to a dictum in the opinion, not required to be decided by the judge in connection with the question presented.

Since that time, Mr. President, you and I may think that courts have gone a long way in extending the construed powers or incidental ones to granted powers. Consider for a moment what has been builded up under the interstate-commerce clause. Consider what has been builded up around the power of Congress over post offices and post roads. Consider the whole drift of judicial construction of the powers of Congress when it was designed to cover a national problem and required plenary powers in Congress to remove the evils which existed under the old Articles of Confederation.

To my mind, these lights drawn from the history of an earlier day are illuminating. Courts have constant recourse to these records. Lawyers constantly cite them in their briefs. The historian makes note of them, and it is eminently fit that occasionally we statesmen have something to do with them ourselves. For that reason I am burdening the Record with these citations.

Now, it being a granted power, we can use the language, we can use the application of the power to the case in point, to the remedy designed to be advanced, in deciding what it means as applied to section 56.

I recognize, in my limited knowledge of affairs military, but one Federal Army. There never will be but one Federal Army that is capable of rendering service in the public defense, and that is the Regular Army of the United States. The volunteer army contemplated in the original section 56, without regard to any of the amendments or substitutes that have been offered, is necessarily but an organization that is here to-day and gone to-morrow. It possesses neither form nor substance. It has no headquarters. It has nothing to recommend it in permanence. It possesses nothing except a name; and Shakespeare, many years ago, spoke of the advisability of things having both a local habitation and a name.

The Federal volunteer army provided for in section 56 has a name, but it never will have a local habitation on the earth, except in war, and it can not reach the point of danger then in advance of the militia of the several States.

It is said, and truthfully said, that the regular organization of the National Guard has never as a unit volunteered in times past. Some of them went in the Spanish-American War. They volunteered; the whole Guard went. It was not a lack of patriotism—and of this I speak from memory. I think we had nine regiments in Illinois at that time in the National Guard. They all volunteered. This is as near as I ever got to the front. We made up a number of provisional regiments. In the Rock Island district, where I lived at that time, across from the Iowa shore, we had a provisional regiment, properly officered. I think there were 11 law students of mine in it— young men who had read law in my office. We took the drill under a Regular Army officer. I was a private, thank the Lord. I remained so during all the chances of service that occurred. It was at one time proposed to elect me as an officer, and that is the only time I ever refused. I said: "No; you will never make a military hero out of me. I have not the knowledge and have not had the preliminary drill, so I will go as a private."

Mr. President, whatever they may have done in the War of 1812 I do not know. I read about it. Possibly some of them would not go across the river; they did not go over on the Canadian side, because they stood on their constitutional right to remain inside of the United States. That may be true; but look at the evidence of the adjutant general of one State, his record during the Spanish-American War, the record of the whole regiment in the congressional district where he lived—an infantry regiment that wanted to volunteer. They were drawn up—and you will find it in the hearings of the committee in the evidence of Adj. Gen. Dickson, of Illinois. He asked all who wished to volunteer for the service to step three paces forward, and every solitary one of them advanced the necessary three paces except three of them, two of whom had valid excuses; and one of them, Gen. Dickson says, was a coward pure and simple, who never even went back home.

They might have done that way in the War of 1812, but that was more than 100 years ago. The allegiance to the General Government was not strong then. A man's loyalty was to the State. Let us settle this problem now in the Senate by conditions that exist now, and not the conditions that existed 100 years ago.

One hundred years ago there was no loyalty to the General Government like the spirit that now prevails. It proceeded to the point where the War between the States occurred. In 1861 it had to be decided by the sword who was right; and all the way from the disastrous field of Balls Bluff, only a few miles from this Capitol, when Baker fell, until the closing of the drama on the clay fields of Appomattox, we fought out the question by the sword, not by the argument of lawyers or by the opinion of statesmen, of whether the Union was strong enough to command the allegiance of a sufficient number of soldiers to write by force what the fathers had peaceably written in the convention at Philadelphia, and the Union was sustained.

But before that, reflect what preparation had occurred, what development of public sentiment, the many appeals that had fallen upon the ears of Senators and Representatives in the old Chamber where Webster and Calhoun debated the respective merits of the powers of the States. There was the day when threats were made; when the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions were passed; when even Massachusetts laid herself under suspicion in the Hartford convention; when Ohio, my native State, opposed an act of Congress and an opinion of the courts, and forcibly resisted the writ of injunction served upon a State officer who was trying to collect taxes on a branch bank of the United States. It grew, Mr. President—and I refer to these gradual developments only to show that it was not entirely a matter of section—until a higher loyalty to the Union came in the fullness of time. All of the questioning of the powers of the Federal Government did not come from the Southern States that seceded in 1861. They succeeded in bringing it to a head; but there were other States, just as loyal in later years as the Southern States are now, that gravely questioned the powers of the General Government to coerce a State.

So by argument, by legislation, by judicial decision, by campaign after campaign, by the power of the sword, Mr. President, we have arrived in 1916 at a point where there is a stronger, higher allegiance, a greater loyalty to the laws of the country and to the Union than there ever has been before. So when we talk of the dictum in the Fifth Wheaton case, upon which an argument has been builded, let us apply it to the existing facts.

Why, let me suppose a case. There is no reason why this Government should continue to exist if we indulge in speculative fears. It is in the power of the people, without a single revolutionary act, to cause the Government to cease its operations. Suppose—it is rather a violent assumption—but suppose everybody should cease to become a candidate. Suppose people should cease to go to the polls. A voluntary, unanswerable, unpreventable destruction of the Federal Government could occur by the negligence or the lack of public spirit of the people of the States. Suppose everybody should cease to vote. Out of the fifteen or sixteen million people that vote, out of many hundreds or thousands of candidates, suppose all of them refused to permit their names to be voted upon. There is no way under existing laws by which you can compel the people to vote or compel anybody to run for office, outside of a New England township.

I suppose up in Vermont and New Hampshire the old rule is in force yet to fine a town officer who will not accept an office. We adopted that rule in my State, and it is the only one I know of where you have to pay a \$3 fine if you will not accept the office of town clerk or town supervisor, for instance—the old New England township provides the only compulsory public service. But on that slender foundation, Mr. President, this Republic could never endure if the people lost their desire for

public service. If they ceased to vote, that would be the end. This Chamber would be empty. The dust would gather upon the desks and the voices of distinguished Senators would no longer echo for the enlightenment of the galleries.

But, happily, there is some such thing as public spirit. It is the only spirit upon which a republican form of government can be successfully builded. So I shall have no fears in regard to the dictum of this opinion cited by the Senator from Idaho [Mr. BORAH], that if the State authorities will not appoint officers in the militia and the militia will not train, we are at an end and the Government helpless. I would rather be in the State militia than run for office in my part of the country any time. It is a much easier task. A good many would rather be shot at than be subjected to indiscriminate attack by everybody and criticized by newspapers the way they criticize us out in the western country, with a pleasing abandon you do not know anything about. It is an argument *ad hominem* all the time—no general characterizations prevail.

Let us see, Mr. President, how these unpatriotic people act—those of no public spirit, those who will haggle and delay or stop, and if I may be permitted in this august presence to use a colloquial phrase, suppose somebody or some States should throw a monkey wrench in the governmental works, what would happen? Suppose all the States should neglect or refuse to provide a militia and so no officers and no training could call into operation the power of the States; nothing for Congress to regulate. There would not be anything then for us to act on. It is the same figment of a strong imagination which, if true, would destroy by inaction the actual operation of every department of the Government. We could not even draw our salaries, which is too horrible to contemplate. It is worse than hostilities by a foreign foe.

But I looked over the list that was presented by the Senator from Maryland [Mr. LEE] of the States having militia, and it is a goodly list. It is a very material table to be in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. Even little Arizona—small in her population but strong in her representation in this body—has between four and five hundred militia. Delaware, not large territorially, has 430 members in its State militia. Call the roll of the 48 States of the Union, Mr. President, and not a solitary State has abdicated its function. Not one of them has refused to support a State militia. How many are there in the aggregate? Why, New York has—how many is it, Senator—16,000 or 17,000, is it not?

Mr. WADSWORTH. Just under 18,000.

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes, sir; and in 1915 I note the appropriations made by the Legislature at Albany. The State of New York appropriated, in 1915, \$1,768,000 to be paid in a direct tax by the property owners of the State of New York to maintain a State militia. Many of the States like Pennsylvania, Ohio, and others of the larger States appropriate from \$400,000 to \$700,000 annually.

While I am on that branch of the controversy, about these States that it is feared might be void of patriotism, that would no longer elect militia officers, that would let their National Guard fall into decay, I want to show, by figures given me by the department, the State appropriations for two years preceding 1915.

The total appropriations for the Organized Militia made by the legislatures of the several States up to December 31, 1913, including such appropriations as are provided here in the District of Columbia and in Hawaii, aggregate \$5,834,000, and for the year ending December 31, 1914, they aggregate \$7,729,000.

Here are the appropriations from the United States Treasury under the late act on that subject. In 1915 there was paid out by the United States to the 48 States and the District of Columbia and Hawaii a total of \$3,858,000. Now, we are under no immediate apprehensions of bankruptcy, not even under a Democratic administration, by reason of this payment, Mr. President—\$3,800,000 in 1915, as against the figures read of the aggregate appropriations made by State legislatures in 1913 and 1914. Again, in 1914 there was paid out of the Treasury \$4,288,000. The marked effect of this support by the Government promises what the future will be. We have only begun. The organizing, arming, and training under general Army regulations have shown now what can be done.

I have remarked a bit ago, and I now reach it in regular order, that the Volunteer Army contemplated in section 56 must stay somewhere. We can not mobilize it on an instant's notice. We must have armories; we must have the usual equipment that goes along with a mobile force. Where will we get it in the Volunteer Army? If we get it anywhere, it must come from the Regular Army of the United States. How much time is contemplated to be used? Thirty days, say. How much money is it estimated will be necessary? Nearly \$25,000,000

under section 56—\$24,944,000—for a volunteer army. Less than \$4,000,000 was paid in one year—1915—to all the State militias from the Treasury under congressional appropriations, and a little over \$4,000,000 the preceding year of 1914. How much, under this bill, is estimated to be paid to the National Guard organization the first year? Forty-six million dollars; to the Regular Army \$126,000,000, and the Volunteer Army under section 56. So it has occurred to me, Mr. President, that Congress takes no risk in depending upon the loyalty and the public spirit of the States to maintain their National Guard; this is more so when the support proposed is extended. It is now an organized body, with headquarters, equipment, and training.

I have listened patiently for two weeks to the discussion of the question of the extent of the power of Congress in organizing, arming, and disciplining the National Guard with the reserved power to the States of the appointment of officers and training of such forces. This reservation is in the nature of an exception to a granted power. The exception is that the States reserve to themselves the power of appointment of the officers and the training of the militia. This, of itself, if it were not an exception or a reservation out of a general power, might be enlarged into a serious disability. However, here are the general powers that go along with the grant:

First, to organize. What does "organize" mean? I have heard several explanations of it, but I do not think any of them have gone far enough. To organize is to furnish with organs, to give such coherent units, agents, or officers as may act with each other as an organic whole for the production of given results. The company, the battalion, the regiment, the brigade, the division, are all included in the term "organize."

Suppose, Mr. President, some act of the general assembly of a State should create different units and provide a different method of organization with different officers? They can do so with the State militia within their own domestic affairs; but no one for a moment thinks that an act of the General Assembly of New Hampshire, for instance, would change the organizing power vested in an act of Congress made for that purpose. No State would attempt it. In other words, the organization provided by Congress is authoritative.

The next is to "arm." What is that? It is to furnish with the necessary weapons of offense or defense. Congress, in other words, acting through the proper officers in detail or department, can require the militia, when Federalized, to use all of the arms provided for the Regular Army in every branch of the service. All of it is included in the term "arming."

The next thing is "disciplining." Mr. President, you and I went to school at a time when they did not spare the rod and spoil the child. What did "disciplining" mean to us? When the rules of a board of education, or in the old-fashioned district school out on the farm the board of directors, said that the power to discipline would be vested in the teacher, I know what kind of discipline I got. It embraced something equal to a court-martial; it embraced the usual methods of discipline by which the necessary results were produced.

It is said here that all these provisions for court-martial written in this bill are invalid. A letter written from Col. Young is in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. Col. Young saw long service in the Illinois National Guard. He has a good record as a soldier. I would have some question—just as he would have if I undertook to instruct him on military tactics—about his constitutional views embraced in his letter. If the Senator from Connecticut [Mr. BRANDEGEE] had not placed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD his letter, I should have done so at the proper time. I had a copy, and notwithstanding I do not agree with some of his conclusions on matters of constitutional law, I should have been glad to have given the matter publicity in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for whatever it might add to clear up this situation. But the disciplining is included in the grant of all three powers—organizing, arming, and disciplining.

"Disciplining" has a fixed meaning. I have spoken my mother tongue for a long time, but it happens that every once in a while I refer to a dictionary, either to refresh my memory or to furnish me with the necessary information. I think I looked at all the dictionaries that are extant on the subject, and here is a collection of them:

Systematic training or subjection to authority, or its result; to train to obedience, subjection, or effectiveness; to drill; to educate; to punish; to chastise.

I believe the powers of organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia are so plenary that this bill lawfully federalizes most effectively the National Guard of the States. The appointment of officers will not disable those powers. The training is under the discipline prescribed by Congress. This bill

defines the discipline in detail under which the State-appointed officers must train the militia. It provides for that uniformity of which the fathers spoke in Philadelphia when they wrote, debated, and labored for us and our descendants.

The spirit of the officers and men of the National Guard has been too much ignored. If the country needed it, such is their spirit that entire organizations would, with hardly a break in the ranks, volunteer.

Federal appropriations are granted on conditions. I do not doubt the validity of any terms imposed. I believe every State would respond, and the doubts and misgivings and fears of unseemly jealousies between the States and the Government would melt in thin air on actual application.

I think courts-martial under an act of Congress, under this section provided, are valid. I have no question but that if they imposed a penalty upon anyone derelict in the service it would be sustained by proper authority.

Some criticism has been made, and in some instances properly made, of acts of State militia in holding courts-martial in places where the civil law had not been suspended, where martial law had been improperly declared, where the courts still exercised their civil and criminal jurisdiction, and where the ordinary processes of those courts were still capable of being served upon offenders.

The act in individual cases in States of the National Guard ought not to condemn, and I do not believe will condemn upon a fair consideration, the National Guard of the several States. What will you do, Mr. President, in time of disorder? As I have heretofore suggested, I have been through several riots in my time. I have marks on my person from missiles as a living memorial, and while I was not in military life, I have had all the substantial results that the most ambitious officer could have desired. What will you do? It is easy enough to criticize public officials. It is easy enough to criticize government and the acts of military officers, but when you see public disorder, when you see life taken, property by the millions being burned, when you see a riotous mob in possession, civil authority suspended and neither person nor property longer safe in the community, what will you do? Not for an instant will any live governor in public authority, although unhappily, as has been done in some cases, call upon the General Government for assistance and confess the governmental imbecility of the State government. He exercises his lawful power to restore order. I know of no Southern State or New England State that has ever conferred its inability to suppress its domestic trouble. It is reserved for certain Western States to have achieved that unenviable distinction.

So, in order to avoid these difficulties, governors and military officers, acting under their authority, have undertaken to preserve order and safeguard life. They have in most instances suppressed the disorder. Sometimes they may have gone beyond the limits of military procedure and interfered with civil jurisdiction. That of itself is no cause to condemn the military of the States. They are acting under great stress, without opportunity to weigh nicely what shall be done, with the primary purpose in view of carrying into execution the laws of the State and of maintaining order within the troubled area. Remember the doubts that destroy action are:

Some craven scruple
Of thinking too precisely on the event.

I shall omit much of what might be said. This grant of power, it is said in some of the arguments I have listened to in the last few weeks, is limited by the second and tenth amendments to the Constitution. It is well known that the second and tenth amendments were added almost simultaneously with the adoption of the Constitution itself. It was known they would be adopted. They are universally regarded a bill of rights. They take away no express grant of power. The utmost that can be said is that they restrain the extension of power by too liberal a construction. They are merely precautionary.

In the controversy between the States of Colorado and Kansas the Federal Supreme Court referred expressly to these amendments, and referred to them for the purpose of limiting the powers of the General Government to the grant of powers found in the Constitution itself, using them as an argument against the importation into that document of powers not theretofore found, saying that only such implied powers can be had as necessarily grow out of a granted power. That is all these two amendments do. They are merely precautionary signals, added by way of amendment to guide the court and to enlighten those charged with the duty of legislation.

I take up another matter which has been alluded to many times, sometimes on the floor of the Senate, about the extreme cost of our military and naval forces. Privates are paid the first year \$15 a month, and thereafter, as successive years of

service are added, their pay may reach \$25 a month, if my memory serves me correctly. What are some of the wages paid in other countries? Herein you will find that all things—equipment, commissary, arms, and the like—go in proportion, and this is a large part of the reason for our large cost of the maintenance of our Army and Navy. I turn to those without reading, and as I shall conclude shortly, I will ask later on that the whole table of the rates paid privates and officers in the various principal powers of the world be incorporated in the Record.

If section 56 is retained, the volunteer army will sap the strength of the State militia. The two can not exist side by side in the same State and both answer the purpose hoped. Let the Government keep the Regular Army as its department.

The training in educational institutions both for the ranks and for officers will answer the purposes desired and add to the reserves. I feel a regret in the necessity that leads me to support the amendment offered by the Senator from Maryland. The chairman of the committee [Mr. CHAMBERLAIN] has met his great duties with equally great patience and ability that commend him to all, and striking out the section will to some degree set aside that much of his and the committee's labors. But I believe it ought to be done.

One thing I would like greatly, Mr. President, to allude to before I conclude what I have to say on section 56 and the motion of the Senator from Maryland to strike it out: Every one is in favor of preparation. I have the result of a poll taken by the Illinois Bankers' Association, which I will at the proper time incorporate, which shows among the poll taken an almost unanimous sentiment among that portion of the 6,000,000 people that inhabit Illinois for adequate preparation. The press has agitated it; the military experts have favored it, not only now, since it has become popular, but during the time it was somewhat unpopular. So all of us in the ardor of preparation are likely not so carefully to watch the details of preparation.

If I had my way about it—and I am aware that this is exceedingly unpopular, and especially in the western country—I would provide for universal military training. I do not believe, if war continues in the world as it has in the last two years, the United States will ever be able to protect herself or survive against any first-class military power unless every able-bodied citizen between certain designated ages in this country takes it upon himself—or has it imposed upon him, rather, by law—to receive the necessary military training. In the absence of such an act of Congress I believe it our duty to direct the public mind to the imperious necessity of universal military training.

I wish to read, and with great satisfaction, these words from a military authority—not one who prepares military treatises, but one who by deeds is greater than he is even by words:

To raise such an army as is proposed, we shall without doubt be compelled to adopt some system of universal military training. It would be wise to place such a law on the statute books, even though it should not be considered necessary to put it into force at this time. The law could then be invoked in time of war without further legislation, and much valuable time could be saved.

These extracts are from an address of Gen. John J. Pershing made February 17, 1916, before the Woman's Club of El Paso, Tex., on the subject of national preparedness. That, however, is not undertaken by this bill. Unless future Hague conventions shall be able to combine enough of the principal powers of the world, and by an armament in the nature of an international police be able to preserve peace among civilized nations and enforce penalties upon an outlaw nation attacking any that may be within the league; unless that shall be done ultimately I am willing to say that the American people must inevitably come to a system of universal military training, and the sooner the better. Let us not deceive ourselves on this momentous issue.

We may talk all we please about volunteers; at last there is but one great directing head in time of war. It is the Regular Army of the United States. Everything must at last be subordinate to it when we face an enemy. Everything in the way of either offense or defense must finally be in the hands of the Regular Army, and for my part I care nothing for the volunteer forces provided in section 56. The reserve corps for officers provided in other sections and the training sought to be provided by the amendment offered by the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. McCUMBER] will, in my judgment, be of more actual value than the entire volunteer army contemplated in section 56, though it were multiplied many fold.

If we are to have an Army on a peace footing, Mr. President, I do not want it as in section 56. Section 56 authorizes the President to call out nearly 300,000 men in time of peace. I myself would much rather vote this afternoon for a bill for universal military training than to vote to put in the hands of

any President in time of peace these vast powers of conscription.

Not only these matters but other things are coming along apace, Mr. President. I voted against the bill to establish an armor plant. The junior Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. OLIVER] was unjustly criticized, I think. If anybody can find I own any steel stock I will gladly acknowledge it, only I want it delivered to me so I can use it as a collateral in the event my credit is exhausted.

I voted against the establishment of such a plant because I could see in it no element of preparation. I saw in it rather a hindrance in the way of adequate preparation. If the Government does not move quicker and more economically than a host of other governmental undertakings, Washington would be in ashes and the Great Lakes would be bearing the forces of a hostile power long before we got a ton of armor plate out of a Government plant. Yet that is not the only thing.

It is proposed that the Government shall establish a nitrate plant. It is no use to fight unless you have explosives, and nitrates are important as an element in the manufactures for that purpose. To make nitrates requires cheap power; and eighteen or nineteen million dollars are to come along in due course of time for the development of water power.

It is proposed to take nitrogen out of the atmosphere; and it is the only time I have ever known the agitation of the atmosphere to get any definite results. We do that a great deal ourselves in this Chamber, but it results only in appropriations most of the time. So it is a kindred measure after all, because it requires money.

The shipping bill will again thrust itself with its unwelcome presence upon this Chamber, and I do not know whether we will be physically able to withstand it this time or not. If it is started before the respective national conventions, it imposes upon the gentlemen who are endeavoring to beat it in that way a task beyond which all others pale into insignificance. But it will appear in due time. What is it based on? More preparation. Our merchant ships are tied up by the war, and we must have a Government ship line going into the freight business with forty or fifty million dollars as an initial expenditure.

I would rather vote a decent sort of a subsidy. I am aware again that that is another unpopular measure in the West and Northwest, but I would rather vote directly for fair subsidies than to vote for a single shipping bill that embarks the Government in the freight and passenger business. That is a part, though, of preparation. The Secretary of the Treasury last summer or fall made a somewhat extended address at various points in the United States, in which he showed that we needed a vastly increased tonnage in order that we might utilize it in time of war for transport and freight service, for colliers, and the like, and everything that would be needed as an auxiliary part of the Navy.

Then we come to the development of water power as an incident to the nitrate development. When they get through with that we will be told the soldiers wear khaki suits, that they wear divers kind of footgear, that they eat a variety of hard-tack and Army rations. Why not, then, start a bakeshop? Why not start a cotton mill and a tailoring establishment? Why not start a chemical factory to get sulphate of quinine and all the medicine? What is the use of paying 300 per cent profit to wholesale druggists when the Government can start some kind of a plant of its own for everything from pills—I am quoting that. I heard a socialist say that on the curbstone one time on Jackson Boulevard. He said, "Everything from pills to battle-ships ought to be made by the people as a grand cooperative commonwealth." The Cavalry use saddles and harness, so start a tannery and a cattle ranch to prepare and produce hides and a factory for manufacturing leather.

Well, we are getting to it here on preparedness, and that leads me to remark it is reaching a point now where there is more "pork" in preparedness than there is effectiveness or economy. There is more "pork" now in sight here than there is public defense; it makes a river and harbor bill look like a poor relation already; and we will be extremely lucky if we get out of the furnace without the smell of fire on our garments.

Is there a lobby prowling about? I do not know. No lobby has ever bothered me in the last 25 years. I talk to everybody. I may have talked to a million of them and I did not know it. I am a guileless, unsophisticated gentleman, when anybody comes to me in broad daylight, and I may have been in communion with them daily here and did not know it. But I hear a good many reports, and so in conclusion I intend to read the following resolution into my remarks and then ask for its unanimous consideration in order that we may find whether or not, like Caesar's wife, we are above suspicion. I think we are, but

I should like to have a certificate of that kind, in view of the numerous rumors floating about the corridors, in order that I may carry it back to my beloved constituents. This is a Senate resolution. I shall ask unanimous consent to consider. If any Senator objects, I am aware it is out of order, but I shall place the matter before the Senate, as well as the responsibility, for the objection to its consideration. It can not delay final action on this bill and will result in clearing some of its provisions from aspersions which it is beyond the power of the individual Senator to answer or repel.

Whereas charges and countercharges have been made on the floor of the Senate, in correspondence and statements incorporated in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD concerning legislation pending on water-power development and the manufacture of fixed nitrogen from atmospheric sources, and it is alleged that a lobby has been and is at present engaged in promoting or opposing pending measures in Congress affecting such matters; and

Whereas it is alleged, among other things, that a lobby is now actively engaged in endeavoring to secure an appropriation by Congress for the development of a site or sites owned by private interests, and it further appearing that under House Committee Document No. 20, of the Sixty-third Congress, the Army engineers have recommended an expenditure of public funds for the purpose of loaning \$18,700,000 to a private corporation now the owner of a water-power site which it is desired to develop, it is claimed; and

Whereas certain private interests engaged in the manufacture of explosives have made proposals to the Government of the United States on matters affecting the public defense which have been the subject of criticism; and

Whereas the various interests concerned, both public and private, as well as certain departments of the Government, have been charged with seeking to affect pending legislation, and such matters have reached that stage that it is material to such pending legislation as well as to the Senate to know if any improper influences have been brought to bear or efforts made to unduly promote or defeat any pending bills: Therefore be it

Resolved, That the Committee on Manufactures be, and is hereby, authorized and directed to investigate the entire question of the activity of any alleged lobby or private interests of any kind, as well as of any department which has concerned itself with such legislation, if it has, concerning the development of water power and the manufacture of fixed nitrogen from any source; and that said committee is hereby given power to procure any witness or witnesses and documentary evidence it deems proper, and may issue proper process therefor under the hand of the chairman of said committee, and the expenses of the investigation shall be audited and allowed by the Senate Committee on Contingent Expenses.

If there is anything, Mr. President, in much that has been said, and some of it in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, the Senate owes to itself, to the departments of the Government, and to the public an investigation of those charges. I believe it to be the easiest and most expeditious way to promote the final steps of preparedness for the public defense. These matters cast their sinister shadow over the Senate. There may be merit in these water-power propositions; I do not know; but I know when such charges are made that many sound and safe and economic questions have been beaten because Members preferred so to vote as to take no chances.

If this investigation is made it will be by the Committee on Manufactures. The chairman of the committee has had experience in such investigations. I have confidence in his integrity and ability and in the individual members of that committee that it would be done adequately and promptly and fully.

To that end, Mr. President, without taking further time, I will offer the resolution before I take my seat and ask unanimous consent for its consideration in the interest of preparedness, first asking that there be incorporated in the RECORD the rate paid to privates and officers in the various countries, which I will designate as Exhibit A, and to insert in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD the whole of the very illuminating article on the public defense, by Gen. John J. Pershing, heretofore referred to, which I will mark Exhibit B.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MARTINE of New Jersey in the chair). Without objection, that course will be pursued.

Mr. SHERMAN. I also ask that the pages which I will designate, and which I will not take the time to read, be printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD from the record of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, with the argument of the delegates in that convention, with Exhibit C, showing the poll made by the Illinois State Bankers' Association.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no objection, that course will be pursued.

The matter referred to is as follows:

[From Charles Pinckney, of South Carolina.]

The exclusive right of establishing regulations for the Government of the militia of the United States ought certainly to be vested in the Federal councils. As standing armies are contrary to the constitutions of most of the States and the nature of our Government, the only immediate aid and support that we can look up to in case of necessity is the militia. As the several States form one Government, united for their common benefit and security, they are to be considered as a Nation. Their militia therefore should be as far as possible national.

A uniformity in discipline and regulations should pervade the whole, otherwise, when the militia of several States are required to act together, it will be difficult to combine their operations from the confusion a difference of discipline and military habits will produce. Independent of our being obliged to rely on the militia as a security against foreign invasions or domestic convulsions, they are in fact the only adequate force the Union possesses, if any should be requisite, to coerce a refractory or negligent member and to carry the ordinances and decrees of Congress into execution. This, as well as the cases I have alluded to, will sometimes make it proper to order the militia of one State into another. At present the United States possesses no power of directing the militia, and must depend upon the States to carry their recommendations upon this subject into execution. While this dependence exists, like all their other reliance upon the States for measures they are not obliged to adopt, the Federal views and designs must ever be delayed and disappointed. To place, therefore, a necessary and constitutional power of defense and coercion in the hands of the Federal authority and to render our militia uniform and national, I am decidedly in opinion they should have the exclusive right of establishing regulations for their government and discipline which the States should be bound to comply with, as well as with their regulations for any number of militia whose march into another State the public safety or benefit should require.

In every confederacy of States, formed for their general benefit and security, there ought to be a power to oblige the parties to furnish their respective quotas without the possibility of neglect or evasion. There is no such clause in the present confederation, and it is therefore without this indispensable security. Experience justifies me in asserting that we may detail as minutely as we can the duties of the States, but unless they are assured that these duties will be required and enforced the details will be regarded as nugatory. No Government has more severely felt the want of a coercive power than the United States; for want of it the principles of the confederation have been neglected with impunity in the hour of the most pressing necessity and at the imminent hazard of its existence, nor are we to expect they will be more attentive in future. Unless there is a compelling principle in the confederacy, there must be an injustice in its tendency; it will expose an unequal proportion of the strength and resources of some of the States to the hazard of war in defense of the rest. The first principles of justice direct that this danger should be provided against. Many of the States have certainly shown a disposition to evade a performance of their Federal duties and throw the burden of government upon their neighbors. It is against this shameful evasion in the delinquent, this forced assumption in the more attentive, I wish to provide, and they ought to be guarded against by every means in our power. Unless this power of coercion is infused and exercised when necessary, the States will most assuredly neglect their duties. The consequence is either a dissolution of the Union or an unreasonable sacrifice by those who are disposed to support and maintain it.

[From Luther Martin, of Maryland.]

Other and more certain engines of power are supplied by the standing army, unlimited as to number or its duration. In addition to this, Government has the entire command of the militia, and may call the whole militia of any State into action, a power which it was vainly urged ought never to exceed a certain proportion. By organizing the militia Congress have taken the whole power from the State governments; and by neglecting to do it and increasing the standing army their power will increase by those very means that will be adopted and urged as an ease to the people.

For this extraordinary provision, by which the militia, the only defense and protection which the State can have for the security of their rights against arbitrary encroachments of the General Government is taken entirely out of the power of their respective States and placed under the power of Congress, it was speciously assigned as a reason that the General Government would cause the militia to be better regulated and better disciplined than the State governments, and that it would be proper for the whole militia of the Union to have a uniformity in their arms and exercise. To this it was answered that the reason, however specious, was not just; that it would be absurd; the militia of the western settlements, who were exposed to an Indian enemy, should either be confined to the same arms or exercise as the militia of the Eastern or Middle States; that the same penalties which would be sufficient to enforce an obedience to militia laws in some States would be totally disregarded in others; that, leaving the power to the several States, they would respectively best know the situation and circumstances of their citizens and the regulations that would be necessary and sufficient to effect a well-regulated militia in each; that we were satisfied the militia had heretofore been as well disciplined as if they had been under the regulations of Congress, and that the States would now have an additional motive to keep their militia in proper order and fit for service, as it would be the only chance to preserve their existence against a General Government armed with powers sufficient to destroy them.

Madison's note of June 18, 1787, gives Hamilton's address on the proposition of Federal Government reported by Mr. Patterson and Mr. Randolph of New Jersey and Virginia, respectively. Hamilton said:

That no amendment of the confederation, leaving the States in possession of their sovereignty could possibly answer the purpose. * * * The States sent us here to provide for the exigencies of the Union. To rely on and propose any plan not adequate to these exigencies, merely because it was not clearly within our powers, would be to sacrifice the means to the end. * * * A certain portion of military force is absolutely necessary in large communities. Massachusetts is now feeling this necessity and making provision for it. * * * A doubt has been raised whether Congress at present has a right to keep ships or troops in time of peace.

Madison says Hamilton leans to the negative on the power of Congress to keep ships or troops in time of peace. Mr. Hamilton then presented his plan of government, the eleventh paragraph of which is—

No State shall have any forces, land or naval, and the militia of all the States to be under the sole and exclusive direction of the United States, the officers of which to be appointed and commissioned by them. (Farrand, Vol. I, Records of the Federal Convention, pp. 283, 285, 287, 291, 293.)

The Wilson plan, found among his papers and in his handwriting, was referred to the committee of detail and contained the following:

The Legislature of the United States shall possess the exclusive right of establishing the government and discipline of the militia and of ordering the militia of any State to any place within the United States. (Farrand, Vol. II, p. 159.)

Another draft of the Wilson papers in his handwriting, with changes in Rutledge's handwriting, was also preserved. It contained the following proposal:

To regulate the discipline of the militia of the several States, to subdue a rebellion in any State on the application of its legislature, to make war, to raise armies, to build and equip fleets, to make laws for calling forth the aid of the militia in order to execute the laws of the Union, to enforce treaties, to suppress insurrections and repel invasions.

The foregoing were among the powers proposed to vest in "the Legislature of the United States." (Farrand, Vol. II, pp. 167-8.)

On August 18, 1787, certain additional powers, proposed to be invested in the Legislature of the United States, were submitted to the convention and referred to the committee of eleven. On this day it was proposed and carried in the affirmative to vest in Congress the power—

To make rules for the government and the regulation of the land and naval forces.

It was proposed at the same time to annex to the foregoing power the following proviso:

Provided, That in time of peace the Army shall not consist of more than ——— thousand men.

Which was lost. It was further proposed to—

Establish an uniformity of exercise and arms for the militia and rules for their government when called into service under the authority of the United States; and to establish and regulate a militia in any State where its legislature shall neglect to do so.

Just preceding this it was proposed—

to make laws for regulating and disciplining the militia of the several States, reserving to the several States the appointment of their militia officers.

On motion the above were referred to the Committee of Eleven. (Journal of the Convention, Vol. II, Farrand, p. 323.)

Madison's notes of same date (Aug. 18, 1787) show that Mr. Gerry in the discussion of the clause "to raise and support armies" said that—

there was no check here against standing armies in time of peace. The existing Congress is so constructed (under the Articles of Confederation) that it can not of itself maintain an army. This would not be the case under the new system. The people were jealous on this head, and great opposition to the plan would spring from such an omission. He suspected that preparations of force were now making against it. (He seemed to allude to the activity of the governor of New York at this crisis in disciplining the militia of that State.) He thought an army dangerous in time of peace and could never consent to a power to keep up an indefinite number. He proposed that there should not be kept up in time of peace more than ——— thousand troops. His idea was that the blank should be filled with two or three thousand.

He further noted the proposal to—

make rules for the government and regulation of land and naval forces—

added from the existing Articles of Confederation.

Luther Martin and Elbridge Gerry now moved:

Provided, That in time of peace the Army shall not consist of more than ——— thousand men.

Gen. Pinckney asked whether no troops were ever to be raised until an attack should be made on us.

Mr. Gerry said:

If there be no restriction, a few States may establish a military government.

Mr. Williamson reminded him of Mr. Mason's motion for limiting the appropriation of revenue as the best guard in this case.

Mr. Langdon saw no room for Mr. Gerry's distrust of the representatives of the people.

Mr. Dayton remarked that—

preparations for war are generally made in peace and a standing force of some sort may for aught we know become unavoidable. He should object to no restrictions consistent with these ideas.

Mr. Mason moved as an additional power—

to make laws for the regulation and discipline of the militia of the several States, reserving to the States the appointment of the officers.

He considered uniformity as necessary in the regulation of the militia throughout the Union.

Gen. Pinckney mentioned a case during the war in which a dissimilarity in the militia of the several States had produced

the most serious mischief. Uniformity was essential. The States would never keep up a proper discipline of their militia.

Mr. Ellsworth was for going as far in submitting the militia to the General Government as might be necessary, but thought the motion of Mr. Mason went too far. He moved—

that the militia should have the same arms and exercise and be under rules established by the General Government when in actual service of the United States, and when States neglect to provide regulations for militia it should be regulated and established by the Legislature of the United States. The whole authority over the militia ought by no means to be taken away from the States whose consequence would pine away to nothing after such a sacrifice to power. He thought the general authority could not sufficiently pervade the Union for such a purpose, nor could it accommodate itself to the local genius of the people. It must be vain to ask the States to give the militia out of their hands.

Mr. Dickinson said:

We are come now to a most important matter, that of the sword. His opinion was that the States never would nor ought to give up all authority over the militia. He proposed to restrain the general power to one-fourth part at a time, which by rotation would discipline the whole militia.

Mr. Butler urged—

the necessity of submitting the whole militia to the general authority which had the care of the general defense.

Mr. Mason said—

had suggested the idea of a select militia. He was led to think that would be, in fact, as much as the General Government could advantageously be charged with. He was afraid of creating insuperable objections to the plan. He withdrew his original motion, and moved a power "to make laws for regulating and disciplining the militia, not exceeding one-tenth part in any year, and reserving the appointment of officers of the States."

Gen. Pinckney renewed Mr. Mason's original motion. For a part to be under the General Government and a part under the State governments would be an incurable evil. He saw no room for such distrust of the General Government.

Mr. Langdon seconds Gen. Pinckney's renewal. He saw no more reason to be afraid of the General Government than of the State governments. He was more apprehensive of the confusion of the different authorities on this subject than of either.

Mr. Madison thought the regulation of the militia naturally appertaining to the authority charged with the public defense. It did not seem in its nature to be divisible between two distinct authorities. If the State would trust the General Government with a power over the public treasure, they would from the same consideration of necessity grant it the direction of the public force. Those who had a full view of the public situation would from a sense of danger guard against it; the States would not be separately impressed with the general situation nor have the due confidence in the concurrent exertions of each other.

Mr. Ellsworth considered the idea of a select militia as impracticable; and if it were not it would be followed by a ruinous declension of the great body of the militia. The States will never submit to the same militia laws. Three or four shillings as a penalty will enforce obedience better in New England than 40 lashes in some other places.

Gen. Pinckney thought the power such a one as could not be abused, and that the States would see the necessity of surrendering it. He had, however, but a scanty faith in militia. There must be also a real military force. This alone can effectually answer the purpose. The United States had been making an experiment without it, and we see the consequence in their rapid approaches toward anarchy.

Mr. Sherman took notice that the States might want their militia for defense against invasions and insurrections and for enforcing obedience to their laws. They will not give up this point. In giving up that of taxation, they retain a concurrent power of raising money for their own use.

Mr. Gerry thought this the last point remaining to be surrendered. If it be agreed to by the convention, the plan will have as black a mark as was set on Cain. He had no such confidence in the General Government as some gentlemen possessed, and believed it would be found that the States have not.

Col. Mason thought there was great weight in the remarks of Mr. Sherman, and moved an exception to his motion "of such part of the militia as might be required by the States for their own use."

Mr. Read doubted the propriety of leaving the appointment of the militia officers in the States. In some States they are elected by the legislatures; in others, by the people themselves. He thought at least an appointment by the State executives ought to be insisted on.

All of which propositions were referred to the committee.

On August 21, 1787, Mr. Livingston, from the committee of eleven, to whom was referred, among other things, a proposi-

tion respecting the militia entered on the Journal of the Convention August 21, 1787, reported the following:

The Legislature of the United States shall have power * * * to make laws for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by the United States.

The foregoing is the exact language of clause 16, section 8, Article I of the Constitution of the United States, except the words "United States" are changed to "Congress." The Journal of the Convention, Mr. Madison's notes, contains the same record. (Farrand, Vol. II, pp. 325-326.)

On August 23, 1787, the second clause of the report of the committee of eleven which concerned the militia was considered. It was moved to recommit the second clause, which lost; and the first part of the second clause referring to the organizing, arming, and disciplining of the Army and governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States passed in the affirmative—9 ayes; 2 noes.

The part reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers under rank of general officers was voted down—ayes 2, noes 9.

On the question of the part of the report "reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers" it passed in the affirmative, and authority of the training of the militia according to the discipline described by the United States passed in the affirmative—ayes 7, noes 4. (Vol. II, Farrand, pp. 380-381.)

Madison's notes, covering the same period (Aug. 23, 1787), contained the debate by the Members on the second clause of the committee report. Mr. Sherman moved to strike out the last sentence, "and authority of training," and so forth. He thought it unnecessary. The States will have this authority, of course, if not given up. (Vol. II, Farrand, pp. 385-388.)

Above motion was lost by a vote of 3 ayes and 8 noes (p. 388). Mason in Madison notes is reported as saying that—

Being sensible that an absolute prohibition of standing armies in time of peace might be unsafe, and wishing at the same time to insert something pointing out and guarding against the danger of them, moved to preface Article I, section 8, to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, etc., with the words, "and that the liberties of the people may be better secured against the danger of standing armies in time of peace."

Mr. Morris opposed the motion "as setting a dishonorable mark of distinction on the military class of citizens."

Mr. Madison favored it. "Armies in time of peace," he said, "are allowed on all hands to be an evil." It was rejected by 2 ayes and 9 noes. (See Debates Virginia Convention, Robertson, 2d ed., 1805, p. 236.)

EXHIBIT A.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
Washington, March 16, 1916.

SIR: Referring to your telephone request of this morning, I am inclosing herewith a copy of a memorandum, which has been furnished our Legislative Reference Division by the Army War College. This seems to give the information which you desire concerning the rate of pay in the various armies of the world.

Very respectfully,

J. L. FARNUM, Secretary.
(For the Librarian.)

Hon. L. Y. SHERMAN,
Room 339, Senate Office Building.

The following tables are furnished through the courtesy of the Army War College:

Pay of the various foreign armies.

Grade and yearly pay in the Austrian Army.

Field marshal	\$4,800.00
General	3,360.00
Lieutenant general	2,803.00
Major general	2,280.00
Colonel	1,440.00
Lieutenant colonel	1,200.00
Major	802.00
Captain	600.00
First lieutenant	480.00
Lieutenant	336.00

DAILY PAY.

Sergeant	.14
Corporal	.06
Private (1-year volunteers)	.024

Grade and yearly pay in the Belgian Army.

Lieutenant general	\$3,700.00
Major general	2,540.00
Colonel	1,900.00
Lieutenant colonel	1,420.00
Major	1,260.00
Captain (first class)	920.00
Captain (second class)	740.00
Lieutenant (first class)	580.00
Lieutenant (second class)	500.00

DAILY PAY.

Adjutant		\$0.54
Sergeant major	\$0.32 to	.43
Sergeant		.28
Corporal	.06 to	.20
Privates (first class)	.02 to	.07
Privates (second class)	.02 to	.06

Grade and annual pay in the Brazilian Army.

(Currency: Inconvertible paper; exchange rate figured at \$0.333.)

Marshal	\$11,200
Major general	9,400
Brigadier general	7,600
Colonel	5,800
Lieutenant colonel	4,800
Major	3,800
Captain	3,000
First lieutenant	2,300
Second lieutenant	1,800
Sergeant major	480
First sergeant	360
Second sergeant	288
Third sergeant	216
Corporal	144
Private	72

Grade and yearly pay in the Chilean Army.

General of division	\$4,000
General of brigade	3,400
Colonels	2,800
Lieutenant colonels	2,400
Majors	2,000
Captains (after 6 years)	1,800
Captains (less than 4 years)	1,400
First lieutenants (after 5 years)	1,200
First lieutenants (less than 5 years)	1,000
Second lieutenants (after 2 years)	720
Second lieutenants (under 2 years)	600
First sergeants	480
5 first sergeants	360
Second sergeants	256
Corporals, first class	216
Corporals, second class	180
Soldiers	145
Conscripts	72

Rate of exchange figured at \$0.20.

Danish Army.

Grade.	Yearly pay.		Daily increase when traveling or on temporary duty not exceeding 30 days.
	From—	To—	
Generals		\$3,650.00	\$2.65
Lieutenant generals		3,650.00	2.65
Major generals		2,120.00	2.65
Colonels		1,802.00	2.65
Lieutenant colonels	\$1,431.00	1,606.50	2.65
Captains	795.00	1,113.00	2.65
First lieutenants	397.50	556.50	2.13
Second lieutenants		270.30	2.12
Staff sergeants	524.70	588.30	1.59
Overseergeants	439.30	492.90	1.06
Sergeants	270.30	413.40	1.06
Cornets		190.80	1.06
Corporals		159.00	7.95

DAILY PAY.

Grade.	During peace.	During war.
Life guard undercorporals	\$0.278	\$0.318
Other undercorporals	.265	\$0.318 to .397
Life guard privates	.251	.281
Other privates	\$0.225 to .238	.281

RESERVE, DURING PEACE.

Grade.	Yearly pay.	Daily increase under orders.
Colonels	\$397.50	\$2.12
Lieutenant colonels	397.50	2.13
Captains	270.30	1.59
First lieutenants	53.00	1.06
Lieutenants	53.00	1.06
Staff sergeants	53.00	1.06
Overseergeants	53.00	.795
Sergeants	53.00	.795

Lieutenants, during war (one-half increase of minimum pay), \$477.

When at a fortress, officers are allowed one-fourth increase of their pay.

During war, line officers are allowed one-half increase of their pay, with the exception of the commanding general and the division generals, who are allowed, respectively, \$106 and \$53 per month.

Transportation furnished officers and men traveling under orders.

French Army.

Grade.	Active pay.	Retired pay.
Marshal of France.....	\$5,760	
Major general.....	3,780	\$1,562
Brigadier general.....	2,520	1,044
Colonel.....	1,637	677
Lieutenant colonel.....	1,317	547
Major.....	1,101	461
Captain, after 12 years as such and 30 years' service.....	1,073	446
Captain, after 8 years as such and 30 years' service.....	1,073	446
Captain, after 8 years as such and 25 years' service.....	930	389
Captain, after 4 years as such and 25 years' service.....	930	389
Captain, after 4 years as such and 20 years' service.....	830	345
Captain, after 4 years as such and less than 20 years' service.....	727	302
First lieutenant, after 8 years as such and 20 years' service.....	727	302
First lieutenant, after 8 years as such and 15 years' service.....	684	281
First lieutenant, after 4 years as such and 15 years' service.....	684	281
First lieutenant, after 4 years as such and 10 years' service.....	641	266
First lieutenant, less than 4 years as such.....	597	252
Second lieutenant, after 6 years' service.....	576	236
Second lieutenant, less than 6 years' service.....	482	201

The above figures vary for the following reasons: First, the grade; second, the employment; third, the station.

Grade.	Daily pay base.	Enlisted men after 5 years' service.	Algerian tirailleur.	Algerian spahis.
Adjutant.....	\$0.49	\$1.02	\$0.56	\$0.31
Sergeant major.....	.20	.74	.28	
Sergeant saddler.....	.15	.68		
Sergeant.....	.14	.68	.16	.14
Quartermaster corporal.....	.10½			
Corporal.....	.04½		.11	.09
Gunners and artificers.....	.01½			
Privates.....	.01½		.04½	.05

Grade and yearly pay in the German Army.

General and field marshal.....	\$3,495.00
Major general.....	3,888.50
Brigadier general.....	2,565.00
Colonel.....	2,193.00
Lieutenant colonel and major.....	1,638.00
Captain (first 4 years).....	850.00
Captain (5 to 8 years).....	920.00
Captain (after 9 years).....	1,275.00
Lieutenant (first 3 years).....	375.00
Lieutenant (3 to 6 years).....	420.00
Lieutenant (7 to 9 years).....	475.00
Lieutenant (10 to 12 years).....	525.00
Lieutenant (after 13 years).....	600.00
Sergeant.....	76.10
Sergeant (after 5½ years).....	118.80
Sergeant (after 9 years).....	141.30
Corporal (obergefreite).....	37.80
Soldier.....	19.80

Great Britain's Army.

Grade.	Yearly pay.	
	When in quarters.	When not in quarters.
General.....	\$15,000.00	\$16,750.00
Lieutenant general.....	11,250.00	12,500.00
Major general.....	6,500.00	7,500.00
Brigadier general.....	4,400.00	5,000.00
Colonel or lieutenant colonel (commanding regiment of infantry).....	2,098.75	
Major.....	1,241.00	
Major (after 3 years' service).....	1,401.60	
Captain.....	1,058.50	
Captain (having higher rank by brevet).....	1,241.00	
First lieutenant.....	591.30	
First lieutenant (after 7 years' service as such).....	682.55	
Second lieutenant.....	474.50	
Sergeant major (infantry of the line).....	456.25	
Sergeant (infantry).....	311.70	
Corporal (infantry).....	149.65	
Private (infantry).....	91.25	

A pound figured as \$5.

Grade and annual pay in the Guatemalan Army.

Major general.....	\$3,600.00
Brigadier general.....	3,000.00
Colonel (infantry).....	1,920.00
Colonel (cavalry, artillery, engineers, and staff).....	2,040.00
Lieutenant colonel (infantry).....	1,680.00
Lieutenant colonel (cavalry, artillery, engineers, and staff).....	1,800.00
Major (infantry).....	1,440.00
Major (cavalry, artillery, engineers, and staff).....	1,560.00
Captain (infantry).....	1,200.00
Captain (cavalry, artillery, engineers, and staff).....	1,320.00
First lieutenant (infantry).....	960.00
First lieutenant (cavalry, artillery, engineers, and staff).....	1,080.00
Second lieutenant (infantry).....	720.00
Second lieutenant (cavalry, artillery, engineers, and staff).....	840.00

First sergeant.....	\$547.50
Second sergeant.....	456.25
Corporal.....	365.00
Private.....	273.75

Grade and yearly pay in the Italian Army.

General.....	\$3,000
Lieutenant general.....	2,400
Major general.....	1,800
Colonel.....	1,400
Colonel (after 6 years).....	1,540
Lieutenant colonel (after 6 years).....	1,145
Lieutenant colonel.....	1,040
Major (after 6 years).....	968
Major.....	880
Captain (after 10 years).....	800
Captain (after 5 years).....	740
Captain.....	680
Lieutenant (after 10 years).....	600
Lieutenant (after 5 years).....	540
Lieutenant.....	480
Second lieutenant (after 10 years).....	480
Second lieutenant (after 5 years).....	460
Second lieutenant.....	420

DAILY PAY, INCLUDING ALLOWANCE IN KIND, ETC.

Sergeant major.....	\$0.50
Sergeant.....	.42
Corporal.....	.23
Private.....	.20

For noncommissioned officers pay increases every 3 years \$0.06 per day until 18 years of service (maximum, \$0.36), when it remains fixed.

Grade and yearly pay in the Japanese Army.

General.....	\$3,750
Lieutenant general.....	2,500
Major general.....	1,950
Colonel.....	1,470
Lieutenant colonel.....	1,090
Major.....	774
Captain (first class).....	630
Captain (second class).....	540
Captain (third class).....	450
First lieutenant (first class).....	342
First lieutenant (second class).....	276
Second lieutenant.....	240

MONTHLY PAY.

Sergeant major.....	\$7.50 to \$9.90
Sergeant.....	3.90 to 6.45
Corporal.....	2.32 to 2.85

Grade and annual pay in the Norwegian Army.¹

Major general.....	\$2,120.00
General (garrisoned).....	1,908.00
Colonel.....	1,590.00
Lieutenant colonel.....	1,431.00
Major.....	1,272.00
Captain.....	\$922.20 to 975.20
First lieutenant.....	503.50 to 577.70
Second lieutenant.....	328.60 to 381.60
Sergeant major.....	168.54 to 387.96
Sergeants.....	117.66 to 337.08
Corporals.....	19.08

Roumanian Army.

Grade.	Annual pay.	Extra allowances.
Minister of war.....	\$2,880.00	\$1,920.00
Major general.....	3,120.00	600.00
Brigadier general.....	2,640.00	480.00
Colonel.....	1,920.00	360.00
Lieutenant colonel.....	1,560.00	240.00
Major.....	1,200.00	156.00
Captain.....	960.00	144.00
First lieutenant.....	720.00	120.00
Second lieutenant.....	624.00	
Sergeant major.....	324.00	
Sergeant.....	168.00	
Corporal.....	96.00	
Private.....	28.80	

Grade and annual pay in the Serbian Army.

General.....	\$2,020.00
Colonel.....	1,440.00
Lieutenant colonel.....	1,100.00
Major.....	990.00
Captain (first class).....	630.00
Captain (second class).....	520.00
First lieutenant.....	440.00
Second lieutenant.....	360.00
Sergeant major.....	120.00
Sergeant.....	72.00
Corporal.....	12.00
Private.....	3.60

Grade and annual pay in the Spanish Army.

General.....	\$5,454.48
Lieutenant general.....	4,545.36
Major general.....	2,727.24
Brigadier general.....	1,813.12
Colonel.....	1,454.52
Lieutenant colonel.....	1,187.76
Major.....	999.96
Captain.....	636.36

¹ This does not include commutation and service allowances.
² Only during service.

First lieutenant.....		\$454. 56
Second lieutenant.....		384. 60
Cadet.....		272. 64
Sergeant major.....	\$272. 76 to	490. 80
Sergeant.....	130. 80 to	272. 76
Corporal.....	71. 52 to	94. 80
Soldier.....	53. 04 to	55. 20

Swedish Army.

Grade.	Annual pay.	Annual pay with commutation and service allowances.
Generals.....	\$2,120. 00	\$3,194. 53
Colonels.....	1,590. 00	3,488. 35
Lieutenant colonels.....	1,192. 51	1,941. 13
Majors.....	1,060. 00	1,893. 63
Captains (first class).....	901. 00	1,420. 40
Captains (second class).....	636. 00	1,155. 40
Lieutenants (first class).....	397. 50	793. 68
Lieutenants (second class).....	270. 31	666. 48
Second lieutenants.....	190. 80	1,586. 93
Corporal (cash).....	\$95. 00 to 147. 00	\$204. 03 to 256. 03
Volunteers.....	69. 00	178. 00
Private.....	19. 70 to 49. 25	129. 00 to 153. 55

¹ Total cost.*Swiss Army.*

Grade.	Annual pay, active service.	Instruction service.
Commander in chief.....	\$3,650. 00	-----
Chief of general staff.....	2,920. 00	-----
Paymaster general.....	1,825. 00	-----
Colonel (commanding division).....	2,190. 00	-----
Colonel (commanding brigade).....	1,825. 00	-----
Colonel.....	1,460. 00	\$1,241. 00
Lieutenant colonel.....	1,095. 00	949. 00
Major.....	876. 00	803. 00
Captain (mounted).....	730. 00	657. 00
Captain (not mounted).....	730. 00	584. 00
First lieutenant (mounted).....	584. 00	511. 00
First lieutenant (not mounted).....	584. 00	438. 00
Second lieutenant (mounted).....	511. 00	438. 00
Second lieutenant (not mounted).....	511. 00	365. 00
Sergeant major.....	219. 00	219. 00
First sergeant.....	182. 50	182. 50
Sergeant (not mounted).....	109. 50	109. 50
Corporal (mounted).....	109. 50	109. 50
Corporal (not mounted).....	73. 00	73. 00
Private.....	58. 40	58. 40
Recruit.....	-----	36. 50

Grade and annual pay in the Turkish Army.

Lieutenant general.....	\$5,280. 00
Major general.....	3,960. 00
Brigadier general.....	2,640. 00
Colonel.....	1,554. 00
Lieutenant colonel.....	1,320. 00
Major.....	1,056. 00
Adjutant major.....	792. 00
Captain.....	528. 00
First lieutenant.....	422. 40
Second lieutenant.....	369. 60
Sergeant major (first sergeant)..... ¹	211. 20
Assistant sergeant major.....	179. 52
Sergeant.....	158. 40
Sergeant major (when from ranks).....	24. 40
Sergeant (when from ranks).....	21. 12
Corporal.....	15. 84
Private.....	10. 56

Grade and annual pay in the United States Army.

Lieutenant general.....	\$11,000. 00
Major general.....	8,000. 00
Brigadier general.....	6,000. 00
Colonel.....	4,000. 00
Lieutenant colonel.....	3,500. 00
Major.....	3,000. 00
Captain.....	2,400. 00
First lieutenant.....	2,000. 00
Second lieutenant.....	1,700. 00
Sergeant major.....	480. 00
Sergeant.....	360. 00
Corporal.....	252. 00
Private.....	180. 00

¹ When from noncommissioned officers' school.

EXHIBIT B.

CHINA HAS GREATER PROPORTION OF TRAINED MEN THAN THE UNITED STATES—GEN. PERSHING, IN ADDRESS ON PREPAREDNESS BEFORE WOMAN'S CLUB, SOUNDS WARNING—LARGER FLEET OF WARSHIPS NEEDED TO GUARD COAST CITIES OF THIS COUNTRY—TO PREVENT LANDING OF HOSTILE EXPEDITIONS BY ONE OF GREAT POWERS MOBILE FORCE OF 500,000 WELL-EQUIPPED MEN ARE NEEDED; RISKS OF WAR ARE TEN TIMES AS HAZARDOUS AS FIRE; SHOULD PREPARE NOW.

[By Brig. Gen. John J. Pershing.]

"To be prepared for war is the most effectual means of preserving peace. A free people ought not only to be armed, but disciplined; to which end a uniform and well-digested plan is requisite." This was the advice George Washington gave his countrymen in discussing the welfare of the Nation in his first annual address to Congress.

No man in our country has ever been in a better position to appreciate the consequences of unpreparedness than George Washington. During those critical years of war the lack of previous military preparedness had been borne in upon him with impressive force. He had learned that high-sounding phrases and rhetorical declarations of patriotism, no matter how sincerely uttered, could not take the place of well-drilled efficiency, and that the untrained enthusiasm of youth was a poor substitute for military knowledge and military discipline.

SHOULD BE PREPARED.

The Revolution began in real earnest after Colonies had made clear their purpose through the Declaration of Independence. The time for decisive action had an effective military force, but unfortunately the people did not realize that an aggregation of civilians with arms could not hold their own against disciplined soldiers under efficient officers. At the very beginning Washington was forced by the British on Long Island to retire to New York, and the accounts of the movement as given in our histories lead to the conclusion that it was a masterly retreat, but in a letter to the President of Congress Washington describes the results in the following words:

"Our situation is truly distressing. The check our detachment sustained on the 27th ultimo has dispirited too great a proportion of our troops and filled their minds with apprehension and despair. The militia, instead of calling forth their utmost efforts to a brave and manly opposition in order to repair our losses are dismayed, intractable, and impatient to return. Great numbers of them have gone off—in some instances almost by whole regiments, by half ones, and by companies at a time."

FLED IN CONFUSION.

A few days later when the British, in pursuit, crossed over to New York, the Continental Army took fright and, scarcely firing a shot, fled in the utmost confusion. There is little doubt that Washington fully appreciated the difficulties that confronted him, for he at once most earnestly presented to the Congress the weakness of hastily organized militia as follows:

"To place any dependence upon militia is assuredly resting upon a broken staff. Men just dragged from the tender scenes of domestic life, unaccustomed to the din of arms, totally unacquainted with every kind of military skill (which is followed by a want of confidence in themselves when opposed by troops regularly trained, disciplined and appointed, superior in knowledge, and superior in arms), are timid and ready to fly from their own shadows.

Besides, the sudden change in their manner of living, particularly in their lodging, brings on sickness in many, impatience in all, and such an unconquerable desire of returning to their respective homes that it not only produces shameful and scandalous desertions among themselves but infuses the like spirit in others."

Washington was called upon to combat all the evils of this temporizing system. The uninstructed men sent by the colonies were often worse than none. The terms of enlistment were so short that they barely learned their duties before they left the service, to be replaced by other green recruits. These generally came unequipped, demanding food, clothing, arms, and shelter. Most of the officers obtained their appointments through family or political connections and incompetency was the rule. The Colonies organized new regiments of raw troops and sent them to the front, instead of filling up the seasoned and experienced regiments already in the field.

Both the Continental Congress and the several Colonies finally resorted to the vicious system of offering bounties. This only added to the difficulties, as many men became professional bounty jumpers, and desertion largely increased. Everything was a makeshift and, notwithstanding Washington's continuous appeals for a regular army organization, the Colonies drifted along from bad to worse during the entire period of the Revolution. It was only upon the most urgent appeals by the leaders of the Revolution that the Colonies could be induced to furnish anything like their respective quotas of men. So difficult was it to retain them with the colors that from first to last 400,000 colonials were borne on the rolls. In the year 1776 we had the maximum of \$9,000, but this dwindled to the minimum of 29,000 in 1791. Yet at no period of the war did Washington have at his disposal an army of over 16,500 men.

The belief is general that it was the patriotic devotion of the minute men and the untrained farmers of Lexington and Concord who won the war for independence, but the fact is that if it had not been for divided public sentiment in England itself and the sluggishness with which the British conducted the war, together with the timely assistance of the French under La Fayette, the United States might still be a British colony. I can but quote here what Gen. Light Horse Harry Lee said years after the war in writing of the action of one of our regiments at Camden:

"While I record with delight facts which maintain our native and national courage, I feel a horror lest demagogues who flourish in a representative system of government shall avail themselves of the occasional testimony to produce a great result. Convinced as I am that a government is the murderer of its citizens which sends them to the field uninformed and untaught where they meet men of the same age and strength mechanized by education and discipline for battle, I can not withhold my denunciation of its wickedness and folly."

FALSE TEACHING OF HISTORY.

The false teachings of American history are largely responsible for our state of unpreparedness to-day. Should we be forced into war now your boys would go out into the field against very great odds. An Englishman recently wrote to one of our general officers and, speaking of the loss of his son on the western frontier of Europe, said:

"We have lost our only son, but neither he nor his fellows had a sporting chance—they had never had military training."

In spite of the lessons of the Revolution, the War of 1812, 20 years later, found the country still unprepared for defense. The same inexcusable and criminal neglect to anticipate the future made it necessary again to enlist unprepared citizens, mostly boys as usual, and send them into the field under ignorant officers and without proper organization—a method which produced the same needless waste of human life. Under this foolish system we were compelled to put into the field during this war the relatively exorbitant number of 34,000 officers and 493,000 men, while the greatest number of British regulars on the American Continent at any time was less than 17,000.

DISASTERS OF WAR.

Among the disasters of this war was Hull's surrender at Detroit of 1,800 men to a British force of 1,320 without firing a shot. Then Hampton, with a body of 5,000 men moving on Montreal, was put to flight by a force of 400 Canadians and Indians. Gen. Wilkinson, com-

manding 8,000 men, also moving on Montreal, was whipped by 800 British regulars at Crystlers Fields. Another force of 4,000 Kentucky Militia under Gen. Hopkins, marching toward Indian villages on the Wabash and Illinois Rivers, got scared at a prairie fire and, deserting their officers, ignominiously retraced their steps and fled to their homes. I shall not further recall the humiliating tales of defeat incident to this war. Except a small victory on the Thames, the action at Lundys Lane, where the regular troops covered themselves with eternal glory, and Jackson's victory at New Orleans, won after peace had been declared, the military operations of this war, including the surrender of the Capital City to the British, after the headlong flight of our troops from Bladensburg, were absolutely disgraceful. Nearly all the blunders committed were repetitions in an aggravated form of the blunders of the Revolution, and like them had their origin either in mistakes or omissions of military legislation.

You would think that a sensible people after all our experience would realize the necessity for adequate preparation, but at the beginning of the Civil War we were still adhering to the fatuous policy of previous wars. We pursued the same course; first calling out the militia, then volunteers, then granting bounties with all their demoralizing effect of wholesale desertion and bounty jumping; and we must record the same result—total failure of the volunteer system and tremendous loss of life and property. Fortunately each side in this war was about equally unprepared and neither had the advantage. To a much greater degree than in former wars, reliance in the North upon the voluntary enlistment prevented rational organization, made operations uncertain, ignored the universal obligations of the individual for military service, and encouraged the shirk and the skulker.

These costly experiences have proved that it is impossible, without tremendous losses, to build up a national army by depending upon State governments for cooperation. In the State militia of to-day each of the 48 States has its own policy, which changes almost with every new governor. The officers are usually elected by the votes of the members of the organization, and it is unreasonable to suppose that these troops will be fit for war until they have had several months of hard training in the field under the direction of competent officers. There can not be any reliance upon any plan for immediate preparedness which does not place the details of organization and training of the forces under the control of the Central Government.

MANY CHANGES IN ART OF WAR.

There have been marked changes in the art of war during the last 10 years, perhaps greater than during any century since the invention of gunpowder. While the same method of transporting and supplying armies were used in both Napoleon's and Caesar's time, the adoption of explosive weapons wrought important changes in handling troops on the battle field. Most of the modern improvements in the arts and sciences have been utilized in the art of war, but of all these the perfection of the interior-combustion engine has probably had a greater influence upon military art than any other modern invention. The full effect of these inventions on the methods of conducting warfare have not yet been fully realized by the world at large.

Marvelously quick transportation of troops, the ability to provide food and supplies for inconceivable numbers of fighting men, rapid communication of intelligence, power to fly through the air and scout the enemy, traveling under water 5,000 miles from base to sink his ships, throwing projectiles of unprecedented weight to smash his forts, transporting and treating thousands of wounded who would otherwise perish but for the use of the automobile—these are some of the more striking improvements in modern methods of conducting warfare, improvements which make military preparation before the beginning of war absolutely essential.

As to the size of armies in the field, the actual numbers of armed fighting men in the present war surpass by far the fabled hordes of history and are indeed almost inconceivable. Of the entire population of Europe 78 per cent are now engaged in this conflict; and considering the population of the whole world, 56 per cent are now at war. The almost unbelievable number of 13,000,000 men are actually under arms in Europe to-day; over 2,000,000 have been killed; nearly 4,000,000 have been wounded, not counting the slightly wounded who have returned to the front; and about 2,225,000 are prisoners of war.

We can not grasp these figures, but in comparison with our own Civil War, which was one of the great wars of modern times, this war may be said to be more than ten times as great. The number of men we had under arms at any one time did not exceed 1,300,000, including both North and South, and about 200,000 were killed on both sides during the war.

SUPPLYING FIGHTING FORCE.

The question of supplying these gigantic armies has been a difficult one, and the success with which it has been accomplished has been most astonishing. These results alone speak volumes of the necessity for thorough preliminary organization of the Nation's resources. The work of supply has been made possible by the combined use of railroads and large numbers of motor trucks moving over military highways. The motor truck under these conditions has proved itself to be about forty times as efficient as the four-mule team.

Another surprising thing in this war is the very extended theater of operations. Along the western war frontier in Europe the present stage consists of two lines of infantry, 300 miles long from the ocean on the west to the mountains on the east, occupying deep trenches, in many instances only a few hundred yards apart. These trenches are often made of concrete, and are supplemented by many supporting trenches and lines of approach and ample underground habitations. This line is held by approximately 2,500,000 men on either side, or nearly 5 men to every yard, and would reach from New York City to Lake Ontario. The other 8,000,000 men are battling in other sections; but if they too manned trenches similar to those in the west, the whole line would reach from Washington to Mobile.

UNITED STATES UNPREPARED.

Let us compare the number of trained soldiers permanently maintained by the different great nations. Germany has over 5,000,000; France, 5,000,000; Russia, 5,000,000; Austria-Hungary, 4,320,000; Italy, 2,600,000; Japan, 2,212,000; England, 695,000; United States, about 100,000, including Coast Artillery, but there is to-day a mobile force of only 30,000 men of the Regular Army within the limits of the United States. Adding to these about 60,000 fairly trained National Guard troops and we have about 90,000 men scattered from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The trained soldiers in the United States are less than 1 in every 1,000 of population, while the average among our possible enemies is 65 per 1,000.

Even China has a greater proportion of trained soldiers than the United States has. At this time when trained military men and modern

organization are more important to the life of any nation than they have been at any other period in history, this Nation can not afford to drop behind in its solicitude regarding the future, but with firm resolve should profit by its own bitter experience and prepare against the evil day that is sure to come.

SEACOAST DEFENSE.

With reference to seacoast defense it may be said that they are primarily for the protection of important cities and harbors, and for that purpose should possess an armament equal to that of the most powerful warships. Naval armament has lately been greatly developed as to caliber, range, and rapidity of fire. The 15-inch guns on foreign warships of the *Queen Elizabeth* class are so powerful that they exceed the range of our coast defense guns by 2,000 to 3,000 yards, or nearly 2 miles. Our artillerymen have a plan to overcome this advantage. The main point is to prevent an enemy from landing an expedition at some other place and capturing the defense from the rear.

Last August the allies secretly moved by sea from Australia, in one convoy of 98 vessels, an army of 125,000 men, completely equipped with transportation, guns, and supplies, and landed it on Gallipoli Peninsula, where the beaches were difficult and where there were barbed wire entanglements under water and the seas were strewn with mines. Sea transportation nowadays is the best, quickest, and safest method of moving troops. The larger trans-Atlantic passenger steamers can be fitted up to carry 7,500 to 10,000 soldiers each, together with all the arms, ammunition, and supplies necessary for a campaign. More than one of the leading powers of Europe could land an expedition of 350,000 men on the Atlantic coast within 15 days and an additional 400,000 by the end of 15 days more. It would be the Army's duty to prevent such landing, if possible.

The Navy's work is securing and maintaining control of the sea, and it must be free to seek out and defeat the enemy's fleet. Any use of the battle fleet for local coast defense is an extravagant use of naval power. If the fleet is defeated and beyond the protection of an adequate Army, it is powerless to prevent either invasion or its own destruction, and so the Army and Navy must cooperate. Any plan of defense that does not consider this fact is defective.

STRENGTH OF NAVIES.

The relative strength of navies is in general measured by dreadnaughts. There have been built, or are building, in the world 162 dreadnaughts, so far as public records show. Leaving out of the count our battleships *South Carolina* and *Michigan*, which are not now considered dreadnaughts, we find that England has 50, Germany 30, France 17 (including 4 already begun), United States 17 (including 5 not yet begun), Japan 10, Italy 10, Austria 8.

Our Navy stands fourth among the navies of the world, but with all of our seacoast to defend that is no place for our Navy to remain. It ought to move up to the top, but if that is not practicable at present, then it ought to be an unquestioned second. A poor Navy for a Nation like ours is worse than none, and is an extravagance that ought not to be indulged. Let us be at least a good second or quit building ships altogether.

MODERN SHIPS NEEDED.

If we are to have a Navy we must scrap all obsolete craft and build more light cruisers for blockade and patrol work, innumerable submarines and destroyers, more hydroplanes for scouting, plenty of trawlers for sweeping the sea of mines, and a large increase in big-gun ships of high speed. All these we need in their proper proportion as recommended by our naval experts, with plenty of seamen for active service and reserves to fill up war losses. To sum up, as has been wittily said, "What this country needs is a battle fleet strong enough to make the landing of an expedition impossible, also an Army strong enough to drive it back if it did land."

The attractiveness that this unprepared Nation offers to any well-armed, well-equipped, aggressive, first-class military power seeking revenge or gain will appear evident when it is realized that we have greater accumulated wealth than any other two nations; twice as many motor cars and motor trucks as all Europe; that we produce more iron and steel than any other three nations; more copper than all the rest of the world, and have a greater mileage of railroads than the nations of Europe combined. These are important elements of military strength, but they are as certainly elements of weakness if they fall into the possession of an enemy to be used against us.

Within an hour to a six-hour's run by automobile from New York City there lie Boston and Philadelphia and many other important cities, also the Pennsylvania coal fields, and practically all cartridge works, smokeless-powder works, small-arms works, torpedo-boat works, and heavy gun and armor-plate works in the whole country. With the landing of a hostile expedition near New York City and the capture from the rear of its seacoast defenses, the enemy's guns could bombard the coast cities and his army could overrun this area and collect billions of dollars in ransom before we could possibly mobilize even the small number of Regulars and National Guard we have, much less enlist and train an adequate army of volunteers. Along the Atlantic coast will be found accumulated wealth to the value of over \$50,000,000,000, or about one-third the total in the United States, quite undefended as far as the Army is concerned, and hence subject to the command of the guns of an enemy's warships, or within easy reach of his expeditionary forces. An enemy once on our shores and in possession of this area would deprive us of all the means of supplying our armies with munitions for the conduct of war, without which he could not be dislodged for years, if at all. Such an enemy certainly could not be driven out by a million of unarmed and untrained men, who, as one of our public men recently boasted, would rise up in defense of the flag between sunrise and sunset.

NEED OF TRAINED TALENT.

To prevent a landing of a hostile expedition by one of the great powers the very ablest and best military talent in the country is agreed that we should have under arms and available for immediate dispatch to the threatened point a well-balanced and well-equipped mobile force of at least 250,000 men, with an additional force of 500,000 trained reserves that could be mobilized within 10 days. Back of these to conduct a war there must be at least 2,000,000 men trained, officered, organized, equipped, and ready for call within 20 days. These are the very least numbers that should be considered. If there is any necessity of being prepared, then it should be done thoroughly. A nation prepared for war can usually protect its rights without having to fight, but to be halfway prepared is only to invite disaster and ruin. This Nation has too much at stake to take chances.

During the past two years new conditions affecting the fundamental rights of nations have been created by this cataclysm of war. The world to-day is in the most anomalous condition mankind has ever seen.

The greatest human struggle of all the ages is going on between the most powerful combinations of nations. Wise men ought to take warning and peer into the future and prepare to-day for what may come to-morrow. Whatever may have been our national policies in the past, whatever may be our political beliefs, we can no longer view the future with unconcern, nor fail to be physically prepared squarely to meet emergencies.

A desire for universal harmony and perpetual peace bespeaks a noble aim, but in the face of dangers that have already befallen nations unprepared it is first of all our duty to marshal our forces and organize our resources. The time is here for the people of this country to arouse themselves, show their wonted courage and revive their devotion to the principles of the fathers. Americans have been dazed, uncertain, and perplexed. They have taken counsel of timidity, and in consequence they appear unable to do any positive thing. It is high time for plain talk and practical performance.

RISKS OF WAR.

The risks of war are ten times as hazardous as fire risks, and although the average man insures against fire he gives little thought to national insurance against war. During the life of this Republic we have had 25 years of war, including the Florida War, not counting Indian wars and other internal disturbances, where the Army has been used. That is to say, we have had one year of war to every five years of peace during the time of our national existence.

It has been declared that the nations engaged in the present deplorable struggle will be so exhausted in the end that they will be in no condition to wage another war. The history of nations, including our own, does not bear out any such theory. When this country emerged from the Civil War it was for the only time in its history prepared for war, and was without doubt the strongest military nation in the world. As such it did not hesitate to demand the immediate withdrawal of France from Mexico, which had been occupied in violation of the Monroe doctrine, a demand that was promptly complied with. At the end of the present war the nations involved will, no doubt, be stronger from a military standpoint than ever before. The population will be no less, as enough male children have been born during this war period to compensate for the losses incurred.

A few peace-at-any-price advocates argue that to prepare for war invites war, and that a nation prepared is likely to go about looking for trouble. If that is so, then the leading nations of the world are seeking war; and if they are all spilling for war, then the most profitable field that presents itself in the world to-day is unprepared America.

UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING.

To raise such an army as is proposed we shall without doubt be compelled to adopt some system of universal military training. It would be wise to place such a law on the statute books, even though it should not be considered necessary to put it into force at this time. The law could then be invoked in time of war without further legislation, and much valuable time could be saved. While primarily for purposes of military defense and not for aggression, the system determined upon should also have for its object the making of brave and courageous citizens, ready to uphold law and order in their own communities and able to defend their homes with sturdy vigor and a distinct sense of efficiency and preparedness. It would be difficult to imagine any discipline that would be of greater value, not only to the individual, but to the industrial, political, and military future of this country, than to provide for the 1,000,000 young men reaching 18 years of age each year five or six months' consecutive military training, under some such intensive system as that followed in the conduct of our summer encampments for citizens.

But when we speak of universal military training a few "little Americans" immediately rise up and begin to parade the familiar specter of militarism. Nobody should be frightened at this apparition. There is no militarism in Switzerland, Australia, or New Zealand, and yet universal military training is compulsory in those countries. Everybody, except those who will not see, should know that the very surest way to avoid militarism, if such a thing were at all possible under our democratic institutions, is to give every man military training. That is the safeguard of individual rights. Militarism for conquest is the dream of monarchs, and is contrary to all our traditions. It means rule by an aristocratic military hierarchy. It can not obtain a foothold in a nation free from class distinction. If all citizens are trained in military tactics, they are at once on an equal footing, and there is no such thing possible as a military caste.

WILSON ON CONSCRIPTION.

In the President's "History of the American People" we find this reference to conscription in the South during the Civil War:

"Almost every white man of fighting age, and many who were too young or too old for the field, came first or last into the Confederate ranks, and the war seemed to be using the whole capacity of a proud and capable race."

"Hundreds of thousands volunteered; the rest were drawn in by conscription. Where it was necessary to use the entire fighting population it was impossible to rely upon voluntary service, and the South with its scant numbers for the field resorted to conscription sooner than the North."

Thus, if it were necessary to add further testimony in favor of the principle of compulsory service, we have it from our own war, and, similarly, we have it in the very recent experience of one of the leading nations now at war in Europe.

It is far better to adopt in time of peace universal training with service by lot than to have general conscription forced upon you, perhaps too late, by the fear of national failure in war. The folly of neglecting military training is without doubt the regret of more than one nation in Europe to-day, and more than one will never again rely upon the vagaries of peace propagandists or on the diplomatic promises of friendly, though warlike, neighbors.

DUTY OF EVERY YOUNG MAN.

With military training every young man would learn that he owes his country the duty of preparing himself to defend her rights if called upon to do so. The instruction would strongly impress upon him his military obligation to the Government. Service for one's country can not be measured by the mercenary standard of wages, but it ought to be given and accepted as the antecedent price of suffrage and for the mutual benefit of both the Government and the citizen. The principle of compulsory service is to require every man to do his part, but there are always those who will hang back when war comes, while the flower of our patriotic young manhood go to the front. We want to get hold of this would-be shirk and teach him to defend the flag that protects him. We want to anticipate and prevent in this country the development of the poltroon or the mollicoddle.

Show me a man, whether native or foreign born, who is not willing to do his share, and prepare himself to be a soldier by giving his services, gratis, to his Government for at least six months' military training, when present world conditions appear ominous and the future is fraught with danger to the Nation, and when, without reference to political party, the leading statesmen are appealing to the country for adequate preparedness, and I will show you a man who places self-interest above patriotism; I will show you a man who would skulk while others defended his home and his family, and I will also show you a man who does not deserve the protection of this great Republic.

EXHIBIT C.

ILLINOIS BANKERS ASSOCIATION,
Chicago, March 31, 1916.

HON. LAWRENCE Y. SHERMAN,
The Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: As indicative of the intelligent, sober judgment of the Central West, we call your attention to what we believe to be the first poll with respect to the subject of national preparedness, which has been fairly taken by a representative organization covering a wide area.

The poll is particularly significant, as the majority of the members of the association are small institutions owned and controlled by local farmers and business men, intimately in touch with the sentiment of the public they serve, and for the further reason that the poll was taken without making any reference to the present international situation, the urgent need for better defense or an appeal to patriotism.

The referendum was ordered by President Woodruff in the current number of the Association Bulletin as a guide for the action of this committee.

The results are so overwhelmingly in favor of a larger Army and Navy, and the adoption by Congress of the recommendations of the Army and Navy officers that this committee feels obligated to bring the matter to the attention of the Members of Congress from Illinois.

The nonpartisan character of the inquiry and the intimate relationship between the men in the small banks and the public justifies the assertion that the expression is that of public opinion in the agricultural, industrial, and other communities in which the banks are located.

The details of the poll are shown in the following tabulation:

Question No. 1. Do you believe our Navy should be enlarged and strengthened?

Yes	572
No	23

Question No. 2. Do you believe our Army should be enlarged and strengthened?

Yes	569
No	28

Question No. 3. In adopting any plan for Army and Navy enlargement, do you believe that Congress should be guided by the recommendations of our Army and Navy officers, who are experts on the subject of Army and Navy matters?

Yes	558
No	24

(Sixteen qualify their answers by saying "To a certain extent.")

It will be seen that to question No. 1, 96 per cent voted in the affirmative; to question No. 2, 95 per cent voted in the affirmative; and to question No. 3, 96 per cent voted in the affirmative; 3 per cent qualifying their vote.

To further justify your confidence in the cosmopolitan character of the replies, attention is called to the fact that over 90 per cent of the votes were cast from the smaller communities in the State, where the relation sustained between the bank men and depositors is that of confidential advisor, thus making the returns a reflection of public opinion. It should also be borne in mind that the vote was given by a conservative element and in a secret ballot.

Without urging upon you the very positive convictions of this committee and that the rank and file of the people in the Central West are emphatically in favor of adequate measures of defense commensurate with the wealth and exposed position of the Nation, we leave you to draw your own conclusions from the very significant poll, which we have pleasure in reporting.

Emphatic comment as to the urgent need for action appears on numerous ballots, while opposed to this are several explanations of the votes against an increase. In only one case is reference made to international disarmament. The "peace at any price" propaganda seems to have few, if any, adherents.

Yours, very truly,

COMMITTEE ON PREPAREDNESS,
OMAR H. WRIGHT, Chairman,
N. M. HARRIS,
JOHN W. THOMAS.

Mr. SHERMAN. This completes all the exhibits which I will submit.

I now ask unanimous consent for the consideration of the resolution I have read.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MARTINE of New Jersey in the chair). There is a question pending before the Senate. If unanimous consent is given for the consideration of the Senator's resolution, of course it will take precedence.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Whenever the resolution is reached in its proper order I shall be very glad to have the subject investigated, but I do not care to have anything taken up at this time. I object.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is made.

Mr. SHERMAN. Let me suggest, with the permission of the Senator from Oregon, that the resolution lie on the table with the understanding that it goes over under the rule.

Mr. SMITH of Georgia. What is the resolution?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. It is a resolution presented by the Senator from Illinois [Mr. SHERMAN]. Objection has been made to its consideration at the present time, and the Senator from Illinois requests that it may lie on the table.

Mr. SMITH of Georgia. It can not be presented except by unanimous consent.

Mr. SHERMAN. Let it go over under the rule to be considered when the pending bill is out of the way.

Mr. HARDWICK. The Senator has not had a right at all to present it. He merely read it for information.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That was all.

Mr. SMITH of Georgia. Can it be read at the desk for information?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair is informed that objection being made the resolution will go back to the Senator from Illinois; that it can not be introduced. It may be reintroduced at another time.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I have no objection to its being presented and lie on the table. I did object to its being taken up for disposition at this time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is it agreeable to the Senate that the resolution shall be received and lie on the table?

Mr. SMITH of Georgia. I think the resolution ought to come in regularly in the regular way.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is made, so that the resolution will be returned to the Senator from Illinois.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. President, I am very reluctant to say anything more than I have said in reference to section 56 of the proposed Army organization bill, but I feel that I ought to say something in regard to the matter, in view of the broad range the discussion has taken.

I want to say, Mr. President, that the committee that has reported out this bill does not arrogate to itself any superior knowledge upon this or upon any other subject connected with the reorganization of the Army. All that it claims for itself is that it has gone into this subject at very great length, and I question very much if the individual Members of the Senate have given it the same careful consideration that the Committee on Military Affairs has given the whole subject. That is the most that the committee claims. There are distinguished Senators here who possess the same means of information, and of superior ability, no doubt; but I question if any Member of the Senate has taken up these various subjects embodied in the bill and considered them as a whole in connection with each other. We have listened to experts in the Army, as well as to prominent civilians, in undertaking to reach a proper conclusion.

I think, Mr. President, it would be a very great mistake to eliminate section 56 from this bill. I want to go further and to say that I believe I can safely say that no member of the committee felt that the National Guard was an entirely dependable force. The history of this country from its earliest times to the present has vindicated the suggestion of many of the Senators here that the National Guard and the militia of this country have never proved a dependable force in time of emergency. I say that without intending to discredit either the patriotism or the efforts of the National Guard to make of themselves a dependable force both in times of peace and in times of war. Appropriations that have been made for the National Guard from time to time, Mr. President, have been made for the sole and only purpose of undertaking to make it an efficient and effective force whenever it might happen to be called upon.

Aside from the standing army, there is no other force in this country that could be utilized immediately for the service of the Government in case anything happened to us; and it was the purpose of the committee to try, so far as it was possible under the limits of the Constitution, and even further, we feared, than the Constitution warranted us in going, to make the National Guard a more efficient force than it has been in the past.

I differ from some of my colleagues here as to the power of Congress over this subject. I realize, however, that there are great differences of opinion amongst the strongest men in this Republic as to the power of Congress over the National Guard or the National Militia. It was in view of this difference of opinion that the Military Committee, so far as it was concerned, did not propose to depend absolutely upon the National Guard, but intended to try to make it more dependable than it was, and at the same time to endeavor to bring within the control of the National Government another force that can and will be made an effective force under complete Federal jurisdiction.

I know what will happen, Senators, in case differences occur between this country and some other country. History tells us what has happened in the past, and we can only judge of what may happen in the future by what has happened in the

past. That will be that when the emergency is upon us Congress will get together within a very short time and pass—what? Pass a bill that will enable the President to call a volunteer army for the purpose of a defense of this country against any attack that might be made upon it. We have always done it, and we shall do it again. In an emergency which confronted us a few days ago we did the same thing, and without a dissenting voice this Congress authorized the President of the United States to enlist 20,000 troops.

The friends of the National Guard will say, "Why did the President not call on the National Guard?" The same question suggested itself in the past, Why did not the President of the United States call upon the National Guard, the National Militia? Simply because, Mr. President, the absolute mainstay and defense of this country in time of emergency is the Regular Army; and the second dependable force is that part of our citizenship that can be mustered into the Regular Army when the time arrives, and be mustered in promptly.

Why, Mr. President, some of our friends here have talked about conditions that may exist when the millennium arrives. Until you can eradicate from the individual human heart greed and selfishness and the desire to get something that belongs to his neighbor, you can not eradicate from the hearts of the nations the same desire that animates the animal man when he comes to deal with his neighbor. The time was when the predatory nations of the earth went unassisted in search of prey; they did not need assistance. While I do not mean to say that the French were a predatory nation, we do know that in the days of Napoleon he went without allies and conquered Europe. Frederick the Great did not need any assistance to accomplish his ends. But predatory nations, Mr. President and Senators, nowadays, like the predatory animals, travel in packs.

One of the peculiar and amazing things in the war that is now devastating Europe is the fact that while one great power that is now involved in it was spending 40 years in training its soldiery and accumulating munitions of war and things that went to destroy human life, another of the great powers was burying the hatchet with its hereditary foes of an hundred years, and fighting battles in diplomacy by which it hoped to overcome its enemies who proposed to fight battles with arms, munitions, and with trained soldiery. We find to-day arrayed upon the one side are nations imbued with the militaristic spirit, and on the other side are nations that have been fighting battles in diplomacy. We find these latter fighting side by side with peoples who for a hundred years have been at each other's throats, either from a spirit of revenge or a desire for commercial supremacy.

While this condition is prevailing we snugly sit here, Senators, with a feeling of security that this country will have nothing to do when this war is over, challenging the powers of the earth to reach us. It may be true that they will not attempt to reach us; God grant they may never be able to reach us; but no man in business in this Republic is going to wait until fire assails his home to get out an insurance policy. Every man of sense and every man of business integrity and ability takes out such a policy before the risk comes.

To profit by the lessons of the last 18 months we ought not to measure the value of our liberty and of this splendid Republic and Government of ours by the standard of the dollars necessary to be expended for preparation to meet any emergency that may come, and we ought to be willing to spend whatever is necessary to do that, even if in 12 months from now we disband every soldier and undo all that we have sought to do. The people of the country demand it and expect it, and no man who loves his country will raise his voice in protest against the action of a patriotic Congress in doing its duty toward our country in the time of emergency.

Somebody speaks of the Monroe doctrine. Mr. President and Senators, if the same spirit animated us to-day that animated Monroe and Congress in 1823, when this doctrine was first announced, there would not be very much reason to fear that our commerce may soon be swept from the sea. Let us take conditions as they are. The time has come when we ought to be candid with each other and be candid with the American people. We do not need any military preparation, Senators, unless we intend to assert the Monroe doctrine and to make it a live force in this Republic. We do not need any preparedness if we intend to allow one of the belligerents to take the lives of our people who have the right to travel in other lands than our own. We do not need any preparedness if we intend to let another of the belligerents take our ships into its ports—and not only our ships, but the ships of other powers that are neutral and carrying our commerce to neutral nations—and search them and take passengers off in violation of all rules of international law. We do not need any preparation if we intend to submit to these indigni-

ties; but, for one, I insist that the same spirit that induced our forefathers to throw cargoes of tea into Boston Harbor; the same spirit that animated our forefathers in the War of 1812; the same spirit that animated them in the Mexican War and in the later wars of the Republic, ought to animate us in this emergency, and we ought to be prepared, if for nothing else that when this war is over we may demand some recompense, if recompense be possible, for the lives that have been destroyed.

If we intend to demand any recompense for the property that has been destroyed, if we intend to demand any recompense for the rights that have been asserted and exercised to go upon American bottoms and remove citizens as well as property, if we are going to demand any satisfaction for the unjust treatment which our people and our interests have received at the hands of those who are engaged in the present war, then we ought to be prepared to back all just demands, all legal demands, all righteous demands, by the force of arms if necessary.

In what shape are we? Like Glendower, we might "call spirits from the vasty deep," but, as Hotspur retorted, "Will they come?" We have not the power to insist upon the performance of a single demand that we have made upon any of the Governments that are now engaged in the European war.

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. President, I am sure the Senator from Oregon does not mean to have that go to the world. The Senator does not mean to say here in the Senate of his country that America has not the power to enforce any just demands against the world. The Senator, I assume, means that is the condition as the Army is now organized, but not that we have not that power within the people of our country.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Oh, yes, Mr. President; but at what sacrifice! Even Gen. Miles, who has been cited by the lovers of peace—and we all love peace and will fight for it, if necessary—even Gen. Miles says that to send an army of untrained men against a regular force of any of the great powers would be death and destruction to them. My friends, if I want to be advised about conditions as to my health I am not going to a blacksmith or a carpenter, I am going to a physician or a surgeon; and if we want to know about the proper way to organize an army, Senators, we want to consult men who have made military studies their life work.

Mr. WORKS. Mr. President—

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Oregon yield to the Senator from California?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I yield.

Mr. WORKS. I should like to ask the Senator from Oregon whether he thinks the force that is provided for in the bill now before the Senate would be adequate to do the things about which he is talking?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I do not, to be perfectly frank with the Senator. Everything that we do in life, Mr. President, is a compromise. You heard one of the members of the committee say this morning that he thought the army which we propose is too large; I think it is too small. The bill is a compromise. We have undertaken to meet these very conditions and to enable us to place ourselves in a position to put an adequate army in the field, if we have to do so, which God grant we may never have to do.

It is not easy to adjust these differences, I will say to the Senator. A distinguished gentleman, who recently held a place in the Cabinet, claimed that in 24 hours we could raise a million men if an emergency ever arose when our country needed them. I have not any doubt about that; I have not any doubt, Mr. President, of the patriotism of the National Guard or of the citizens of this country. I have every confidence in the world in them; but every man who stops for a moment to think knows that to send 1,000,000 untrained soldiers against a division of trained men would simply mean to send 1,000,000 to their absolute and certain death. There is no question about that.

They say we are not going to have any such condition in this country; they say we can not be invaded. We have been invaded in the past. Within the last few weeks 100 or more bandits from the south of us invaded the United States, and we have not caught them yet. It seems to me, Mr. President, that we were invaded in 1812. Lying off the mouth of Chesapeake Bay was a small British fleet, with how many troops? A few thousand; and against a militia, organized as they were in the State of Maryland and in the District of Columbia, they marched into Washington and set fire to the Capitol. Oh, no; we are not going to have any invasion! It would not take a very large force transported to the United States to wipe us off the map. With a part of our soldiery in the Philippines, a part in Hawaii, a part in Porto Rico, a part at the Panama Canal, and about 25,000 of them in the United States, how large a body of men from any other country would it take to put us out of commission, Mr. President?

The very distinguished Senator from California [Mr. WORKS] not long ago in a speech made by him stated—and truly stated—that on the Pacific coast alone there were trained veterans of the Russo-Japanese War in excess of our own continental Army. There is not any question about that. I do not apprehend any trouble from these people. They are, however, the constructors and builders of railroads from the Pacific coast into the interior of this Republic. They are the dynamite and powder carriers, and as reasonable men, representing a constituency of 100,000,000 people, it behooves us, Mr. President, to act with judgment and discretion and determination to place our country in a position where it not only can defend itself, but can also assert its rights and see that its just demands are complied with by the balance of the world.

We sent back more than 40,000 reservists to the Greek Army, men who were here making a living in our country at the boot-black stands, the soda fountains, and places of that kind, and yet when their country called them into requisition they went cheerfully. Why shut our eyes to the conditions? I have no apprehension of war or trouble with Greece; I am merely calling attention to the facts.

Germany, one of the belligerent countries to-day, if I am correctly informed, has over 90,000 reservists in this country, and the name of every one of them is listed in the German consular offices in the United States. I have no fear of war with Germany—not at all; I am not an alarmist—but let us have the facts. Two years ago, because I insisted on an increase in our Military Establishment, I was looked upon as a jingoist, and I presume I am so looked upon yet; but I have no fear of any of these charges. I have greater fear, Mr. President, that the time may come when this country ought to assert herself but that she will not be in a position to assert herself.

It seems to me I remember, since I have been in the Senate of the United States, that a distinguished Senator introduced a resolution protesting against the acquirement of property at Magdalena Bay by one of the powers now engaged in the European war, on the ground that it was an unfriendly act toward the United States. It may have been. The charge has been made since then that efforts have been made by the same military power to acquire a holding in Mexico; and we know that any alliance that might be suggested by almost any power with the people to the south of us would be gladly received, because we have not a friend there. So why blind ourselves to conditions? Because one favors preparedness for the defense of our country it is no indication that he fears war.

Why, if the morning papers have correctly reported the facts, one of the great belligerents in the conflict which is raging in Europe is asserting the right that a vessel shall not leave the United States unless its manifest is viséed by them. How long, Mr. President and Senators, is the United States going to submit to such indignities as these? There is no better preparation against the assertion of such rights than to be prepared to resent them when the insults are offered.

Mr. VARDAMAN. Mr. President, would it interrupt the Senator if I were to ask him if he really thinks the failure of the United States to demand of England that she respect our rights under international law is because of a lack of preparation on the part of the United States?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I do.

Mr. VARDAMAN. Does the Senator really think that?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I do; yes, sir. Did not the President go out on a western tour and say that preparation was necessary? What did he mean by it?

Mr. VARDAMAN. And yet he said that we were absolutely at peace with the world—

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. We are.

Mr. VARDAMAN. And that he thought that war was not imminent at all.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. We are suffering the peace of China right now; and every nation that comes along and wants a slice of poor China takes it; that is all there is about it. Have we reached the period of humiliation and degradation in our national life when we are going to submit to any such treatment as is now being accorded to China and to other non-militant powers of the earth?

Mr. President, there has not been an obligation entered into at The Hague conference or a single obligation in the declaration of London that has not been violated and set aside whenever it has suited the nations to violate it.

And now Holland, if the newspapers speak the truth, is about to be invaded from either side or from both sides. Why? For anything that Holland has done? Not at all. But to suit the whim and emergencies of those who are engaged in the war. On the one side they say, "We will cross you to get to the ocean and reach our enemies"; on the other side they say, "We will

cross the ocean and cross you to get to our enemy on the other side of you." It is not because of anything that Holland has done, any more than Belgium was embroiled in the conflict because of anything she had done; and yet, Senators, it may be that the fate of Belgium may be meted out to Holland, than whom there is no more splendid race of people in the world. It is greed in the heart of nations, Mr. President, as it is in the heart of man that brings on these fearful calamities. Who knows when a similar calamity may come to us?

Referring to the Monroe doctrine again—and the Senator from Illinois referred to it—we have set ourselves up as a sort of protector of the South American Republics; not so much for their protection as for the maintenance of our integrity and our existence. You know, as well as I, that colonization has already set in on the east coast of South America by some of the powers that are now engaged in this war; and, if you do not know it, you can very soon ascertain that colonization has set in on the west coast of South America by another warlike power. Is the Monroe doctrine simply the assertion of a barren right or is it the assertion of a doctrine that the United States intends to insist upon and to enforce if occasion ever arises when she ought to assert it? She may have to assert it, and I believe will have to assert it, to maintain her own integrity, if not in the near future, in the not distant future, anyway. The only time it ever was asserted practically against the combined powers of Europe was when, taking advantage of conditions which existed here during the Civil War, certain European Governments undertook to set up a monarchy to the south of us, and the United States practically served notice on the world that that could not go on, and it did stop.

But we may have to assert that doctrine again, Mr. President. We are trying all the time to make our relations more intimate with the Republics to the south, and I think we ought to do that, but in order to assert the Monroe doctrine we ought to be prepared to maintain it; and, in order to maintain it, we must be prepared with an adequate Army to do it, and a Navy, too.

I sometimes am compelled to compare our present condition with the condition that confronted our small population in 1812. There is not a single rule of national or international life, there is not a rule of international law, that was violated then, and which led to war, which has not been violated over and over again in the past two years. And yet, with the martial spirit that had come to our forefathers from the Revolutionary period, our people resented the course that was being pursued by these foreign powers. Why not be in a position to resent it now?

You can take Madison's message to the Congress in 1812, Mr. President, and compare it with conditions as they exist now, and there was not a single condition in that day and age that does not exist to-day; and yet our friends talk about the power of the militia to defend and maintain our country! Mr. President, we negotiated a disgraceful treaty before the War of 1812 was concluded, and there was not a single thing that was in issue between the two Governments that was determined by the treaty of Ghent—not one; and we did not win the War of 1812 until Jackson, with his Squirrel Shooters, reached New Orleans and fought the battle after the treaty had been negotiated, and he did not know it; and we won the war after we had submitted to a disgraceful treaty.

Somebody speaks about the bravery of the national militia at that time, Mr. President. I think a careful examination of the history of that time will disclose that the national militia on the other side of the river had gone into absolute retreat when the British regulars landed and came in contact with Jackson.

I have no disposition to discredit the National Guard. I want to help it. But the National Guard, if it come here with the determination to defeat every other attempt to place ourselves in a condition for national defense, ought to be wiped out of all legislation that comes before Congress. Mr. President, if the National Guard intends to come here as a political force, as it has done—there is not any question about that—and undertake to control legislation that has for its purpose the raising of an army to protect our country against the world, I for one shall favor from now on the elimination of the National Guard as a factor in this country—and I have been their friend, and hope I may continue to be—not because I love Caesar less but because I love Rome more; and my purpose in this legislation has been to try to assist in making the National Guard an effective military force in this country.

Now, if it is their purpose, as it has been evinced—and I want the Senate to understand that I am not referring to the course of Members of this body or Members of the House, but at it has been evinced by methods that have been adopted on

the outside of these bodies—if they intend to make a political as well as a military force of themselves, I for one am in favor of putting them out of business, because in the last analysis this country must depend for its defense first upon our Regular Army and then upon a force that can be controlled by the Central Government.

Mr. McCUMBER. Mr. President—

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Oregon yield to the Senator from North Dakota?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I yield.

Mr. McCUMBER. All of us have received a vast number of telegrams from the several National Guards, and I wish the Senator would explain to us what their real objection and purpose is in desiring to strike out this particular section. Wherein does it conflict with anything that they may desire with reference to their own recognition?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. There is an old saying, Mr. President, that if you scratch a Russ you will catch a Tartar. If you scratch the back of a guardsman, and get the actual motive behind his desire to strike out section 56, you will find that it is because he is afraid it will impair the National Guard itself.

Mr. McCUMBER. Wherein?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. They say that it raises a competing force.

Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield to me I think I can furnish the reason officially for which the Senator from North Dakota asks.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Oregon yield to the Senator from Minnesota?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I yield, Mr. President.

Mr. NELSON. Night before last I received nine telegrams from officers and members of the National Guard of Minnesota urging me explicitly to vote against section 56. I called the attention of the newspaper correspondents of our evening papers at St. Paul and Minneapolis to these telegrams, and told them I thought the National Guard were trying to hamstring this Army bill. This morning I received from the adjutant general of the National Guard of Minnesota this telegram, which gives the real reason; and I want to read it for the benefit of the Senator from North Dakota:

According to columns of to-night's dispatch from Washington, the men of the National Guard and the undersigned were criticized rather severely by you for our opposition to section 56, Chamberlain bill. We believe in the Volunteer Army as provided by the act of April 25, 1914, but we do believe that the National Guard could not exist as an effective unit if section 56 became a law. One would most seriously affect the other.

Their opposition is because they are jealous of the Volunteer Army, and they are fighting it because they think it will interfere with their existence. That is the reason. I have another similar telegram from the adjutant general of North Dakota, which I will hand to the Senator from that State, if he has not received one like it.

If the Senator will yield to me further, I want to say that in all my experience here I have never seen an instance of such bald lobbying as there has been by these outside influences to defeat this section of the bill.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. President, those telegrams express just what I said awhile ago. That is the purpose of it. I do not agree with these telegrams. I think the National Guard is mistaken about the purpose of this section, or the effect of it. It is simply undertaking to reach a way of organizing another force to be utilized in time of trouble. That is all there is about it.

It has been stated here, and it is a fact, that there are many young men in this country who would like to perform some military service for their country, but they do not go into the National Guard for reasons which have been explained. The young men of the labor organizations do not want to go into it, because it may be that when it acts as a police force it may be called out against the men with whom they are under some obligations measurably to act. These same young men who would like to assist in performing some military service for the country can not go into the Plattsburg camps, for instance, as they have been conducted, because it costs a good deal of money. These young men who assembled in these camps last summer paid their own expenses. They are young men who are able to do it. In order to make a democratic organization into which the rich man and the poor man, the employer and the employee, the banker and the clerk, can go, we have fixed this bill so that they can all go into it.

In that connection, I can better indicate what I have in mind if I read a letter from Mr. Gompers to Hon. RICHARD OLNEY, 2d, a Member of the House of Representatives, written on the 13th of March last. I am going to ask to have it inserted

in the RECORD, but I am only going to read the last portion of it:

In order to provide for all citizens equal opportunity for participation in training camps, there must be some compensation for loss of wages, otherwise those with small incomes will be unable to benefit by them.

Now, mind you, this bill provides for their transportation to and from the place of the maneuvers, and it gives them the same rate and pay that the soldier gets in the Army. That is small, it is true; but there are thousands and tens of thousands of young men in this country who are willing to sacrifice something in order to get the benefit of a training.

Mr. Gompers says:

There are many indications that there has been a decrease in the virility of our Nation during the past decade. Whatever the cause of this decrease in physical power and resistance it is a matter of grave concern to all.

Agencies that will build up our citizens physically must be a part of our social organization. Nor is this of concern from the military standpoint only or purely as a problem of national defense. The effect of increased vigor and of better health among our citizens will be plainly shown in increased efficiency in all activities of life. If these agencies are in accord with democratic ideals, they will leave an indelible impression upon the mental outlook and the habits of all those who come under their influence.

In addition to what I have written, you may perhaps be interested in my address, at the annual meeting of the National Civic Federation, on the subject of National Preparedness. That address, together with a letter I wrote to the National Security League, was made a public document. I am sending you a copy—

And so forth. I ask to have the whole of the letter inserted in the RECORD.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it will be so ordered.

The letter referred to is as follows:

WASHINGTON, D. C., March 13, 1916.

HON. RICHARD OLNEY, 2d.

House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

SIR: There are many features of the Plattsburg camp idea which I heartily approve, but there are some features that I can not wholly indorse. In reply to an invitation to visit the Plattsburg camp last summer, I wrote Gen. Leonard Wood, calling his attention to some of these. The features and the tendencies that I could not approve were the limitations put upon the democracy of the movement.

Under the provisions for the Plattsburg and similar training camps, it was impossible for men working for wages to avail themselves of the opportunity for military training, physical development, and outdoor life.

To be sure, I fully appreciate the fact that the Plattsburg camp was democratic in spirit, and with this spirit must have had a lasting effect upon those of different walks of life who for a few weeks at least lived together without artificial distinctions, under conditions which brought out the inherent value and good qualities of the men.

But, as I have said before, because of inability to pay their expenses in such a training camp, the wage earners were practically debarred from this opportunity.

In order to provide for all citizens equal opportunity for participation in training camps, there must be some compensation for loss of wages; otherwise those with small incomes will be unable to benefit by them.

There are many indications that there has been a decrease in the virility of our Nation during the past decade. Whatever the cause of this decrease in physical power and resistance, it is a matter of grave concern to all.

Agencies that will build up our citizens physically must be a part of our social organization. Nor is this of concern from the military standpoint only, or purely as a problem of national defense. The effects of increased vigor and of better health among our citizens will be plainly shown in increased efficiency in all activities of life. If these agencies are in accord with democratic ideals, they will leave an indelible impression upon the mental outlook and the habits of all those who come under their influence.

In addition to what I have written, you may perhaps be interested in my address at the annual meeting of the National Civic Federation, on the subject of National Preparedness. That address, together with a letter I wrote to the National Security League, was made a public document. I am sending you a copy, and call your attention specially to the first four paragraphs on page 10.

Very truly yours,

SAML. GOMPERS,

President American Federation of Labor.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Gompers in that letter, which I have had printed as a public document, goes further than many of our friends here go, and takes the same position that the distinguished Senator from Illinois [Mr. SHERMAN] does, and says that in the last analysis the only defense for our country and the maintenance of the integrity of this Republic is universal military training. It is going to come, Mr. President—possibly not now, but it is bound to come—in view of the disposition of a great many of the splendid people of this country to object to the expenditure of a dollar for the maintenance of an army.

Mr. CUMMINS. Mr. President—

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Oregon yield to the Senator from Iowa?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I yield.

Mr. CUMMINS. Something has been said about telegrams received from the members of the National Guard against section 56. I ask the Senator from Oregon if it is not true that he has received a great number of telegrams in favor of sec-

tion 56 and if he did not this morning make them a part of the RECORD?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. CUMMINS. Is it any greater offense to receive a telegram for the section than to receive a telegram against it?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Let me say to the Senator that there is no evidence in the case of any telegram I got that they were from any others than individuals. I will qualify that statement, however. I believe some of them did come from the Military Training Association, but many of them are from individuals.

Mr. HITCHCOCK. Mr. President—

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Let me say to the Senator that I do not object particularly to members of the National Guard expressing their views. The Senator will remember that while he was a member of an investigating committee once I asserted the right of any citizen to come before Congress and assert his views.

Mr. CUMMINS. Mr. President, another question, or rather a suggestion. I did not call the fact to the attention of the Senator from Oregon on account of anything he had said; but there has been a suggestion from another source that it was an offense for a member of the National Guard to express his opinion with respect to this section.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I do not think so. I am in entire accord with the Senator in that respect. My view is that a man has a right to assert his views. But when it comes in the form of a propaganda by any particular organized body in this country, when it begins to assume the complexion of a general movement along the whole line, the danger of it is in making of this body a great political institution. That is the great danger. I think if there is any danger from militarism in this country it is in the danger of the control that is being attempted to be exercised over Congress right now.

I have gone far afield of what I wanted to say, but I really think this is a time when men ought to talk plainly about these things, and if you have any faith in what you are talking about you ought to be willing to say it. Now, I may be all wrong. I believe in peace, but I do not believe the millennium is right here now. I believe that the best way to maintain peace is to be prepared to fight if you have to. I knew an old Presbyterian minister out in my part of the country when I first went out there, 40 years ago, who said he had lived in mining camps, and that everywhere he had preached, in barrooms or on the streets where gambling games were going on, no man had ever insulted him at any time, no matter where he happened to be. I asked him why, and he said: "My size was my protection, and every man was afraid to attack me."

So, Mr. President, the size of the Military Establishment of a country is its protection in time of peace as well as in time of war. I say that without believing in a large military organization. On this subject I would rather have the views of men like Washington and the other celebrated fighters of this country than to have the views of statesmen. We have tried to follow some of the views of Washington. Inasmuch as Washington has been quoted here a little bit, I am going to read what he says about this very subject. I am not sure but that it was read here the other day, but it will bear repetition, because he said it after he had been through the Revolutionary War, and knew what difficulties he had to encounter, and what trouble he had in maintaining an effective and efficient organization:

The jealousy of a standing army—

Says Washington—

and the evils to be apprehended from one are remote, and, in my judgment, situated and circumstanced as we are, not at all to be dreaded; but the consequence of wanting one, according to my ideas formed from the present view of things, is certain and inevitable ruin. For, if I was called upon to declare upon oath whether the militia had been most serviceable or hurtful, upon the whole I should subscribe to the latter.

Now, he had had a little bit of experience—quite a little.

Mr. LEE of Maryland. Mr. President—

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Oregon yield to the Senator from Maryland?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. LEE of Maryland. Of course Gen. Washington referred to untrained militia.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Oh, yes; yes, he did. There is not any question about that. I am conceding for the National Guard that they are many, many times more valuable now, as a military force, than they were then.

Mr. VARDAMAN. Mr. President, may I ask the Senator a question?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Yes.

Mr. VARDAMAN. When did Washington say that?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Right after the Revolution.

Mr. VARDAMAN. At what time?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I do not recall the date. I have not it.

Mr. VARDAMAN. Does the Senator remember that in 1783 he said:

The militia of this country must be considered as the palladium of our security and for the first effectual resort in case of hostilities.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Yes; but he believed in a trained one. If the Senator will read a little more about what he said, he will find that he believed in a trained one.

Mr. VARDAMAN. Oh, yes; they all believed in that.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. No; some of our friends do not believe in anything, because they are sleeping in the peaceful belief that we never will have any trouble and never will need to be prepared.

Mr. VARDAMAN. I do not think the Senator has any right to impute that to anybody else.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Oh, I am not imputing it to the Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. VARDAMAN. Well, I know; but to anybody. Why does the Senator say that?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Because I have heard such expressions from hundreds of them. What more proof does a man want than that? I venture to say that the Senator has heard the same expressions.

Mr. VARDAMAN. No.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I have heard them. I have received letters, Mr. President, protesting against the expenditure of a dollar for national defense or any other military training in this country. There is not any question about that; and if the Senator will read the hearings before the committee he will find that they contain just such statements as that.

Why, so eminent and distinguished a man as Gen. Miles came before that committee and said he did not think we needed to do anything. He practically said that.

I do not mean to misrepresent anybody; but it has been said that a good many of Washington's writings were collaborated in the field between him and Hamilton. Whether that be true or not, I have often wondered how in the world he found time to organize his troops and fight, because he was writing letters to the Congress all the time asking them for God's sake to do something; and really and truly, until the Congress of the United States got thoroughly scared and handed over to Washington the absolute control of the Continental Army to do with as he pleased the Revolution was not brought to a close.

Mr. President, I believe in the patriotism of our ancestors as thoroughly as anybody. I have a right to, and ought to, because my people on both sides were here during the Revolutionary period. On both sides of the House they participated in the events of those days. But it is not true that our ancestors were always as patriotic as they ought to have been. You do not have to take my word for it. Read what Washington says, or any of those gentlemen who participated in that war, and you will find, Mr. President, that finally it got to be so bad that not only did the States pay bounties to our ancestors to get them to stay in line, but the Colonies paid them bounties, the Government paid them bounties, and toward the end they promised them land, and to the officers of the Revolution they promised to give them salaries for the balance of their days equal to one-half the salaries they were getting as officers in the Revolutionary War. Now, I am not criticising that; but Washington said, and others have said, that you could not depend upon the patriotism of a people to defend their country in case of an emergency. You have got to have some other means of bringing to the standards the men who are necessary and essential to the defense of our country.

Washington's convictions, embodied in his criticism of the militia, were confirmed by the defeat of Gen. Gates, when he wrote to the President of Congress on the 15th of September, 1780, as follows:

I am happy to find that the last disaster in Carolina has not been so great as its first features indicated. This event, however, adds itself to many others to exemplify the necessity of an army and the fatal consequences of depending on militia. Regular troops alone are equal to the exigencies of modern war, as well for defense as offense, and whenever a substitute is attempted it must prove illusory and ruinous. No militia will ever acquire the habits necessary to resist a regular force. Even those nearest to the seat of war are only valuable as light troops to be scattered in the woods and harass rather than do serious injury to the enemy. The firmness requisite for the real business of fighting is only to be attained by a constant course of discipline and service. I have never yet been witness to a single instance that can justify a different opinion, and it is most earnestly to be wished that the liberties of America may no longer be trusted, in any material degree, to so precarious a dependence. I can not but remark that it gives me pain to find the measures pursuing at the southward still turn upon accumulating large bodies of militia, instead of once for

all making a decided effort to have a permanent force. In my ideas of the true system of war at the southward the object ought to be to have a good army rather than a large one.

There is not any question about that. A strong, efficient, well-drilled, trained army is worth millions of untrained or partially trained organizations, no matter whether State or otherwise.

Particularly is that true in the present emergency, Mr. President. Why, there has not been a single thing that could be conjured up from the workshop of the devil himself that has not been resorted to in the war that is now pending in Europe. Mr. President, in the face of what is before us every day, it seems to me that this Congress would be absolutely disregardful of its duty to itself and to the people if it did not avail itself of every instrumentality it has to secure not a large trained army but trained men that could go into the Army in case of call.

Section 56 as proposed in the Senate substitute is not perfect by any manner of means, Mr. President. It is simply one of the instrumentalities to undertake to get the young men to train, and partially put themselves in a condition to be utilized in case of trouble.

I have really talked longer than I felt I ought to talk, Mr. President, but I have felt justified in doing so in view of the strictures that have been indulged in, not only with reference to the efforts of the committee but upon the men who are here asking that they may be permitted to render some service to their country. A number of these young men came here and expressed a perfect willingness to become enlisted men of the United States Army and to drill 60 or even 90 days. I think possibly there ought to have been a maximum fixed, not exceeding a certain number of days; but whenever they are discharged from camp, they are still the reserve to be called upon for service in the Regular Army.

How many of them would go, I do not know. I am frank to say that I sometimes fear that we will not have all we want, but it will at least be a beginning. I want to call the attention of the Senate to the result of the enlistment that was ordered to be made by a joint resolution of the House and Senate a short time ago. How many men do you think we have enlisted under the joint resolution calling for 20,000 passed here about the 17th of March? Here it is:

From March 17 to March 20 there were about 372 applicants for enlistment accepted. Total for the five days ending March 25, acceptances, 840. Total for the six days ending March 31, acceptances, 851. Total acceptances, 2,063; and two-thirds of a month has elapsed!

Now, I do not know that we are going to have any trouble in Mexico. I do not think we will. I hope we will not. But no man can tell, Mr. President, where this chase of bandits is going to lead us. It is a physical impossibility for any man to predict what is likely to happen. No man could have told 48 hours beforehand what was going to happen in Europe until a match was struck to a powder magazine that exploded and set the civilized world in conflagration. No man can tell what this will lead to; and yet we are sitting here supinely wasting time, Mr. President—and I am guilty of a part of it myself; we are all guilty of the same thing—wasting time, when we ought to be getting ourselves in a position to meet any emergency that comes up. If section 56 is made a part of the bill, we will at least have 10,000, or 20,000, or 30,000, or 50,000, or 100,000, or possibly at the end of the fourth year 261,000 men who have had some training, and all that is necessary to get them into the service is for the President to issue a proclamation calling them into service. We are not situated that way now. The committee has gone further and has undertaken to bring those into the Federal reserve who have served an enlistment in the Regular Army by paying them a small sum.

The Senate may strike that out, I do not know, but when it does, it will have stricken from the bill provisions which the committee has faithfully endeavored to insert for the purpose of placing this dependable force under the control of the President.

Mr. WORKS. The Senator from Oregon has called attention to the evident reluctance of the American citizen to enlist in the Regular Army. Suppose we should have trouble with Mexico, which we all hope we will not, does the Senator think we would have any trouble in securing volunteers in a case of that kind?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Let me say to the Senator, as I said awhile ago, I have no question about the patriotism of the American people when they feel that their services are necessary, but what I am getting at is that to send out a body of untrained troops into Mexico or anywhere where an emergency

calls for them is simply sending our young men to slaughter. Let me call the Senator's attention to one fact.

Mr. WORKS. I was only calling the Senator's attention to that particular phase of the situation.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. They will enlist, I have not any doubt about that. I have too much confidence in our people to feel that they would not, particularly if they could realize that we were in danger, but the great trouble in this country has always been that when an emergency is almost upon us there are those who go about and tell the people there is nothing to fear, that it is all nonsense to talk of danger, and that we do not need to get ready for trouble. There are distinguished gentlemen doing this very thing now.

Mr. BRANDEGEE. Does not the Senator know that the condition in Great Britain was such that when the emergency came and they did get the volunteers they had a million or two million men in training camps for the last year instead of having them meet the emergency?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. There is no doubt about that.

Mr. SMITH of Georgia. Thirty days training amounts to practically nothing. They would not be ready for service.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I tried to show the other day that they have in these training camps only 14 hours less training in 30 days than the National Guard has in a year.

Mr. SMITH of Georgia. These are not National Guards. At least 200,000 are to be a part of the Regular Army, and I would like to see them enlisted and trained at once.

Mr. BRANDEGEE. That is the very reason why something like section 56 ought to be passed, so that before the emergency arises you can put these men in training camps for three or four months, and then they will be used when the emergency comes.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I have no doubt about that.

The question of the Senator from California [Mr. WORKS] suggests this to my mind. If ever we have a war, it will be a war of boys, not a war of mature men. That is a broad statement to make, and I will undertake to call the attention of the Senate to the fact. If there is any trouble now, we will find that it will be our boys, and the mothers in this country who did not raise their boys to be soldiers will, nevertheless, be sending their boys patriotically to the front. There are just as many good mothers in this country now as there were in the Revolutionary days. There are just as many patriotic mothers in this country now as there were in the days of the Civil War, when a mother who had five sons sacrificed on the altar of their country received a letter from Lincoln, calling her attention to the sacrifice she had made in sending these sons to die in defense of the Union. But it will be a boy's war, that is what it will be, and the object of this section is to train these boys not only in the manner of conducting themselves when the emergency arises but how to protect and maintain sanitary conditions when they are called into the service.

In the Spanish-American War more young men died in training camps than died as a result of participation in the war, and it has always been so. If these proposed training camps only taught the young men how to care for themselves in camp, it would save thousands and hundreds of thousands of lives, if an emergency ever does come. To show that the Civil War was fought by boys, I call attention to the fact that the ages of the men in the Union Army were as follows:

Those 10 years and under	25
Those 11 years and under	38
Those 12 years and under	225
Those 13 years and under	300
Those 14 years and under	1,523
Those 15 years and under	104,987
Those 16 years and under	231,051
Those 17 years and under	844,891
Those 18 years and under	1,151,438
Those 21 years and under	2,159,798
Those 22 years and over	618,511
Those 25 years and over	46,462
Those 44 years and over	16,071

Of the total men enlisted—2,778,304—less than one-fourth were over 21 years of age.

Mr. WORKS. Does the Senator think that he can get the cream of the American youth to enlist in the Regular Army?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I am assured that they will under this section 56.

Mr. WORKS. That is not in the Regular Army, properly speaking. I am speaking now about the Regular Army.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. They are enlisted soldiers and become a part of the Federal forces under this section.

Mr. WORKS. I can understand very well how a mother might consent to her son volunteering in case of an emergency, but I can not very well appreciate the feeling of a mother who is willing to surrender her boy to go into the Regular Army under conditions as they exist to-day.

Mr. SMITH of Georgia. We are going to change those conditions before we get through with the bill.

Mr. WORKS. I hope we will.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. That would lead to a discussion that I do not care to enter into now. That feeling is abroad in the land. There are individual instances where the condition of the enlisted man is bad, but it has been exaggerated, with the result that many people in the country think that an enlisted soldier is a mere slave. I think the Senator from California gave a few instances of bad treatment, and I think there are cases of bad treatment, but there are bad cases in every human institution. We will not only find it in the Army, but the pulpit itself is not free from conditions sometimes which are discreditable to it. But that does not affect the pulpit; neither is the fact that an occasional abuse of power and privilege in the Army exists discreditable to the Army. We find a drunken officer once in a while who is cruel to his men; but to that one cruel man there are dozens of patriotic, loyal American citizens who safeguard the rights and the well-being of the enlisted man.

Now, Mr. President—

Mr. SUTHERLAND. Mr. President, will the Senator permit me to ask him a question? There have been a good many suggestions here from time to time that the training which would be given to these citizen soldiers would be practically negligible. I understand some amendment that was adopted here limited it to 30 days. Can the Senator from Oregon tell us how many days or how many weeks annually the citizen soldiers of Switzerland are trained?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I can not now, I will say to the Senator, but I introduced a bill modeled measurably after the Swiss and Australian systems, to fix the time of training. They commence to train when very young.

Mr. LEE of Maryland. I can give the Senator that information.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Very well, if you have the data.

Mr. LEE of Maryland. I have looked into the Swiss system lately, and I think it would be well to study the system of some other republican form of government for military discipline in connection with this bill. This is found in Senate Document No. 360, page 77.

The school of recruits is for 67 days. The first repeated course is 13 days. The school of noncommissioned officers is 22 days. The school of recruits of noncommissioned officers is 67 days. The ordinary soldier in the first year has 80 days; the noncommissioned officer has 169 days. The noncommissioned officer is selected from the apt men among the recruits. Then the commissioned officer has 82 days in the school of officers, with the 67 days that went before, or 318 days are taken under that system of intensive training to make a lieutenant.

Mr. SUTHERLAND. During what length of time is the training for 318 days given?

Mr. LEE of Maryland. It is pretty continuous in connection with the officers, but in connection with the men it is 67 days in one year, 13 days in the next year, and then 13 days every year, with 10 days for mobilizing the Swiss forces. Their forces are brought out completely every summer.

Mr. SUTHERLAND. It is 67 days for the first year.

Mr. LEE of Maryland. Yes, sir.

Mr. SUTHERLAND. And after that only 13 days.

Mr. LEE of Maryland. Of course, it varies a little, I will say to the Senator, in the encampments for the artillery, the infantry, and the cavalry.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Now, Mr. President—

The VICE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection to the Senator from Oregon proceeding? The Chair hears none.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I am perfectly willing to submit to the rule, but I have violated it just once, and there have been many violations of the rule here. I will not do it again.

In view of the statement made by the Senator from Kansas [Mr. CURTIS] a day or two ago, I want to call attention to the question of the cost of volunteers. If the House provision prevails with reference to the National Guard, they are required within a certain time to raise about 450,000 men. If the Senate committee provision with reference to the National Guard prevails, they will be required to have about 265,000 men and the Volunteer Army about 261,000 men; so that the combined force under the Senate committee provision is about equal to the National Guard force required to be raised under the House provision. In other words, the House attempted to make the whole reserve force out of the National Guard and we have undertaken to make it up out of the National Guard and the Volunteer Army.

The Senator from Kansas spoke of the cost of volunteers as being \$24,934,938 for the first year. That is true, but the Sen-

ate must not forget that the only cost of the 30 days' training is \$3,481,000, while most of the balance of the expense is due to new equipment, ordnance, heavy artillery, and so forth. In other words, the cost of the personnel is not high, but they are continuing to add to the stock that the Government ought to have in case we have any trouble at all. So it is with the second year, and so it is with the third year, and so it is with the fourth year. This is made on the basis of raising increments of one-fourth of the whole number each year. So when you come to the last year the expense is proportionately diminished, because they have the equipment, and all the expense

that is made is laying in supplies, which the Government ought to have.

I am going to ask to have inserted in the RECORD a statement which will give these items in detail, so that the Senate may refer to it later. It is a statement of per diem costs and cost of permanent equipment, and so forth, to be furnished from appropriations disbursed by the Quartermaster Corps for equipment and maintenance of volunteer force provided in Senate bill 4840, Sixty-fourth Congress, first session.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered. The statement referred to is as follows:

Statement of per diem costs and cost of permanent equipment, etc., to be furnished from appropriations disbursed by the Quartermaster Corps for equipment and maintenance of volunteer force provided in Senate bill 4840, Sixty-fourth Congress, first session.

Appropriations.	First year: 4 Infantry divisions— 3,036 officers; 53,793 men; 22,220 animals.		Second year: 8 Infantry divisions— 6,072 officers; 107,586 men; 44,440 animals.		Third year: 12 Infantry divisions; 1 Cavalry division—9,542 officers; 169,130 men; 76,233 animals.		Fourth year: 16 Infantry divisions; 2 Cavalry divisions—13,012 officers; 230,674 men; 108,026 animals.	
	Cost of permanent equipment, not including mounts or means of transportation, and other costs not practicable to state at per diem rate.	Per diem cost of equipment and supplies other than permanent.	Cost of permanent equipment, not including mounts or means of transportation, and other costs not practicable to state at per diem rate.	Per diem cost of equipment and supplies other than permanent.	Cost of permanent equipment, not including mounts or means of transportation, and other costs not practicable to state at per diem rate.	Per diem cost of equipment and supplies other than permanent.	Cost of permanent equipment, not including mounts or means of transportation, and other costs not practicable to state at per diem rate.	Per diem cost of equipment and supplies other than permanent.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Pay of the Army.....		\$52,294.05		\$104,588.10		\$164,413.97		\$225,251.00
Subsistence of the Army.....		16,137.90		32,137.90		50,739.00		69,202.20
Regular supplies.....	23,849.21	6,307.00	23,849.21	12,663.60	29,943.21	21,746.82	29,943.60	30,559.09
Incidental expenses.....		1,344.48		2,016.90		3,023.35		4,538.02
Horses, Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers (hire of).....		14,008.00		28,016.00		49,723.00		71,430.00
Transportation of the Army.....	400,241.00	18,568.00	824,459.00	37,136.00	1,303,598.00	68,764.00	1,768,875.00	100,392.00
Water and sewers.....		7,387.77		14,775.54		23,227.36		31,679.18
Clothing, camp and garrison equipage.....	1,775,169.00		1,952,685.90		2,226,220.59		2,509,357.05	
Total.....	2,199,259.21	116,047.20	2,800,994.11	231,334.04	3,559,761.80	381,639.50	4,308,175.65	533,351.49

NOTE.—The amounts shown in columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 cover costs under appropriation "Regular supplies" for equipment such as paulins, buckets, etc., which would be required by the troops concerned whether in camp for one day or longer; these supplies are not of the class immediately consumable and will last three or more years, depending on the length of time in use each year. The amounts in the same columns for appropriation "Transportation of the Army" are to cover transportation of personnel and supplies and would be required for the commands involved whether in camp for a day or for a month. The amounts in the same columns for "Clothing and equipage" cover the outer clothing, equipage, and blankets necessary to uniform the commands involved, and are based on uniforms lasting three years. Ten per cent has been added each year to cover losses and shortages of uniforms and other equipage.

The amounts shown in columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 cover costs as follows:

Pay of the Army: The per diem cost of the number of officers and men shown in the respective columns.

Subsistence of the Army: Per diem cost for the number of enlisted men shown at 30 cents per day each.

Regular supplies: Per diem cost of fuel, forage, light, stationery, and ice, etc.

Incidental expenses: Per diem cost of clerks, laborers, telegrams, telephones, etc.

Horses, Cavalry, etc.: Per diem cost of hire of minimum mounts for troops concerned.

Transportation of the Army: Per diem cost of hire of draft and pack animals, harness, and wagons.

Water and sewers: Per diem cost of purchase of water, toilet paper, etc.

There is no amount included in the estimate for hire of camp sites, it being assumed that the troops (Volunteers) would be assembled on military reservations.

No amount is included for tent floors or tent frames or for mess or kitchen shelter or temporary shelter of any kind.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. I am not going to trespass further. I should also like to put in the cost of the ordnance. The matter referred to is as follows:

Estimate of the annual appropriations for the Ordnance Department during each of the next four years to supply the annual contingents of the Volunteers with the full equipment and other material now issued to the Organized Militia: considering this force as coming to full authorized strength in the fourth year and not counting upon using any reserve equipment or material that may be now accumulated.

Fiscal year—	Ordnance stores and supplies.	Manufacture of arms.	Automatic machine rifles.	Armament of fortifications B.	Small-arms target practice.	Total.
1917.....	\$3,651,000	\$1,318,000	\$744,000	\$9,226,000	\$120,000	\$15,059,000
1918.....	3,651,000	1,318,000	744,000	9,226,000	120,000	15,059,000
1919.....	4,677,000	1,557,000	834,000	10,283,000	138,000	17,489,000
1920.....	4,677,000	1,557,000	834,000	10,283,000	138,000	17,489,000
Total.....	16,656,000	5,750,000	3,156,000	39,018,000	516,000	65,096,000

Estimate of the annual appropriations for the Ordnance Department during each of the next 4 years to supply the equipment required for field army troops for 6 field armies.

Fiscal year—	Ordnance stores and supplies.	Manufacture of arms.	Armament of fortifications B.	Total.
1917.....	\$144,000	\$27,000	\$1,190,000	\$1,361,000
1918.....	288,000	54,000	2,380,000	2,722,000
1919.....	144,000	27,000	1,190,000	1,361,000
1920.....	288,000	54,000	2,380,000	2,722,000
Total.....	864,000	162,000	7,140,000	8,166,000

Estimate of the annual current appropriations under the Ordnance Department for the support of the Army for each of the next five years and annually thereafter.

Fiscal year—	Ordnance stores and supplies.	Manufacture of arms.	Ordnance service.	Small arms target practice.	Armament of fortifications, L.	Armament of fortifications, N.	Total.
1917.....	\$444,000	\$50,000	\$49,000	\$81,000	\$37,500	\$467,000	\$1,128,500
1918.....	883,000	100,000	98,000	162,000	72,000	934,000	2,249,000
1919.....	1,406,000	210,000	147,000	274,000	111,000	1,401,000	3,549,000
1920 and annually thereafter.....	1,923,000	420,000	196,000	386,000	147,000	1,888,000	4,940,000

Estimate of the annual appropriations for the Ordnance Department during each of the next four years to maintain the equipment required for field-army troops for six field armies.

Fiscal year—	Ordnance stores and supplies.	Armament of fortifications L.	Total.
1917.....	\$3,000	\$3,000	\$6,000
1918.....	9,000	9,000	18,000
1919.....	12,000	12,000	24,000
1920.....	18,000	18,000	36,000

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Now, there is one other question, somebody was undertaking to make a little fun of the National Guard by asking the question what would be done with all this. Our Army has been over 100,000 sometimes, and then it diminishes. When the appropriations are cut down the Army diminishes. What becomes of the equipment? It is placed in storage. So this equipment that is being accumulated is placed in storage exactly the same as if the Government was buying it and keeping it in storage for future use. There is not any question about that. It is put in storage depots somewhere convenient, under the custody and control of the Government all the time, and is well cared for.

Mr. President, I am not going to trespass longer on the Senate, but I do hope the Senate will not consent to strike section 56 out of the bill, because I believe that it affords the basis for a splendid reserve force.

Mr. OLIVER. Before the Senator takes his seat I should like to ask him a question. I should like to ask the Senator why the committee in framing section 56 took the congressional district as the unit instead of the State?

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. It was thought it would make it more democratic to do that. It is not confined to the district.

Mr. OLIVER. I see that.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. They can go into another district, but it was thought there are a great many young men in some of the States where they could form in a congressional district locally where they could not go to a central place.

Mr. OLIVER. It seems to me that is objectionable. The congressional district is a shifting quantity; it changes every 10 years; and in some States there are more Congressmen than districts. In my own State there are 36 Representatives and only 32 districts.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Let me call the Senator's attention to the fact that it is based on the number of congressional districts and is not confined in its operation to the district. For instance, a State has two congressional districts and it would be entitled to an apportionment of so many Volunteers. It is based upon the proportion of Volunteers, not based on the number of congressional districts, and is not confined to the district.

Mr. OLIVER. In that case the apportionment of Pennsylvania would be only 82, whereas their proper proportion would evidently be 86, and the same way with the State of Texas, which has two Representatives at large; the State of Alabama I believe has one or two at large, and so on. The States that have Representatives at large would have no apportionment based upon those Representatives at large. I expect to vote against the elimination of this section, but I think that is something we ought to take into consideration. I think it would be much better to make the State the basis instead of the congressional district.

Mr. O'GORMAN. Mr. President, I do not intend to discuss at length the questions involved in the pending bill. I shall probably content myself with stating the reasons why I shall vote for the retention of section 56 in the bill reported by the Military Committee. I am not enthusiastic about the bill as it comes to the Senate. I should prefer to see a larger Military Establishment than the bill contemplates. I believe the military forces provided for by the bill are inadequate, considering the vast interests and the great wealth of this country.

The two provisions, however, which seem to have engaged the attention of some of the Senators to-day, that relating to the so-called Volunteer Army and that relating to the National

Guard, are at best experimental features. No one can predict with any confidence as to how successful either of these experiments will work out. I am not confident that either of them will work out successfully, because I am persuaded, from such attention as I have given to this question of military preparedness, that the time will come when this country, profiting by the example furnished by the belligerents in the present war, will find it necessary to have a conscriptive or compulsory service; and once that plan is adopted, service in the Army of the United States will become more attractive than it is to-day. Enlistment will then become the manifestation of a patriotic impulse, shared by every citizen, to bear the burdens which are necessarily incident in a democracy such as ours with the rights which are conferred upon every citizen.

I am quite well aware that at this time there is no general sentiment in this country favorable to a compulsory military service. I do not press the suggestion at this time; but I am unable to find any reasonable or adequate justification for the attitude of opposition to section 56, providing for a Volunteer Army, emanating, as it does, largely from those whose interests seem to be centered in the National Guard.

We have had a National Guard in the various States for a long time. That they have disappointed public expectation in most of the States will not be successfully disputed. I take pride in the accomplishments of the National Guard in my own State; I believe that they are efficient, that they are capable, that they are devoted, that they are patriotic, but no Senator could have listened a few moments ago to the recital of the Senator from Oregon [Mr. CHAMBERLAIN], when he referred to the declarations made by Gen. Washington, without being impressed by the fact that the liberties of this country will hang upon a slender reed whenever they are dependent upon the services of the militia of the various States.

The militia of the several States are State organizations; they are designed for State purposes; and it is my opinion that the provision of this bill with regard to the militia of the several States does not add to the value of the recommendations made by the committee. Yet, I would not venture to pronounce judgment on that proposition. I rather content myself with the assertion made a few minutes since that this attempt to broaden the influence of the National Guard is but an experiment; and no Senator will derive more satisfaction from the success of the experiment than I shall. When it is realized that both of these propositions are experimental—the one as to the Volunteer Army and the other as to the National Guard—I can not see the wisdom of those who have confidence in the National Guard insisting upon the absolute suppression of the volunteer system, without giving it at least the opportunity of showing whether or not it can meet the expectations of those who believe that the volunteer system, rather than the National Guard, offers the better protection and safeguard to American institutions. Both plans should have a fair trial.

Mr. President, I am not one of those who believe that danger from abroad is imminent. I am not alarmed at the outlook. I do not believe that any of the belligerents, when this war is over, will have any disposition to invade our rights. It is true they are all doing it now. There is not a single belligerent that feels any restraint in disregarding the rights of neutral nations. Russia has invaded Persia in absolute disregard of the neutral rights of that nation. Germany has invaded Belgium and has invaded Luxembourg in disregard of neutral rights. France and England, in absolute defiance of neutral rights, have taken possession of the islands and the ports of Greece, with the King of that country protesting, and protesting in vain, against the disregard of Grecian rights. The mails of our citizens are taken off neutral ships in absolute disregard of neutral rights. Our commerce is interfered with and disturbed, threatening many of the citizens of this country with absolute ruin—all in disregard of neutral rights. There is not a belligerent—not one—engaged in this contest showing any respect for neutral rights.

Nations when in war, fighting for their very existence, believe, as men do, that self-preservation is the first law of nature; that is the international code that prevails. The protest of a

neutral will receive attention, if at all, only when the protest is backed by a power sufficiently strong to enforce the protest.

While I do not believe that there is the slightest danger of our country becoming involved in a war, I nevertheless realize that war is possible at any time. Of the 11 or 12 nations now involved in this dreadful cataclysm that is oppressing the earth, few of them had any apprehension of becoming involved until within a few days before the conflict was on. In my judgment, the best guarantee of peace, the best assurance of national security, is to be prepared adequately to defend ourselves against any nation whose predatory inclinations might threaten our peace or security.

I believe there ought to be a much larger increase in our Army than is contemplated by this bill, but I believe this bill goes a long way in furnishing the desired security. I am well aware that there are diverse views on this subject, and that perhaps the Military Committee has done all that might reasonably be expected of it in attempting to reconcile them, with the result that this measure—largely a compromise—is now submitted to us; but it is my belief, Mr. President, that the most indispensable feature of this bill is the provision known as section 56, and I shall vote for its retention. I have more confidence in the proposed volunteer army provision than in any other part of this bill, and it is for that reason that I should regard its rejection as most unfortunate.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. President, I always listen with delight to the Senator from New York [Mr. O'GORMAN], even when I differ from him in opinion. I, of course, share the common human weakness of listening with still more delight when I agree with him in opinion. I am glad he said what he has said. He has made it unnecessary for many of us to say a great deal that we otherwise might have said.

The Senator from New York is right upon the main, salient point, which is the cause and occasion of this legislation. The legislation itself is a mere result; it is a mere response. The world condition brought about the response, and the cause, the European war, the legislative American result. The cause is this, that when nations are engaged, as the Senator from New York says, in a world war, each one really or fancied in defense of its very existence, its liberties, and its peculiar institutions, they do pay no attention to neutrals unless neutrals have something whereby they can make them pay attention. That need not be dwelt upon. Everybody knows it. Nobody but a fool ignores it. It might be uttered a priori and left there.

But just to take one phase of this war in Europe. We were disputing here three or four or five or six weeks ago about whether a belligerent warship had a right without warning to sink an unarmed belligerent merchant ship upon the high seas, which belong to no nation, but belong to all the civilized world. It looked as if we were about to bring that argument to a peaceful conclusion. Within the last week, however, things have gone so far beyond that that it has ceased to be the main issue. Within that time not alone unarmed belligerent ships but unarmed neutral ships have been ruthlessly, unwarned destroyed upon the high seas with the human freight which they carried and with the material freight which they carried. We are negotiating. Negotiating! What an empty phrase! Why, nothing more? Simply because we have nothing with which to back up our talk and our note writing.

I differ from the Senator from New York about one thing. He says he "expects no trouble; he looks for none, but it may possibly occur." I tell you that as surely as the sun comes up to-morrow morning, unless this country puts itself in a condition where it can resist and withstand bullying, we are going to have trouble with the successful party in this European war unless we surrender the positions which we have diplomatically taken and tamely submit to the rule which the victor may lay down to our demands for compensation or indemnity. We have in one case, where our women and children were murdered on the high seas, demanded a disclaimer, a disavowal, and an apology. Have you any idea that you are going to get either in your present condition of naval and military strength? What are you going to do if you do not get it? If the administration withdraws from its position, from all the enemies of the administration, from all of its political opponents, from many of its friends—and the administration is at this time the Government of the United States—there will come up the cry "the administration knows how to write notes, but it does not know how to do anything to follow up its notes." The stupidity of Congress on the one side or its cowardice on the other will be laid on the President. That is a matter of importance to the entire country, but it is a matter of especial importance to those of you upon this side of the Chamber and to the constituents who, as Democrats, sent you here.

There is no use, Mr. President, upon this or upon any other occasion of burying your head in the sand like an ostrich, and then, because you temporarily *will* not see anything, declaring that nothing exists. This European war is going from bad to worse. It is starving peoples, killing peoples, maiming peoples, bankrupting peoples.

The desperation of motive on each side to win is increasing from day to day. You have got one of two pathways to take. Either simply say, "We will let it all go as a part of the illness of the time," pay no attention to it, excuse it because of the cardinal facts of human nature which have provoked it; or else, upon the other hand, you must stand out as the predominant neutral nation of the world and insist upon neutral rights, and especially upon neutral rights as against those acts of barbarism which destroy American life—even lives of women and little children. You can take the one path or you can take the other; but you can not, with self-respect, take any path between the two. You may quote the Scriptural injunction that when a man slaps one of your cheeks you should turn the other or you may accept the ordinary human idea, which is that when a man slaps one of your cheeks you will slap one of his; or, at any rate, if you do not, you will make him apologize for slapping yours, and give him time to do it; which is a gentlemanly method of procedure, but for the fact that in individual cases you are temporarily too angry to resort to the gentlemanly method. Individually you can not for lack of patience; but, thank God, a nation can. Yes; it can; but if, after patience is exhausted, what then? A nation can always demand an apology, a disavowal, a disclaimer; but after that what? Supine submission or a fight? You may pursue one or the other course.

So I differ with the Senator from New York [Mr. O'GORMAN] when he says that "there is not the slightest danger" of our being provoked into war. That there is not the slightest danger of the English people upon the one side and ours upon the other, or of the German people upon the one side and ours upon the other, wanting war with one another is almost a platitude, is a truism; but that little by little, as the passions of men are aroused and as provocation succeeds provocation, you will reach the point when we must, in response to European contempt and bullying, do something or supinely lie down I have no doubt. Nor have I any doubt that you can avoid all of that by letting the world see that you foresee it and that you are getting ready. You do not have to be completely ready to avoid it. You just have to show your teeth; but your teeth you must show.

I agree with the Senator from New York; I want the Regular Army increased to the point that it is increased in this bill. I want the militia strengthened to the point that it is increased in this bill, although I have my doubts, if the question could even be brought up before a judicial tribunal, as to whether or not we could legally exercise some of the powers that we insinuate in this bill. Still, I am willing to chance it; and I am willing, if possible, to make out of the militia of the several States an efficient, or comparatively efficient, instrument for the national defense. I am especially in favor of section 56 of this bill.

What are these men under section 56? In the first place, remember they are "volunteers." You gentlemen from my own section of the country, please remember that. They are not conscripts. They can not be "called into the service" originally by the President of the United States. They are volunteers. They call themselves into the service, and after they call themselves they become, and then only become, subject to the President's orders. They are volunteers.

Why, Mr. President, I find that it has been said during this debate, in substance, that "if a man should be elected President who had no sense of the race issue," and of its vital importance in the preservation of white civilization in a part of this country, and who was "politically antagonistic to the white man," and wanted to make the "nigger" and the nigger's civilization—if there be any—supreme, he could use section 56 of this bill to organize "nigger" regiments, and mobilize them for military training "in every congressional district of every State of the South."

Now, just think a moment! A man must volunteer to go to these drills, which under the committee amendment are to last "not more than 30 days," in a whole year. I hope, by the way, before the consideration of the bill is concluded, to amend the amendment by making it 90 days. But say he shall go at not more than 30 days. Now, he is to "volunteer." Can those of you who have a sense of humor, from Texas and Georgia and Alabama and Louisiana and Mississippi, imagine a lot of plantation darkies volunteering to go to Plattsburg and drill 30 days or 90 days, and lose their crops of cotton and corn, and hire somebody while they are gone to take care of their one mule

or their two mules or their three mules, their cow and their calf, or their three cows and two calves, or whatever it may be?

The excited imagination of Macbeth, harassed by the memory of crime, evoked the picture of Banquo, and he carried on conversations with him; but that was not any more remarkable than expecting the negroes to overcome white supremacy in the South by "a Plattsburg drill."

Whether or not the negro is going to carry his mule with him, to be certain he is fed while he is gone, I do not know, but if he left him behind and trusted to another darky to feed him he would probably find his poor old mule either sold or mortgaged when he came back.

And suppose that there was a drill ground, akin in its nature to that of Plattsburg, started in my own State, let us say, and that a lot of darkies did volunteer to go to it; what would happen? Why, the white men who had gone as volunteers would go home before enlistment—disgusted; and they would leave the 15 or 20 darkies in Mississippi that might be able to go and willing to go in sole possession of the camp. The darky would have to be able to go, first, financially, and then he would have to be willing. Now, what would that willingness and that going involve in a State like Mississippi?

Suppose a lot of darkies went into Hinds County, to a so-called Plattsburg drill, as a voluntary force of some sort, and, with arms in their hands, began to be disciplined, so that in the opinion of the white people of the State they became a source of menace to white civilization, what would happen to those volunteer darkies? Echo answers, "What?" And do you suppose the darky does not know that? He knows it better than any other human being on the surface of this globe.

Mr. President, I believe that the future, the civilization, the intelligence, the industrialism, the agriculture, the education, the morality of the South depends absolutely upon white political and social supremacy; and whenever I see anything that really threatens that supremacy I shall resist it. I would resist it not only by my voice here, but by my vote at home, and I would not only resist it by my voice and by my vote, but I would resist it, if absolutely necessary, at the sacrifice of my life, which does not amount to very much anyhow. But you can not scare me *every day in the week* with "a nigger in the woodpile" unless the nigger is in the woodpile. [Laughter.] You can not frighten me to death *every day* with merely alleging that a nigger is in the woodpile, especially if I know the woodpile, and I know that there are not enough sticks of wood in the woodpile for the darky to hide under, as in this case. You might do that once a year—on April 1—not oftener.

I have heard but one real, solid objection made to section 56, and that was made, or rather intimated, in a private conversation between the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. CLAPP] and me, by him, and that was that it looked as if this soldier under section 56 were a sort of "aristocratic citizen" soldier. There is some color of that about it, because the men who go to these drills expect to support themselves, and will pay out twice as much while they are there as the Government will pay them, or probably five times as much. That objection I can understand; but the other objection—to wit, that a poor darky could go there and take possession of the Plattsburg camp or other camps like it and from that vantage ground threaten white civilization—I confess I do not understand. That any President of the United States could draft the darky into Plattsburg camps for political purposes is, of course, mere moonshine. Nobody will contend that a man could be gotten into these volunteer camps by any volition in the world except his own. He must first *want* to go, and then he must go; and then, in order to go, he must not only be willing to go but *financially able* to go. How far from home? Five hundred to a thousand miles. Watch Amos and Sambo going that trip! Watch their welcome by the so-called aristocrats when they get in camp! The welcome of greasers at Columbus, N. Mex., would not be a patching to it.

Mr. President, one additional word upon a subject not exactly cognate to this:

I do not quite agree with the Senator from New York [Mr. O'GORMAN] that the provision in this bill for the increase of the Regular Army is not sufficient. I think it is. I think our difference of opinion grows out of the fact that he regards, as the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. LODGE] seems, from what he said the other day, to regard, the Army as our "first defense." I not only do not regard it as our first defense, but I do not regard it as our main defense, nor our chief defense. It may be right now our immediate defense. That is a different proposition. Just in our present state of naval unpreparedness

I am willing to vote for a greater increase to the Regular Army than I would vote for if we were in a state of naval preparation. By the way, I apologize to the Senate for using the words "preparedness or unpreparedness." I meant lack of naval preparation. I just fell into it by contagion. If we had sufficient naval preparation, I would not vote as much addition to the Army as I shall vote for in this bill. But now, when it comes to your naval bill—and it is going to come to it pretty soon—I am going to vote for every proposition that increases the Navy over and above what any proposition before the House or the Senate fixes it at.

This Government, great and rich and abundant in wealth, in ingenuity, in industrialism, in enterprise, can, if it wishes to do so, build 12 dreadnaughts and 20 battle cruisers and 100 submarines and the adequate number of transports and auxiliaries in a single year. You need not tell me you can not do it. When this country had a third of its present population, at the outbreak of the Civil War, and did not have one-twentieth of its present wealth and great industrial establishments, when the Federal Government was put to it, it did in the way of naval preparation in one year what everybody had prophesied could not be done in 10 years; and we can do it again.

Every shipyard in this country, private and public, ought to be put to work building ships of the several desired types, so that at the end of this war in Europe, which will last from one to two years longer—it can not last much longer than two years more without universal bankruptcy—we shall be ready not to whip on land any force which may be sent against us but to sink at sea any force that may be started against us. Aye, more than that, not even to sink at sea any force that will be started against us, because if we have the ships, and the world knows we have them, none will be started. Aye, even still more, we will be ready to still the bullying voice of menace before it dares even to take a diplomatic stand, before it dares to threaten an ultimatum, much less to issue one. You will save more money in what you do not have to spend for war at sea and war on land if you let war come by overweakness at home, encouraging overconfidence and aggression abroad—five times over—than the amount of money that you would spend now to go into this thing in the right, wholesale way and be done with it. What would you lose?

Say you make up a program for 10 years wherein to build up an irresistible fleet—or not an irresistible fleet, either. I do not mean that; I mean a fleet which can resist anything else, which can defend the country. Suppose that is your 10-year program. Suppose, on the contrary, you do it all in one or two years. What have you lost? Merely the interest on your money; that is all. You have lost the interest upon one-tenth of your money for 1 year, upon nine-tenths of your money for 9 years, and upon ten-tenths of it for 10 years—merely the interest upon your money; that is all—and the United States can borrow money at from 3 to 3½ to 4 per cent. Now why, merely for the sake of the interest charge, postpone to 1920 or 1921 that which you can have completed in 1918? And why, in the meanwhile, my friends, piddle around in a quarrel between the National Guard and the Plattsburg Camp? Tweedledum and tweedledee! What does it all amount to? If there is any virtue in either one, let us have both. If there is virtue in neither, let us have neither. But you get up here and debate with one another, spend precious time, one gentleman holding the affirmative and another the negative upon the proposition:

Resolved, That the National Guard is greater than the Plattsburg drill.

That is what you are doing. You have been at it two weeks, and you must remember meanwhile that this is the august, deliberative assembly which is celebrated in its own opinion for its wisdom. You are talking about the National Guard and Plattsburg, when the main thing in the whole bill is the national defense, and the piece de resistance is the increase in the Regular Army.

It reminds me of something I cut out of this evening's issue of the Washington Star, which I will read in a minute, and it reminds me of it not only on that account but upon this account—that when you want advice, when you want to cure an evil about anything, you ought to go to the man who knows something about it—first the evil, then the remedy—and ought not to take a monkey wrench and try to attend to the job yourself, unless you understand both the mechanism and use of the monkey wrench. That means that the thing that is needed first should be discovered and then afterwards, if we have got to consult with somebody, we should consult with "somebody who knows." In this case the people who know are our men in the Regular Army and our men in the Navy, and if they do not know

we do not stand any chance internationally anyhow. If the men we have educated and equipped for war purposes are to be set aside by men who have been educated and equipped for peace purposes when war questions are involved, then this Nation is gone anyhow and there is no use talking about it. This is what Walt Mason wrote:

My watch wouldn't work worth a dime; it was always a fortnight too slow; instead of recording the time, it monkeyed around, to and fro.

[Laughter.]

I do not mean any disrespect to the Senate by reading that—

The mainspring seemed out of repair; it traveled by spasms and jerks; so I sat me right down in a chair and studied the watch and its works.

I might sit me down in a chair and study naval and military propositions for a week and I would not know very much about them, although I attended a military school for two years and did learn some little things under a set of tactics that have been succeeded since by another set.

But to continue the reading:

I took it apart with a wrench and studied the levers and gears, all piled in a heap on a bench; I studied and wiggled my ears. I put the wheels back in the case and shook them to give them a shock, but the hands didn't go round the face, and the works didn't tick nor yet tock. I asked of the plumber advice, and counsel I asked of the judge, consulted the dealer in ice—and still the blamed works wouldn't budge. "Methinks," I remarked, "and I wist, I must go to the jeweler's shop." He gave it three twists of the wrist, and the watch went along like a top. That plan's kept me down in the past—

It has kept this Nation down—

a plan that is doubtless the worst; I always reserve till the last the thing I should tackle at first.

Mr. President, I see nothing in this bill to threaten public liberty or life in peace, or the pursuit of happiness, which I love better than either. I see nothing in it to threaten the Constitution, for even if we are insinuating certain powers over the militia or National Guard which we do not clearly and indubitably possess the United States Supreme Court can correct it. I think that is a doubtful point. I do not think the unconstitutionality is clear. If so, on my oath I must and would oppose it. I see nothing in it to threaten the sovereignty of the State of Mississippi. I see nothing in it to threaten "the supremacy of the white man's civilization." I shall therefore vote for it. I shall later on offer an amendment to section 56, which will be in order before the amendment itself is voted upon, to change the period of annual drill from "30 days" to "90 days," so that there may be a period of 90 days at most, mind you, because the bill now says "not more than 30," and it will then read "not more than 90."

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE.

A message from the House of Representatives, by J. C. South, its Chief Clerk, requested the Senate to return to the House the bill (H. R. 13006) to authorize the reconstruction of an existing bridge across the Wabash River at Silverwood, in the State of Indiana, and the maintenance and operation of the bridge so reconstructed.

The message also announced that the House had passed the following bills and joint resolution:

S. 585. An act conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Claims to hear, determine, and render judgment in claims of the Sisseton and Wahpeton Bands of Sioux Indians against the United States;

S. 707. An act for the relief of Beverly E. Whitehead;

S. 922. An act for the relief of Mary E. Nicolson;

S. 1048. An act for the relief of Warren E. Day; and

S. J. Res. 80. Joint resolution authorizing the Secretary of War to receive for instruction at the United States Military Academy, at West Point, René W. Pintó y Wentworth, a citizen of Cuba.

The message further announced that the House had passed the following bills, in which it requested the concurrence of the Senate:

H. R. 1024. An act for the relief of Allen M. Hiller;

H. R. 1373. An act for the relief of W. W. Wall;

H. R. 1592. An act for the relief of George W. Trahey;

H. R. 1609. An act for the relief of S. L. Burgard;

H. R. 1636. An act for the relief of Karen S. Sorenson and James Lyle;

H. R. 2052. An act for the relief of the estate of William D. Allen;

H. R. 2535. An act for the relief of A. H. Rebentish;

H. R. 2554. An act for the relief of Mrs. Joseph Cameron;

H. R. 2555. An act for the relief of the Minnesota & Ontario Power Co.;

H. R. 2814. An act for the relief of George W. Gamble;

H. R. 3794. An act for the relief of Thomas S. Johnson;

H. R. 3895. An act for the relief of F. W. Schultz;

H. R. 4866. An act for the relief of Julia R. Goodloe;
H. R. 5262. An act for the relief of John B. Hoover;
H. R. 5411. An act for the relief of Olaf Nelson;
H. R. 5453. An act for the relief of the State Board of Harbor Commissioners of the State of California;
H. R. 7062. An act for the relief of Erskine R. Hayes;
H. R. 7239. An act for the relief of Philip H. Heberer;
H. R. 7417. An act for the relief of Lawrence J. Kessinger;
H. R. 8068. An act for the relief of E. C. Hornor;
H. R. 8108. An act for the relief of the legal representatives and heirs of Elizabeth Bruce, deceased, widow of the late John H. Bruce;
H. R. 8325. An act for the relief of Borden H. Mills;
H. R. 9353. An act for the relief of Ira G. Kilpatrick and Guy D. Dill;
H. R. 9898. An act for the relief of John E. Jones;
H. R. 9994. An act for the relief of Samuel H. Walker;
H. R. 10049. An act for the relief of Capt. Harvey H. Young;
H. R. 10052. An act to reimburse J. T. Nance;
H. R. 10641. An act for the relief of Fred Henderson;
H. R. 10642. An act for the relief of Louis Jones;
H. R. 10643. An act for the relief of Theodore Bagge;
H. R. 10791. An act for the relief of the occupants of the Tittle town site;
H. R. 11261. An act for the relief of Mary S. Corbin;
H. R. 11262. An act for the relief of Mrs. C. D. Corbin;
H. R. 11304. An act for the relief of Martha A. Moffitt;
H. R. 11939. An act for the relief of William Guy;
H. R. 12248. An act for the relief of the estate of Mary H. S. Robertson, deceased; and
H. R. 13064. An act for the relief of the M. A. Sweeney Ship-yards & Foundry Co.

ENROLLED BILL SIGNED.

The message also announced that the Speaker of the House had signed the bill (S. 4671) to exempt from cancellation certain desert-land entries in Riverside County, Cal., and it was thereupon signed by the Vice President.

PETITIONS AND MEMORIALS.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN presented a memorial of sundry citizens of Marshfield, Oreg., remonstrating against the enactment of legislation to limit the freedom of the press, which was referred to the Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads.

He also presented a petition of sundry citizens of Pendleton, Oreg., praying for national prohibition, which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

He also presented a petition of sundry citizens of Portland, Oreg., praying for Federal censorship of motion pictures, which was referred to the Committee on Education and Labor.

He also presented memorials of sundry citizens of Oregon, remonstrating against the enactment of legislation for compulsory Sunday observance in the District of Columbia, which were ordered to lie on the table.

Mr. DILLINGHAM presented petitions of sundry citizens of Vermont, praying for national prohibition, which were referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. McLEAN presented petitions of sundry citizens of Connecticut, praying for national prohibition, which were referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

He also presented a petition of the Chamber of Commerce of Hartford, Conn., praying for Federal aid to vocational education, which was ordered to lie on the table.

He also presented petitions of sundry citizens of Hartford and Stafford Springs, in the State of Connecticut, praying for Federal censorship of motion pictures, which were referred to the Committee on Education and Labor.

Mr. THOMAS presented petitions of sundry citizens of Colorado, praying for national prohibition, which were referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

He also presented a petition of the East Side Woman's Christian Temperance Union, of Colorado Springs, Colo., praying for the adoption of an amendment to the Constitution granting the right of suffrage to women, which was ordered to lie on the table.

He also presented petitions of sundry citizens of Colorado, praying for the creation of a system of rural credits, which were ordered to lie on the table.

Mr. MARTINE of New Jersey presented memorials of sundry citizens of Trenton, Burlington, Lambertville, and Rancocas, all in the State of New Jersey, remonstrating against the enactment of legislation for compulsory Sunday observance in the District of Columbia, which were ordered to lie on the table.

He also presented memorials of sundry citizens of Atlantic City, Pleasantville, Northfield, and Egg Harbor City, all in the

State of New Jersey, remonstrating against the enactment of legislation to limit the freedom of the press, which were referred to the Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads.

He also presented petitions of sundry citizens of Atlantic City, Hackensack, and Manasquan, all in the State of New Jersey, praying for national prohibition, which were referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. WARREN presented a memorial of Dutch Flat Grange, No. 11, Patrons of Husbandry, of Lander, Wyo., remonstrating against an increase in armaments, which was ordered to lie on the table.

He also presented a petition of Dutch Flat Grange, No. 11, Patrons of Husbandry, of Lander, Wyo., praying for Government ownership of telegraph and telephone systems, which was referred to the Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads.

He also presented a petition of sundry citizens of Thermopolis, Wyo., praying for national prohibition, which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. OLIVER presented petitions of sundry citizens of Pittsburgh, Pa., praying for the extension of military training in civil educational institutions, which were referred to the Committee on Military Affairs.

He also presented memorials of sundry citizens of Pennsylvania, remonstrating against the enactment of legislation to limit the freedom of the press, which were referred to the Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads.

He also presented memorials of sundry granges of Pennsylvania, remonstrating against an increase in armaments, which were ordered to lie on the table.

He also presented petitions of sundry granges of Pennsylvania, praying for Government ownership of telephone and telegraph systems, which were referred to the Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads.

He also presented petitions of sundry citizens of Pennsylvania, praying for national prohibition, which were referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

He also presented a memorial of the Coke Producers' Association, of Uniontown, Pa., remonstrating against the enactment of legislation to further restrict immigration, which was referred to the Committee on Immigration.

Mr. WILLIAMS presented a memorial of sundry citizens of Jackson, Miss., remonstrating against the enactment of legislation to limit the freedom of the press, which was referred to the Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads.

Mr. HUGHES presented petitions of sundry citizens of New Jersey, praying for national prohibition, which were referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. BURLEIGH presented petitions of sundry citizens of Maine, praying for national prohibition, which were referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. WADSWORTH presented petitions of sundry citizens of New York, praying for national prohibition, which were referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

He also presented memorials of sundry citizens of New York remonstrating against the enactment of legislation for compulsory Sunday observance in the District of Columbia, which were ordered to lie on the table.

Mr. CLARK of Wyoming presented petitions of sundry citizens of Wheatland and Thermopolis, in the State of Wyoming, praying for national prohibition, which were referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. PHELAN presented a petition of the Twentieth Century Club, of Berkeley, Cal., praying that an appropriation of \$300,000 be made for the improvement of the Yosemite National Park and for the creation of a national-park service, which was referred to the Committee on Appropriations.

He also presented a petition of the Christian Endeavor Union of Los Angeles, Cal., praying for prohibition in the District of Columbia, which was ordered to lie on the table.

He also presented a petition of Local Lodge No. 148, International Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, and Helpers Union of America, of Vallejo, Cal., praying for the enactment of legislation to further restrict immigration, which was referred to the Committee on Immigration.

He also presented petitions of sundry citizens of California, praying for national prohibition, which were referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

BILLS INTRODUCED.

Bills were introduced, read the first time, and, by unanimous consent, the second time, and referred as follows:

By Mr. OLIVER (for Mr. PENROSE):

A bill (S. 5389) granting a pension to Elise Seabel; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. REED:

A bill (S. 5390) granting a pension to Maria Gille (with accompanying papers);

A bill (S. 5391) granting a pension to James Enloe (with accompanying papers);

A bill (S. 5392) granting a pension to Hugh Kesterson (with accompanying papers);

A bill (S. 5393) granting a pension to Eliza E. Miller (with accompanying papers); and

A bill (S. 5394) granting a pension to Julia M. Anderson (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. LANE:

A bill (S. 5395) to repeal sections 2588, 2589, and 2590 of the Revised Statutes of the United States; to the Committee on Commerce.

A bill (S. 5396) granting an increase of pension to Alice L. Rix (with accompanying papers); to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. BURLEIGH:

A bill (S. 5397) granting a pension to Arthur M. Clark; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. MARTINE of New Jersey:

A bill (S. 5398) to increase the limit of cost of post-office site and building at Millville, N. J.; to the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds.

By Mr. O'GORMAN:

A bill (S. 5399) granting an increase of pension to Oliver P. Gillson; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. RANSDELL:

A bill (S. 5400) for the relief of the heirs of Mrs. Susan A. Nicholas; to the Committee on Claims.

WABASH RIVER BRIDGE.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair lays before the Senate the request of the House of Representatives to return to the House the bill (H. R. 13006) to authorize the reconstruction of an existing bridge across the Wabash River at Silverwood, in the State of Indiana, and the maintenance and operation of the bridge so reconstructed, and the Committee on Commerce will be discharged from the further consideration of the bill and the request of the House of Representatives will be complied with.

HOUSE BILLS REFERRED.

The following bills were severally read twice by their titles and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs:

H. R. 1024. An act for the relief of Allen M. Hiller; and

H. R. 10049. An act for the relief of Capt. Harvey H. Young.

The following bills were severally read twice by their titles and referred to the Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads:

H. R. 3895. An act for the relief of F. W. Schultz; and

H. R. 10052. An act to reimburse J. T. Nance.

The following bills were severally read twice by their titles and referred to the Committee on Indian Affairs:

H. R. 5262. An act for the relief of John B. Hoover; and

H. R. 11939. An act for the relief of William Guy.

The following bills were severally read twice by their titles and referred to the Committee on Public Lands:

H. R. 4866. An act for the relief of Julia R. Goodloe;

H. R. 9353. An act for the relief of Ira G. Kilpatrick and Guy D. Dill; and

H. R. 10791. An act for the relief of the occupants of the Tuttle town site.

The following bills were severally read twice by their titles and referred to the Committee on Claims:

H. R. 1373. An act for the relief of W. W. Wall;

H. R. 1592. An act for the relief of George W. Trahey;

H. R. 1609. An act for the relief of S. L. Burgard;

H. R. 1636. An act for the relief of Karen S. Sorenson and James Lyle;

H. R. 2052. An act for the relief of the estate of William D. Allen;

H. R. 2535. An act for the relief of A. H. Rebentish;

H. R. 2554. An act for the relief of Mrs. Joseph Cameron;

H. R. 2555. An act for the relief of the Minnesota and Ontario Power Co.;

H. R. 2814. An act for the relief of George W. Gamble;

H. R. 3794. An act for the relief of Thomas S. Johnson;

H. R. 5411. An act for the relief of Olaf Nelson;

H. R. 5453. An act for the relief of the State Board of Harbor Commissioners of the State of California;

H. R. 7062. An act for the relief of Erskine R. Hayes;

H. R. 7239. An act for the relief of Phillip H. Heberer;

H. R. 7417. An act for the relief of Lawrence J. Kessinger;

H. R. 8068. An act for the relief of E. C. Hornor;

H. R. 8108. An act for the relief of the legal representatives and heirs of Elizabeth Bruce, deceased, widow of the late John H. Bruce;

H. R. 8325. An act for the relief of Borden H. Mills;
 H. R. 9898. An act for the relief of John E. Jones;
 H. R. 9994. An act for the relief of Samuel H. Walker;
 H. R. 10641. An act for the relief of Fred Henderson;
 H. R. 10642. An act for the relief of Louis Jones;
 H. R. 10643. An act for the relief of Theodore Bagge;
 H. R. 11261. An act for the relief of Mary S. Corbin;
 H. R. 11262. An act for the relief of Mrs. C. D. Corbin;
 H. R. 11304. An act for the relief of Martha A. Moffitt;
 H. R. 12248. An act for the relief of the estate of Mary H. S. Robertson, deceased; and
 H. R. 13064. An act for the relief of the M. A. Sweeney Shipyards & Foundry Co.

RECESS.

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. President, I understand that one or two Senators desire to address the Senate on the pending bill, and in view of that fact I move that the Senate take a recess until to-morrow at noon.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 6 o'clock and 5 minutes p. m., Wednesday, April 5, 1916) the Senate took a recess until to-morrow, Thursday, April 6, 1916, at 12 o'clock meridian.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

WEDNESDAY, April 5, 1916.

The House met at 12 o'clock noon.

The Chaplain, Rev. Henry N. Couden, D. D., offered the following prayer:

We lift up our hearts unto Thee, O God our Father, from whom cometh our strength to resist the wrong and pursue the right as it is given us to see the right. Increase, we beseech Thee, our strength, that we may be heroes in the daily battles of life. Renew our enthusiasm, our zeal, our courage, that we may climb the heights of intellectual, moral, and spiritual attainments as individuals and as a Nation and be prepared for every emergency in the onward march of civilization. And Thine be the praise through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.

The Journal of the proceedings of yesterday was read and approved.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE.

By unanimous consent, at the request of Mr. STEELE of Pennsylvania, indefinite leave of absence was granted to Mr. DEWALT, on account of serious illness.

H. SNOWDEN MARSHALL.

Mr. WEBB rose.

The SPEAKER. For what purpose does the gentleman from North Carolina rise?

Mr. WEBB. Mr. Speaker, I rise for the purpose of presenting a matter of privilege to the House in the nature of a report and statement from the Committee on the Judiciary, which I send to the desk and ask to have read. (H. Rept. 494.)

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. WEBB, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the following report in the nature of a statement:

By direction of the Committee on the Judiciary, I beg leave to make the following report, in the nature of a statement, to the House of Representatives. On the 12th day of January, 1916, Hon. FRANK BUCHANAN, a Representative in Congress from the State of Illinois, arose in his responsible position, on the floor of the House and impeached H. Snowden Marshall, district attorney for the southern district of the State of New York, charging the said H. Snowden Marshall with numerous malfeasances and misfeasances and with corrupt and improper behavior and conduct in office, all of which charges were read by the Clerk of the House. Immediately after the reading of said charges Representative BUCHANAN offered for the immediate consideration of the House resolution 90, which provided, among other things, "that the Committee on the Judiciary be directed to inquire and report whether the action of this House is necessary concerning the alleged official misconduct of H. Snowden Marshall," etc. After debate on the resolution, the House, upon motion of Mr. FITZGERALD of New York, referred the resolution to the Committee on the Judiciary for its consideration and action.

The Committee on the Judiciary immediately began the consideration of said resolution and called Representative BUCHANAN before it to make such statement and furnish such information concerning the truth of his impeachment charges, as set out in House resolution 90, as he was able to make and furnish. Thereafter, on the 27th day of January, 1916, by direction of the Judiciary Committee, the chairman thereof offered in the House of Representatives the following resolution:

"House resolution 110.

"Resolved, That the Committee on the Judiciary, in continuing their consideration of House resolution 90, be authorized and empowered to send for persons and papers, to subpoena witnesses, to administer oaths to such witnesses, and take their testimony.

"The said committee is also authorized to appoint a subcommittee to act for and on behalf of the whole committee wherever it may be deemed advisable to take testimony for said committee. In case such subcommittee is appointed, it shall have the same powers in respect

to obtaining testimony as are herein given to the Committee on the Judiciary, with a sergeant at arms, by himself or deputy, who shall attend the sittings of such subcommittee and serve the process of same.

"In case the Committee on the Judiciary or a subcommittee thereof deems it necessary, it may employ such clerks and stenographers as are required to carry out the authority given in this resolution, and the expenses so incurred shall be paid out of the contingent fund of the House.

"The Speaker of the House of Representatives shall have authority to sign, and the clerk thereof to attest, subpoenas for witnesses, and the Sergeant at Arms or a deputy shall serve them."

The said resolution was on said date unanimously agreed to.

While further considering the House resolution 90 and the said House resolution 110, on the 31st day of January, 1916, the Committee on the Judiciary authorized the chairman to appoint a subcommittee of three to execute the purposes of House resolution 110 to act for and on behalf of the full committee wherever it may be deemed advisable to take testimony for said committee, and on February 1, 1916, the chairman appointed Messrs. CHARLES C. CARLIN, WARREN GARD, and JOHN M. NELSON as members of such subcommittee.

Thereafter the said subcommittee organized and heard the testimony of certain witnesses in the Judiciary Committee rooms in the city of Washington. The subcommittee determined, for its further information and in carrying out the duties assigned it under the resolution of the House of Representatives, that it should hear the testimony of certain other witnesses in the city of New York, and on the 28th day of February, 1916, the said subcommittee, under subpoenas duly signed and attested by the clerk thereof, caused certain witnesses to be brought before it, in the Federal post-office building in the city of New York, and continued the examination of witnesses upon said charges, up to and including the 4th day of March, 1916.

On the 3d day of March, 1916, there appeared in a New York newspaper an article containing, among other things, the following language:

"It is the belief in the district attorney's office that the real aim of the Congress investigation is to put a stop to the criminal investigation of the pro-German partisans."

On the 3d of March, 1916, the subcommittee called before it one, Leonard R. Holme, who testified to the subcommittee that he wrote the article containing the foregoing language, but when asked whether or not he conferred with anybody in the district attorney's office before the article was written replied that he had to decline to give the source of his information. The chairman of the subcommittee then propounded this question to the witness: "Did you confer with Mr. Marshall before you wrote this article," to which the witness replied, "I respectfully decline to answer the question, sir." The chairman of the subcommittee then propounded the following question to him: "Did you confer with anybody in Mr. Marshall's office," to which the witness replied, "I respectfully decline to answer that question, sir."

Whereupon the Sergeant at Arms was directed by the chairman of the subcommittee to take charge of the witness and keep him in custody until the further order of the committee. At 4:10 o'clock p. m. of the same day, the chairman of the subcommittee again propounded the foregoing questions to Witness Holme, and the following proceedings were had:

"Mr. CARLIN. Mr. Holme, the committee has directed me to order you to answer the question which was asked you. Mr. Stenographer, read the testimony of Mr. Holme.

(The entire previous testimony of Mr. Holme was read to the committee by the stenographer in the hearing of the committee only.)

"Mr. CARLIN. Mr. Holme, I hand you this article in the sixth column of page 4 of the New York Times, dated Friday, March 3, 1916. The article is headed "Marshall refuses Buchanan evidence." I now call your attention to this paragraph of the article:

"It is the belief in the district attorney's office that the real aim of the Congress investigation is to put a stop to the criminal investigation of the pro-German partisans."

"I ask you from whom you got that information?

"Mr. HOLME. That information, sir, is a deduction. I have known at the time these proceedings were begun in Washington—it was before the indictment of Congressman BUCHANAN—that there had been a considerable amount of talk around this building as to their nature. I am down here practically every day of my life, and I meet with a great many men who are connected with the district attorney's office, and who are in this building in various other regular capacities, and I based that paragraph entirely upon my knowledge of the general gossip around the building and the general feeling in the building.

"Mr. CARLIN. Why did you not state that, instead of saying it is the belief in the district attorney's office?

"Mr. HOLME. Well, sir, it comes to much the same thing, does it not? The district attorney's office is a large organization.

"Mr. CARLIN. Is that your answer?

"Mr. HOLME. Yes, sir.

"Mr. CARLIN. Did you base that part of the article upon a conference held with H. Snowden Marshall or any subordinate of his in the district attorney's office?

"Mr. HOLME. I based that article on my general knowledge of the conditions surrounding this proceeding and the general opinion floating around the building.

"Mr. CARLIN. You state that it is the general belief in the district attorney's office. Now, who in the district attorney's office expressed that belief?

"Mr. HOLME. I don't think I could give you any definite names, because I have discussed this matter with a large number of different people at various times.

"Mr. CARLIN. As a matter of fact, did anybody in the district attorney's office express that belief?

"Mr. HOLME. Yes, sir.

"Mr. CARLIN. Who?

"Mr. HOLME. I can only remember a very few, and I respectfully decline, as a newspaper man, to express their opinions, which are often given to me in general conversation.

"Mr. CARLIN. Was the belief expressed by Mr. Marshall or either of his assistants?

"Mr. HOLME. I respectfully decline to answer, sir.

"Mr. CARLIN. Mr. Stenographer, insert in the record this article which I hand you, and the date line of the paper.

"Mr. GARD. I understand you to say, Mr. Holme, that this extract which has been read to you was written by you?

"Mr. HOLME. Yes, sir.